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Abstract
The Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) protocol enables mobile nodes (MNs) to remain con-
nected to other correspondent nodes (CNs) while roaming the IPv6 Internet.
Home and correspondent registrations are essential parts of the MIPv6 proto-
col, whereby MNs register their care-of addresses (CoAs) with their home agents
(HAs) and with their CNs, respectively. Security provision for home and corre-
spondent registrations is a fundamental part of the MIPv6 protocol and has been
an open research issue since the early stages of the protocol.
This thesis examines state-of-the-art protocols for securing home and cor-
respondent registrations in MIPv6 networks. The strengths and weaknesses of
these protocols are discussed. The investigation of these protocols leads to the
proposal of an enhanced home registration protocol and a family of correspon-
dent registration protocols. The Enhanced Home Registration (EHR) protocol
extends the basic home registration protocol defined in MIPv6 to support the
location authentication of MNs to their HAs. The EHR is based on novel ideas of
segmenting the IPv6 address space, using a symmetric CGA-based technique for
generating CoAs, and applying concurrent CoAs reachability tests. As a result,
EHR is able to reduce the likelihood of a malicious MN being successful in luring
an HA to flood a third party with useless packets using MIPv6. In addition, EHR
enables HAs to help in correspondent registrations by confirming MNs’ CoAs to
CNs. Simulation studies of EHR have shown that it only introduces a marginal
increase in the registration delay, but a significant increase in the signalling over-
head as a cost of supporting the location authentication of MNs.
The thesis also proposes a family of correspondent registration protocols.
These protocols rely on the assistance of home networks to confirm the MNs’
ownership of the claimed HoAs and CoAs. The protocols consist of three phases:
a creation phase, an update phase and a deletion phase. Informal and formal
protocol analyses have confirmed the protocols’ correctness and satisfaction of
the required security properties. The protocols have been simulated extensively
and the results show that they produce lower registration delay and a reduction
in the signalling overhead during update and deletion phases. This is at the cost
of a varying increase, depending on the protocol variant, in the registration delay
and signalling overhead during the creation phase.
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Definitions
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms
The following gives the alphabetical list of terms and acronyms used in the thesis.
BA – Binding Acknowledgement; a mobility message sent by a home agent and
a correspondent node to a mobile node to acknowledge the binding of a
care-of address.
BACoT – Binding Acknowledgement with Care-of Token; a mobility message
sent by a home agent to a mobile node to acknowledge the binding of a
care-of address and deliver a fresh care-of token.
BHR – Basic Home Registration; a home registration process that allows a mo-
bile node to (de)register a care-of address with a home agent.
BU – Binding Update; a mobility message sent by a mobile node that contains
the mobile node’s home address and current care-of address.
BUCoT – Binding Update with Care-of Token; a binding update message sent
by a mobile node to a home agent, which contains a care-of token.
CA – Certification Authority; a trusted entity that issues and revokes public-key
certificates.
CGA – Cryptographically Generated Address; an IPv6 address in which the
interface identifier part is generated using a cryptographic one-way hash
function that takes the address owner’s public key and some auxiliary pa-
rameters as its input.
CN – Correspondent Node; a peer node either mobile or stationary that com-
municates with a mobile node.
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CoA – Care-of Address; a mobile node’s transient address that gives the mobile
node’s location while away from home link.
CoT – Care-of Test; a mobility message sent by a correspondent node to a mo-
bile node as a response to a Care-of Test Init message.
CoTI – Care-of Test Init; a mobility message sent by a mobile node to initiate
the return routability procedure and request a care-of keygen token from a
correspondent node.
Correspondent Registration – A process that is initialized by a mobile node
to notify a correspondent node about the mobile node’s current location
while away from home link.
DAD – Duplicate Address Detection; a test for checking whether an address is
already in use.
EHR – Enhanced Home Registration; an enhanced home registration protocol
that supports the location authentication of mobile nodes to their home
agents, see Chapter 4.
HA – Home Agent; a router located on a mobile node’s home link with which
the mobile node has registered one of its current care-of addresses.
HoA – Home Address; a mobile node’s permanent address that identifies the
mobile node in its home link.
Home Registration (HR) – A process that is initialized by a mobile node to
notify a home agent about the mobile node’s current location while away
from home link.
HoT – Home Test; a mobility message sent by a correspondent node to a mobile
node as a response to a Home Test Init message.
HoTI – Home Test Init; a mobility message sent by a mobile node to initiate
the return routability procedure and request a home keygen token from a
correspondent node.
INF-based protocol – A correspondent registration protocol for use when no
prior relationship exists between mobile nodes’ home links and correspon-
dent nodes.
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IPSec – Internet Protocol Security; a set of protocols that provides security to
IP and upper-layer protocols.
IPSec AH – IPSec Authentication Header; a member of the IPSec protocol
suite, which is used to protect the authenticity and integrity of an IP packet.
IPSec ESP – IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload; a member of the IPSec
protocol suite, which is used to protect the confidentiality, authenticity,
and integrity of an IP packet.
LT – Binding Lifetime; a lifetime for the binding of home and care-of addresses
of a mobile node.
MIPv6 – Mobile IPv6; an IP-layer mobility protocol that enables mobile nodes
to remain connected to other correspondent nodes while roaming the IPv6
Internet.
MN – Mobile Node; a mobile device that has a home link and a permanent
home address on that link. It can change links and maintain reachability
using its home address.
PK-based protocol – A correspondent registration protocol for use when a
mobile node’s home link has a certified public/private key pair.
PKI – Public-Key Infrastructure; an infrastructure including all entities involved
in managing public-key certificates.
Public-key certificate – A digital document, issued and digitally signed by a
CA, that binds the name of a public-key owner to his public key.
RO – Route Optimization; a mode of communication that allows packets to be
routed directly between a mobile node and a correspondent node.
RR – Return Routability; a procedure that is currently used to protect corre-
spondent registrations in the Mobile IPv6 protocol.
SA – Security Association; a bundle of algorithms and keys that is used to spec-
ify parameters controlling security operations in IPSec.
SK-based protocol – A correspondent registration protocol for use when a se-
cret key is shared between a mobile node’s home link and a correspondent
node.
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Notation
The following notation has been used throughout the thesis.
KI Entity I’s secret key (a secret random value generated and
only known by I).
KI−J A secret key shared between entities I and J.
(PKI , SKI) Entity I’s public/private RSA key pair.
KBM A binding management secret key.
KBC A binding confirmation secret key.
ENCK(x) A ciphertext of a data item x encrypted with key K.
DECK(x) The inverse function of encryption function ENCK(x), i.e. it
denotes decryption of ciphertext x using key K.
SIGI(x) Entity I’s signature on a data item x.
H(x) A collision-resistant one-way hash function, such as SHA1.
MACK(x) A keyed hash function using key K, such as HMAC SHA1.
LTBReq A binding lifetime requested by a mobile node.
LTBRem A remaining lifetime for the binding of home address and
care-of address at the mobile node and the home agent.
NI A fresh random nonce generated by an entity I.
CGA
Parameters
Auxiliary parameters used in generating a CGA-based ad-
dress; they include a 128-bit random number (called a mod-
ifier), an eight-bit number (called a collision count), and a
64-bit subnet prefix of the CGA-based address.
x || y Concatenation of data items x and y.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The rapid growth in the number of wireless Internet devices combined with a
desire of the users of these devices to remain connected to the Internet lead to
the development of IP-based mobility protocols. These protocols allow mobile
Internet hosts (called mobile nodes (MNs)) to remain connected to other hosts
(called correspondent nodes (CNs)) while roaming the Internet. However, as will
be shown, these protocols also add inherent security risks to those already in the
Internet today. Most of these risks are introduced from redirecting traffic intended
for an MN from one address to another. The signalling for such redirection
requires protection. If not protected, it can have detrimental effects on the entire
Internet [1]. The need to reduce vulnerabilities can be seen by examining existing
attacks that have been launched on Internet devices.
1.1 Network Security Threats and Attacks
A security threat can be informally defined as an entity or program with the
capability to cause harm or distort normal security operations by exploiting vul-
nerabilities in a system [2, 3]. In these papers, five types of threats to computer
networks are identified:
• Errors and omissions: comprising of network errors, system faults and omis-
sions. They cause harms to the system, or create vulnerabilities in the system
and can be caused by all types of users (novice and expert users).
• Deliberate software threats: comprising of network worms, viruses, Trojans
and denial of service.
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• Insider threats: comprising of disgruntled employees and threats from legit-
imate users of the systems.
• Cyber-threats: comprising of terrorism, political warfare, organised crimes,
phishing, and pharming.
• Natural disaster: comprising of fire, flooding, earthquakes, and hurricane.
Figure 1.1: Dollar amount losses due to security threats [4]
Figure 1.1 shows the losses in US dollars caused by different types of threats
obtained from CSI/FBI crime survey [4]. As shown, viruses topped the list;
however, other new types of threats, such as Cyber-threats, are beginning to
emerge. These types of threats accounted for a significant amount of dollar losses
compared to previous years.
1.2 IP-based Mobility Protocols
IP-based mobility protocols aim to achieve two goals: first, allow MNs to be
reachable as long as they are connected somewhere to the Internet, and second,
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maintain ongoing connections between MNs and their CNs. These goals are
achieved by assigning an MN two IP addresses: a permanent home address (HoA)
that identifies the MN in its home link and a transient care-of address (CoA) that
gives the MN’s location while away from its home link. The HoA remains the
same during movements and the CoA changes every time the MN changes its IP
connectivity. When the MN moves to a foreign link and configures a new CoA,
it initiates a home registration process to register the CoA with a router in its
home link (called a home agent (HA)). This registration allows the HA to create
a binding for the MN between its HoA and its CoA. Using this binding, the HA
intercepts all packets on the home link destined for the MN’s HoA and forwards
them through a tunnel to the MN’s registered CoA, i.e. to the MN’s current
location [5, 6, 7, 8]. Thus, via the HA’s binding for the MN, the MN is reachable
at any location on the Internet using its CoA, and its ongoing connections are
maintained using the HoA.
IP-based mobility protocols also define a correspondent registration process
that allows an MN to register its CoA with a CN. The correspondent registration
improves routing (called route optimization (RO)) by enabling packets to be sent
directly between the MN and the CN. The correspondent registration is voluntary
in the sense that either the MN or the CN can refuse to do it, and they can
continue communicating via the MN’s home link [5].
In the home/correspondent registration, the MN sends the HA/CN a mobility
message called a ‘Binding Update (BU)’ that contains the MN’s HoA and current
CoA. The HA/CN first stores this binding in its binding cache, which indicates
packets destined to that HoA should be forwarded/sent to the bound CoA. The
HA/CN then replies to the MN by returning a ‘Binding Acknowledgement (BA)’
mobility message that acknowledges the binding of the current CoA.
The BUs sent from MNs during home and correspondent registrations, i.e. the
location management feature of IP-based mobility protocols, are obviously very
sensitive; they modify routing to enable mobility in the network. By spoofing
BUs, an attacker can divert traffic to itself or to another node and prevent the
original MN from receiving the traffic destined to it. This opens up possibilities
for many attacks, discussed later in Section 2.2.1, such as denial of service, man-
in-the-middle, connection hijacking, and impersonation attacks [5, 9]. Therefore,
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the biggest security vulnerability of IP-based mobility protocols is the authenti-
cation and authorization of BUs sent from MNs. Consequently, a security provi-
sion for home and correspondent registrations is a fundamental part of IP-based
mobility protocols. It is believed that the deployment of an IP-based mobility
protocol without securing home and correspondent registrations could result in a
breakdown of the entire Internet [1].
The current specifications of IPv6-based mobility protocols use IPSec Encap-
sulating Security Payload (ESP) [10] to protect home registrations and a Return
Routability (RR) procedure to protect correspondent registrations [5, 11]. In ad-
dition, sequence numbers are used within BUs and BAs to protect against replay
attacks. IPSec and sequence numbers can protect home registrations against out-
sider attacks, i.e. an attacker cannot send a spoofed or a replayed BU message
instead of the MN. They can also partially protect against insider attacks, i.e.
the MN cannot send a BU on behalf of another MN that is using the same HA.
However, they fail to prevent the MN from lying about its current location, i.e.
the MN might provide a false CoA to the HA and thus redirect data to this
address.
The RR procedure does not provide sufficient protection for correspondent
registrations. Furthermore, it is inefficient as it requires the exchange of six
messages and takes about 1.5 round-trip times between the MN and the CN to
complete one correspondent registration. The procedure checks the MN’s reach-
ability at both the HoA and the CoA. In the procedure, the CN generates and
sends two secret keys as plaintext to the MN’s home and care-of addresses. The
MN and the CN use the two keys to establish a session key that is used to pro-
tect the subsequent correspondent registration. However, an attacker that can
capture both the keys can generate the session key and successfully impersonate
the MN. As a result, the procedure only reduces the number of attackers from
any node in the Internet to those that are on the route between the CN and
the MN’s home link. In addition, the procedure increases signalling overhead
and registration delay as it requires six messages and about 1.5 round-trip times
per correspondent registration. Other protocols, discussed later in Chapter 3,
were proposed to overcome the RR’s limitations and to protect correspondent
registration; however, they also have their limitations in terms of needing a secu-
rity infrastructure, increasing registration delay, increasing signalling overhead,
and/or increasing load at MN side.
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The limitations of the solutions currently used to protect home and corre-
spondent registrations have motivated the research described here to investigate
ways of improving security provisions for home and correspondent registrations
in IPv6-based mobility protocols.
1.3 Research Hypotheses
Existing work on securing home registrations fails to protect against legitimate
MNs behaving maliciously. A malicious MN could pretend to own a third party’s
address and lure an HA to flood that victim with useless packets. Similarly, ex-
isting solutions for securing correspondent registrations do not provide sufficient
protection and/or cause high registration delay and signalling overhead. As men-
tioned above, securing home and correspondent registrations are a fundamental
part of the deployment of IP-based mobility protocols without the breakdown of
the entire Internet.
The first hypothesis of this research is that it is possible to improve home
registrations to support location authentication of MNs to their HAs. This could
be achieved by cryptographically configuring an MN’s CoA based on a secret key
shared between the MN and an HA, and by applying a concurrent CoA reachabil-
ity test. By doing so, the HA could verify authenticity of the CoA and verify the
MN’s reachability at the CoA with a marginal increase in the registration delay.
In addition, this could enable HAs to participate in correspondent registrations
by confirming MNs’ CoAs to CNs.
The second hypothesis is that an efficient and secure correspondent registra-
tion could be achieved by involving HAs in the registration (to confirm MNs’
HoAs and CoAs) and by designing the registration to occur in three phases: a
creation phase, an update phase and a deletion phase. The authentication of an
MN and a home link to a CN, and the establishment of registration session keys
could be done when they do not impact registration delay. They could take place
in the creation phase where the MN and the CN communicate through the MN’s
home link. In addition, by using these session keys in the update and the deletion
phases, the security strength of the correspondent registration could be increased
and the registration delay and signalling overhead could be reduced.
The third hypothesis is that all stationary hosts, such as popular web servers,
could be protected against different attacks caused as a side effect of the location
25
1.4. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES
management feature of IP-based mobility protocols by finding a way to differen-
tiate between redirectable and non-redirectable IP addresses. This could prevent
attackers from falsely claiming that stationary hosts’ addresses are their HoAs or
CoAs. Consequently, it could significantly reduce possible attacks that could be
launched due to IP-based mobility protocols.
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives
The aim of this research is to improve the security as well as the efficiency of
home and correspondent registrations in IP-based mobility protocols. To restrict
the scope of the discussion, this thesis is limited to an improvement in the Mobile
IPv6 (MIPv6) mobility protocol. The reasons for this are threefold. Firstly, to
support the rapid growth of the Internet, it is expected that IPv6/MIPv6 will
replace the current IPv4/MIPv4 in the next few years. Secondly, MIPv6 is the
base for all IPv6-based mobility protocols; other IPv6-based mobility protocols
such as Fast Handover Mobile IPv6 [6] and Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 [8] are ex-
tensions of MIPv6 that improve handover latency. Thirdly, simulation packages
such as NS-2 and OPNET [12, 13] implement MIPv6, and thus could be used to
simulate and evaluate existing solutions as well as the proposed solutions.
In order to achieve this aim, the objectives of this thesis are as follows.
1. To thoroughly understand the security and performance needs of home and
correspondent registrations;
2. To identify weaknesses in the existing solutions for securing home and cor-
respondent registrations;
3. To overcome the weaknesses and to advance the state of the art by designing
an enhanced home registration protocol that supports location authentica-
tion of MNs to their HAs, i.e. allows HAs to verify MNs’ ownership of
claimed CoAs;
4. To overcome the weaknesses and to advance the state of the art by designing
a family of correspondent registration security protocols that could be used
in different scenarios depending on the relationship between MNs’ home
links and CNs;
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5. To perform security analysis and performance evaluation of the designed
protocols. This will show improvements offered and identify any negative
impacts of the designed protocols.
1.5 Research Method
It was possible to identify the following key tasks that need to be completed as
part of the research project.
1.5.1 Literature Review
The first task was to study the general area of interest. In the context of this
project, a starting point of addressing the issues related to IP-based mobility was
given. From this, MIPv6 protocol was selected as an IPv6-based mobility proto-
col that will be used in the next few years to support mobility in the Internet.
The next point was to identify security risks that could be launched by applying
the MIPv6 protocol. The security and performance requirements of home and
correspondent registration processes used in the MIPv6 protocol were then identi-
fied. Related existing work was identified and reviewed against the requirements.
Gaps where further work was necessary were identified. Design hypotheses based
on state-of-the-art work were identified, and theoretical work on designing pro-
tocols based on the hypotheses could start. From this, the area of securing home
and correspondent registrations was identified as the field of research. At this
point, the literature review was not finished; reviewing relevant literature carried
on throughout the project. As new work was published, this too was reviewed
and where necessary taken into account.
1.5.2 Theoretical Work
Upon the initial intensive literature review, solutions for the issue of providing
security to home and correspondent registrations in MIPv6 protocol were iden-
tified. The ideas were repeatedly refined by taking input from existing work.
Considerations were given to minimising any additional overheads incurred by
the proposed solutions. At the conclusion of this stage, two novel protocols were
proposed. The first protocol was the Enhanced Home Registration (EHR) proto-
col and the second was a family of correspondent registration security protocols.
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1.5.3 Security Analysis
On completion of the design stage, the next stage was to verify the security of
the proposed protocols. The security analysis strategy included three methods:
informal analysis, formal analysis and comparison with related work. The in-
formal analysis was used to analyse the proposed protocols against the security
requirements and risks identified in the literature review stage. The formal anal-
ysis was used to provide a rigid and thorough means of testing the correctness of
the proposed. The formal analysis was carried out using both the framework of
protocol composition logic [14, 15] and the Casper/FDR2 model checker [16, 17].
Finally, a comparison of the proposed protocols and their most relevant work was
done to demonstrate the merits of the security (and performance) they provide
over the related work.
1.5.4 Simulation Modelling
After the security analysis stage, the next stage was to evaluate the performance
of the proposed protocols. Evaluation was carried out using the OPNETTM Mod-
eler version 14.5 simulation package [13]. The first step was to design and con-
struct the simulation models. Once the simulation models were constructed, they
were validated. Validation was performed by driving a mathematical model of a
simplified simulation model and comparing the simulated results with the results
obtained from the mathematical model. In addition, the OPNET debugger was
used to prove that the proposed protocols operate correctly by outputting dif-
ferent processes carried out by all involved entities, and by outputting relevant
packet information, i.e. source address, destination address, packet contents, and
packet size. Once the validation was complete, the simulation models could be
run with confidence that they were accurate.
1.5.5 Evaluation
When simulation was completed, the last stage was to process the results and
produce graphs. These graphs were used to compare the performance of the
proposed protocols with that of the most related existing work. Conclusions were
then drawn from these comparisons.
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1.6 Achievements and Novel Contributions
The research work presented in this thesis has led to the following achievements
and novel contributions:
1. The design of a novel symmetrical CGA-based technique to cryptograph-
ically generate and verify an IPv6 address. It makes use of a secret key
shared between the participants, i.e. address owner and address verifier, in
the address generation and verification processes. As a result, it reduces
the computational and communication costs of the participants compared
to the traditional CGA-based technique, which requires digital signature
generation and verification processes. This in turn resulted in the suit-
ability for use by MNs to configure new CoAs and by HAs to verify the
authenticity of those CoAs. It aims to reduce the likelihood of a malicious
MN being successful in stealing a third party’s address by forcing the MN
to attempt about (261) tries to be able to produce the same address.
2. The design of a novel concurrent CoA reachability test that allows an HA
to register and use an MN’s new CoA while concurrently verifying the MN’s
reachability at that CoA. This test has no effect on the registration delay
as it runs parallel to data transfer to and from the new CoA. It also allows
the HA to make use of a secret key, called the ‘node key’, to produce tokens
sent to the MNs. This enables the HA to verify that the token returned
by the MN is indeed its own without forcing the HA to remember a list of
all tokens it has handed out. In addition, the test allows the HA to limit
the number of BUs that can be received from unreachable CoAs, which
prevents malicious MNs from bypassing the test by continuously sending
BUs without involving the test. Even though a concurrent CoA reachability
test is not entirely new in the MIPv6 context, this is the first concurrent
CoA reachability test between HAs and MNs that incorporates the node
key concept, is able to prevent malicious MNs from bypassing the test, and
has no effect on the registration delay.
3. The proposal of a novel method of segmenting IPv6 address space to dif-
ferentiate between redirectable and non-redirectable IPv6 addresses. The
method uses two bits of the IPv6 64-bits interface identifier field to distin-
guish between redirected-from addresses (i.e. MNs’ HoAs), redirected-to
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addresses (i.e. MNs’ CoAs), and non-redirectable addresses (i.e. stationary
hosts’ addresses). This method needs to be deployed on a global scale on
the IPv6 Internet to be able to protect stationary hosts, as well as other
MNs located at their home links, against attacks that could be launched
via abuse of current and future mobility protocols.
4. The design of a novel home registration protocol called the Enhanced Home
Registration (EHR) protocol. It incorporates the novel symmetrical CGA-
based technique, the novel concurrent CoA reachability test, and the novel
segmenting IPv6 address space method mentioned above to allow HAs to
verify MNs’ ownership of claimed CoAs without incurring a negative impact
on registration delay. The protocol introduces a marginal increase in the
registration delay, but a significant increase in the signalling overhead as a
cost of supporting location authentication of MNs.
5. The design of a family of novel correspondent registration security protocols
that rely on the assistance of an MN’s home link to enable a CN to securely
authenticate an MN’s ownership of a HoA and a CoA. The protocols can
be used in different scenarios depending on the relationship between MNs’
home links and CNs:
− SK-based protocol for use when a secret key is shared.
− PK-based protocol for use when the home link has a certified pub-
lic/private key pair.
− INF-based protocol for use when no prior relationship exists.
The protocols are designed in three phases: a creation phase, an update
phase and a deletion phase, where most of the authentication and keys
establishment take place in the creation phase (while the MN and the CN
communicate through the MN’s home link). By carrying out authentication
and keys establishment in the creation phase, and by using these keys in
the update and deletion phases, security strength is increased and registra-
tion delay is reduced. In addition, the protocols oﬄoad computational and
communication to the home link from the MN, thus reducing computing
and memory requirements as well as power consumption for the MN.
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6. Security and performance evaluation of the proposed protocols. Specifically,
(a) informal analysis of the protocols against the security requirements and
well-known attacks; (b) formal verifications of the security properties using
the framework of protocol composition logic and the Casper/FDR2 model
checker; and (c) evaluation of the performance of the protocols using OP-
NET simulation package, which has been compared to that of related work.
Parts of the research work presented in this thesis have been published in the
following conference proceedings.
1. Osama Elshakankiry, Andy Carpenter and Ning Zhang. A New Secure
Binding Management Protocol for Mobile IPv6 Networks, In Proceeding of
the 4th International Symposium on Information Assurance and Security
(IAS08), IEEE CS Press, Naples, Italy, September 2008, pp. 281-286.
2. Osama Elshakankiry, Andy Carpenter and Ning Zhang. A Novel Scheme
for Supporting Location Authentication of Mobile Nodes, In Proceeding
of the Second International ICST Conference on Security and Privacy in
Mobile Information and Communication Systems (MobiSec2010), LNICST,
Catania, Italy, May 2010, pp. 91-102.
1.7 Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the current specification
of the Mobile IPv6 protocol; it defines the basic home registration and the return
routability procedure, which are currently used to protect home and correspon-
dent registration processes, respectively. It also presents the security risks and
attacks and outlines the security services that define the security requirements
for securing home and correspondent registration processes. Chapter 3 gives a
survey of state-of-the-art protocols relevant to the protection of the correspon-
dent registration process. The strengths and weaknesses of these protocols are
then identified.
Chapters 4 to 6 present our novel research work, contributions, and results.
Chapter 4 presents the design, implementation and performance evaluation of our
EHR protocol. This chapter includes the efficiency analysis and the performance
comparison of the proposed EHR protocol with the basic home registration proto-
col. Chapter 5 presents the design of a family of novel correspondent registration
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security protocols. Chapter 6 presents the security analysis and performance eval-
uation of the protocols proposed in Chapter 5. The security analysis is conducted
both informally against requirements and attacks, and formally using both proto-
col composition logic and Casper/FDR2 model checker. Again the performance
of the protocols are measured and compared with the most related existing pro-
tocols. A brief description of the methods chosen for formal verification of the
protocols’ security properties is also provided. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the
thesis and suggests directions for future work. A brief introduction to the basic
cryptographic techniques that are used in the design of home and correspondent
registration protocols is given in Appendix A. Full details of simulation model
validation and formal protocol verification are also presented in the appendices.
A brief introduction to the OPNET Modeler simulation package and the Cryp-
toSys Cryptography Toolkit that are chosen for performance evaluation is also
given.
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Chapter 2
The Mobile Internet Protocol
version 6 (Mobile IPv6)
This chapter gives an insight into the current specification of the Mobile IPv6
protocol. In detail, Section 2.1 presents an overview of the protocol, its main
components, and the two possible modes of communications allowed between
an MN and a CN. Section 2.2 details security risks and attacks that could be
launched via abuse of the location management feature of the protocol. It also
presents the security services and performance requirements needed to overcome
these attacks. Section 2.3 gives an overview of the Internet Protocol Security
(IPSec), which is currently used to protect control traffic between MNs and HAs.
Section 2.4 is devoted to the description of the basic home registration process
included in the protocol, which enables an MN (while away from home link) to
register its current location with an HA. It also analyses the security services
provided by the protocol to the process against the requirements specified in
Section 2.2. Section 2.5 presents a detailed description of the return routability
(RR) procedure included in the protocol to protect correspondent registrations. It
also identifies the security and performance limitations of the procedure against
the requirements specified in Section 2.2. Finally, Section 2.6 summarises the
chapter.
2.1 Basic Operations
Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) is an IP-layer mobility protocol for the IPv6 Internet [5].
It is designed to allow a mobile node to always be reachable with one address,
33
2.1. BASIC OPERATIONS
i.e. a home address, regardless of the mobile node’s actual location. It also
makes it possible for the mobile node to maintain existing connections with other
correspondent nodes across different locations.
The MIPv6 protocol introduces three network entities: a mobile node (MN),
a home agent (HA) and a correspondent node (CN). The MN is a mobile device
that has a home link and a permanent home address (HoA) on that link. The MN
also acquires one or more transient care-of addresses (CoAs) when it roams to
some foreign link. The HA is a router located on an MN’s home link with which
the MN has registered one of its current CoAs. The HA maintains registrations
of the MNs that are away from home and their current CoAs. In addition, when
the MN is away from home, the HA intercepts packets on the home link destined
for the MN’s HoA and forwards them to the MN’s registered CoA. The CN is
a peer node that communicates with an MN. The CN may be either mobile or
stationary, and it does not have to be aware of the MIPv6 protocol.
In order for an MN to receive data packets destined for its HoA while away
from home, it must register one of its current CoAs with an HA on its home link.
When the MN moves to some foreign link, it automatically detects its movement
using the Router Discovery protocol [18]. In addition, the MN automatically
obtains a new CoA corresponding to the subnet prefix of the foreign link using
either stateless or stateful address auto-configuration [19, 20]. The MN may have
multiple CoAs at the same time with different subnet prefixes (e.g. in the case
of overlapping wireless networks). The MN registers one of its current CoAs
with the HA by running a home registration process. The MN initiates the home
registration by sending a Binding Update (BU) message to the HA, which contains
the MN’s HoA and CoA. The HA stores this binding, i.e. association between the
HoA and the CoA, in its Binding Cache (which will be explained later in greater
detail). Using this binding, the HA intercepts and forwards packets destined for
the HoA to the bond CoA. The HA concludes the home registration by returning
a Binding Acknowledgement (BA) message to the MN to acknowledge the binding
of the CoA. The MN’s CoA registered at the HA is called the MN’s primary CoA.
There are different ways for an MN to communicate with a CN. While the
MN is at home, all traffic between the MN and the CN is routed to and from the
HoA using the normal IPv6 routing mechanisms [21], i.e. no special procedure is
required. When the MN is away from its home link, two modes of communication
are possible: bidirectional tunnelling and route optimization. In the bidirectional
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tunnelling mode, all traffic is routed indirectly via the MN’s home link. In detail,
this means packets from the CN are routed to the MN’s home link where the
HA intercepts and forwards them through a tunnel to the MN’s CoA. Packets
to the CN are tunnelled from the MN to the HA (‘reverse tunnelled’) and then
routed normally from the home link to the CN. Tunnels between MNs and HAs
are normally performed using IPv6 encapsulation [22]. However, when these
tunnels need to be secured, they are replaced by IPSec tunnels. The bidirectional
tunnelling mode is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Bidirectional tunnelling communication
The route optimization (RO) mode allows packets to be routed directly be-
tween the MN and the CN, as shown in Figure 2.2. This mode requires the CN to
be aware of the MIPv6 protocol and the MN to register its current location with
the CN. The registration is performed by running a correspondent registration,
in which the MN and the CN exchange BU and BA messages. As a result, the
CN creates a Binding Cache entry and stores the binding between the MN’s HoA
and CoA. Subsequently, the CN sends all packets destined for the MN to its CoA
instead of its HoA. The RO mode allows the presumably shorter path between
the MN and the CN to be used and minimizes traffic levels at the HA as well as
at the home link [23].
In order for the optimized route to be used, two new types of routing headers
are included in the MIPv6 protocol: the ‘Home Address Destination Option’
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header and the ‘Type-2’ header. When routing a packet directly to the CN,
the MN uses its CoA as the source address and includes its HoA in a ‘Home
Address Destination Option’ header. The header indicates that although the
source address is the CoA, the packet is actually from the node whose address is
the HoA. After receiving the packet, layer 3 at the CN replaces the source address
with the HoA before passing the packet to the upper layer protocol. Similarly,
when routing a packet directly to the MN, the CN sets the destination address to
the MN’s CoA and includes the MN’s HoA into the ‘Type-2’ header. The header
indicates that although the packet is destined for the CoA, it is really intended
for the HoA. When the MN receives the packet, layer 3 at the MN replaces the
destination address with the HoA before passing the packet to the upper layer
protocol. Thus, through the use of the two new headers, the MIPv6 operation
and the use of the CoA are transparent to the upper layer protocol, as far as the
upper layer protocol is concerned, and the HoA is used for all communications.
Figure 2.2: Route optimization communication
The MIPv6 protocol also defines a new mobility header called the ‘Alternate
Care-of Address’. This header may be used to hold the MN’s CoA in BU messages
sent by the MN. Normally, a BU message specifies the CoA in the source address
field of the IPv6 header. However, the MN may specify a different CoA by
including it in the ‘Alternate Care-of Address’ header. When the ‘Alternate
Care-of Address’ header is included in the BU message, the recipient must use it
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as the CoA for the binding rather than using the source address of the message
as the CoA. This header is provided for use when the MN wishes to register a
CoA that cannot be used as a topologically correct source address, when the MN
wishes to deregister its CoA with a CN while it is away from home, or when the
security mechanism used does not protect the IPv6 header.
The MN maintains a list called ‘Binding Update List’. This list specifies all
of the bindings that the MN has or is trying to establish with CNs. The binding
with the MN’s HA is stored in the list as well. The MN uses this list to determine
whether packets for a specific CN should be sent directly to the CN or tunnelled
via the HA. The list is also used to determine to whom the MN should send BU
messages when roaming to another link. On the other hand, both the HA and
the CN maintain a ‘Binding Cache’ of the accepted bindings received from other
MNs. The Binding Cache at the CN allows it to send packets directly to the
MN’s CoA. The HA uses its Binding Cache to determine which MNs it is serving
as a home agent.
2.2 Security and Efficiency of Binding Updates
The location management feature of the MIPv6 protocol makes it possible for an
attacker to send a spoofed BU message to an HA and/or to a CN. By spoofing
BUs, the attacker can launch different types of attacks including session hijacking,
man-in the-middle (MITM), and denial-of-service (DoS) [9]. This section exam-
ines the security and efficiency of BUs used in MIPv6 protocol. Section 2.2.1 first
presents security risks and attacks imposed by the introduction of the binding
feature of the MIPv6 protocol. Section 2.2.2 then describes security services that
should be provided to prevent such attacks, and the performance requirements
that should be considered while providing these security services.
2.2.1 Security Risks and Attacks
Most of the attacks introduced by the binding feature of the MIPv6 protocol
cause inappropriate bindings that misinform other entities (HAs and CNs) about
the location of an MN, making them redirect traffic intended for the MN to a
wrong destination. The attacks can be summarized as follows [5, 9]:
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• Malicious MNs flooding attacks. A legitimate MN sends a spoofed BU
message to an HA and/or a CN. In the spoofed message, the MN sets the
home address to its own HoA and the care-of address to a victim node’s ad-
dress, falsely claiming that it has moved to the victim’s location. As a result,
the HA/CN would redirect all subsequent packets, which should otherwise be
delivered to the MN itself, to the victim’s address, flooding the victim with
excessive unwanted data. This is shown in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: A malicious MN flooding attack
• False Binding Update attacks. An attacker impersonates another (mobile)
node and sends a spoofed BU message. As a result, the attacker would redirect
traffic destined for the original (mobile) node to itself (or to a third node). This
is shown in Figure 2.4 and can be summarized as follows:
− Session hijacking attacks. The attacker sends a spoofed BU, in which
the home address is set to the (home) address of a victim (mobile) node,
and the care-of address is set to the attacker’s address. In this way, the
attacker can hijack existing connections and launch DoS attacks against
the victim (mobile) node as packets destined for the (mobile) node will
be directed elsewhere. This is shown in Figure 2.4(a).
− Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. The attacker sends a spoofed BU, in
which the home address is set to the (home) address of a victim (mobile)
node, and the care-of address is set to the address of a victim third node.
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In this way, the attacker can launch DoS attacks against both of the victim
(mobile) node and the victim third node. This is shown in Figure 2.4(b).
− Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks. The attacker sends spoofed
BUs to two CNs in order to set itself as a MITM between them. This is
shown in Figure 2.4(c).
Figure 2.4: False Binding Update attacks
• Return-to-home spoofing attacks. An attacker claims to be an MN that
is currently away from its home link. The attacker starts a communication
with a CN and sends a spoofed BU in which the home address is set to the
(home) address of a victim (mobile) node, and the care-of address is set to the
attacker’s address. The attacker next starts to download a heavy stream of
data, such as video streaming, from the CN. The attacker then sends a spoofed
BU to remove its Binding Cache entry at the CN, claiming that it has returned
to the home link. As a result, the CN sends subsequent traffic to the victim’s
address, flooding the victim with excessive unwanted data.
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• Replay attacks. An attacker replays a BU that an MN had sent earlier to an
HA or to a CN. Consequently, the HA (or the CN) redirects subsequent traffic
to the MN’s old location. This causes DoS attacks to both of the MN and the
node (if any) that is currently located at that location.
• Resource exhaustion DoS attacks. A security protocol that could be used
to protect BUs may increase the participants’ vulnerability to resource exhaus-
tion DoS attacks. An attacker may exploit the protocol features to exhaust
memory and/or computing resources of a CN. The attacker can flood the CN
with BUs that cause it to perform computationally expensive cryptographic
operations or to create a lot of states in its memory.
It is expected that the correspondent functionality of MIPv6 will be deployed
in most IPv6 nodes. In addition, the addresses of MNs are indistinguishable
from those of stationary ones. Thus, the above attacks are applicable to the
whole Internet. The attacker can be anywhere on the Internet and all Internet
nodes are potential targets. To summarise, both BUs exchanged between an MN
and its HA and between an MN and its CN in MIPv6 protocol need protection.
Otherwise, the MN and the CN are vulnerable to DoS, MITM, impersonation,
and hijacking attacks. Third parties are also vulnerable to DoS attacks.
2.2.2 Security Services and Performance Requirements
In order to minimise and address the security risks and attacks discussed above,
the following security services should be provided [5, 9]:
• Authentication
The authentication service provides assurance that a BU message has originated
from the entity that owns the claimed home and care-of addresses. Authenticating
a home address ensures that the entity is authorized to create a binding for that
home address. In addition, authenticating a care-of address ensures that the
entity is indeed located at that care-of address.
• Integrity
The integrity service ensures that the received BU message contains the same
binding data as sent.
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• Freshness
The freshness service prevents attackers from replaying a previously authenticated
BU message.
• Resource exhaustion DoS resistance
The resource exhaustion DoS resistance protects CNs against memory and CPU
exhaustion DoS attacks. A CN should set a limit on the amount of resources used
for managing locations of MNs. The CN also should not retain any state about
individual MNs until it receives an authentic BU from that MN, i.e. the honesty
of the MN is proved. Furthermore, the CN should use computationally inexpen-
sive cryptographic operations to authenticate the MN, or should delay expensive
operations (if any) until the MN provides some assurance of its honesty.
In addition, the following performance requirements should also be considered
while providing the above security services [24]:
• Cost-effective operation at MN
The MN’s capabilities should be considered through minimising the operational
load at the MN. The operational load includes:
− Computational cost: the number of computationally expensive cryptographic
operations performed by the MN.
− Communication cost: the number and length of messages sent/received by
the MN.
• Support delay-sensitive application
The delay introduced as the result of securing BUs should be considered. A longer
delay may significantly impact delay-sensitive applications.
2.3 Internet Protocol Security (IPSec)
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) is a standard framework for securing IP com-
munications. IPSec is a set of protocols that provides security to IP and upper-
layer protocols for secured exchange of IP packets [25, 26]. It provides two types
of security algorithms: symmetric ciphers for encryption, and keyed one-way hash
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functions for authentication and integrity. It can be used to provide data confi-
dentiality, data integrity, data authenticity, and optional anti-replay protection.
IPSec supports two modes of operation: transport mode and tunnel mode.
The transport mode protects the payload and upper-layer headers of each IP
packet. In this mode, an IPSec header is inserted between the IP header and the
upper-layer protocol header. On the other hand, the tunnel mode protects the
entire IP packet. In this mode, the entire IP packet to be protected is encapsulated
in a new IP packet and an IPSec header is inserted between the outer and inner
IP headers.
IPSec has two basic protocols to provide security: IPSec Authentication
Header (IPSec AH) [27] and IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload (IPSec ESP)
[10]. The IPSec AH is used to protect the authenticity and integrity of an IP
packet with a keyed cryptographic hash value. The proof of authenticity and
integrity is based on the possession of a secret key that is used to calculate a
MAC value for the IP packet. Figure 2.5 depicts the IPSec AH header format.
The ‘Next Header’ field identifies the type of transport protocol used in the up-
per layer. The ‘Payload Length’ field specifies the length of AH header. The
‘Reserved’ field is reserved for future use and must be set to zero. The ‘Secu-
rity Parameter Index (SPI)’ field, in combination with the destination IP address
and security protocol (IPSec AH), uniquely identifies the Security Association
(SA) for this datagram. The ‘Sequence Number’ field contains a monotonically
increasing counter value (sequence number). Finally, the ‘Authentication Data’
field is a variable-length field that contains the Integrity Check Value (ICV) for
the attached packet (including the AH header itself).
Figure 2.5: IPSec AH header format
Figure 2.6 depicts the coverage of the authentication protection for IPSec
AH in transport mode and in tunnel mode. The ICV is computed first at the
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transmitter by the use of a keyed one-way hash function that is also known to the
receiver. Then, the ICV is recomputed at the receiver and compared to match
the received value for authentication integrity. The ICV computation excludes
values of the IP header that are subject to change during transmission such as
time-to-live, flags, and header checksum.
Figure 2.6: IPSec AH authentication protection
The IPSec ESP can provide confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and op-
tional anti-replay services to the IP packets it is protecting. Figure 2.7 depicts
the IPSec ESP header and trailer format. The IPSec ESP header consists of
‘Security Parameter Index (SPI)’ and ‘Sequence Number’ fields that are exactly
the same as in IPSec AH. The IPSec ESP trailer consists of three fields. The
‘Padding’ field is used to adjust the size of the plaintext (consisting of the Pay-
load Data, Pad Length, and Next Header, as well as the Padding) to the size
required by the encryption algorithm used. The ‘Pad Length’ field contains the
number of pad bytes inserted by the encryption algorithm. The ‘Next Header’
field is the same as in IPSec AH. The figure also shows the ‘Authentication Data’
field, which contains the ICV computed over the packet and the ESP header and
trailer (not including the authentication data itself). This field is optional and is
included only if the authentication service is required.
Figure 2.8 depicts the protection coverage of authentication and encryption
for IPSec ESP in transport mode and tunnel mode. The ESP header is inserted
in exactly the same way as the AH header. The ESP trailer is inserted after the
payload data and before the ESP authentication data. The ICV computation
steps are the same as in IPSec AH.
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Figure 2.7: IPSec ESP header, trailer, and authentication data format
Figure 2.8: IPSec ESP authentication and encryption protection
IPSec uses Security Associations (SAs) to specify parameters controlling se-
curity operations. The SAs are represented through data records stored in the
communicating entities that contain parameters such as encryption and authenti-
cation algorithms, secret keys, IPSec mode (transport or tunnel), IPSec protocol
(AH or ESP), and so forth. SAs can be set up manually or by a security as-
sociation and key-management protocol that performs an entity authentication.
SAs are unidirectional, so two SAs have to be set up for secured bi-directional
communication. IPSec can provide anti-replay protection only if dynamic keying
is used. The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is the most widely adopted proto-
col for SA negotiation and keying material provisioning [28, 29]. It uses either
pre-shared secrets or public keys for authenticating IPSec, negotiating security
services and generating shared keys.
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2.4 Standard Home Registration
Home registration is a process that is initialized by an MN to inform an HA
about the MN’s current location. It is performed through the use of BU and BA
mobility messages. When the MN roams away from the home link, it initiates the
process to request the HA to serve as the home agent for its HoA by registering
its current CoA with the HA. The process also allows the MN to update the
HA with the MN’s new CoA after roaming to a new foreign link, to extend the
lifetime of a registration that is about to expire, or to delete a registration after
returning to the home link.
Security provision for home registrations is a fundamental part of the MIPv6
protocol to avoid the various attacks stated in Section 2.2.1. The MN uses services
of the HA and they belong to the same administrative domain. Thus, it is
assumed that the MN and the HA know each other in advance and can use a
pre-shared secret (or other authentication infrastructure such as certificates) to
establish a bidirectional IPSec Security Association (SA), which can be then used
in protecting home registrations. As a result, the base specification of the MIPv6
protocol [5] uses IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [10] and sequence
numbers to protect control traffic between MNs and HAs [11]. The control traffic
includes BU and BA mobility messages, and is carried by the Mobility Header
protocol in IPv6 [21]. A home registration process is shown in Figure 2.9 and can
be summarised as follows [5].
An MN initiates a home registration by sending a BU mobility message to an
HA. The BU message contains the MN’s HoA, the MN’s current CoA, a sequence
number, and a binding lifetime request. The MN must include its current CoA in
the new ‘Alternate Care-of Address’ mobility header even if the CoA appears as
the source address of the BU message. That is because IPSec ESP in transport
mode does not protect the IPv6 header. To protect against replay attacks, the
MN sets the sequence number to a value that is greater than the value sent in
the previous BU to this HA (if any). In addition, if the purpose of the BU is
to delete the MN’s binding entry at the HA, the MN will set the CoA equal
to its HoA and the binding lifetime request to ‘zero’. Finally, if the MN does
not receive a valid matching BA message within a retransmission interval of
one second, the MN will resend the BU message to the HA. The retransmission
interval is doubled upon each retransmission, until either a matched response is
received or the retransmission interval reaches a maximum retransmission interval
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of 32 seconds. At this point, if there is only one HA in the home link, the MN
will continue to periodically retransmit the BU message at this slower rate until
acknowledged. Otherwise, the MN will reinitiate the home registration by instead
trying a different HA.
When the HA receives the BU message, it authorizes the sender of the mes-
sage, and verifies the authenticity, integrity, and freshness of the message. The
HA first authorizes the sender of the BU to ensure that it is actually authorized
to create a binding for the claimed HoA. This authorization is meant to prevent
an MN from using its SA to send a BU on behalf of another MN that is using
the same HA and is provided by using the claimed HoA in identifying the IPSec
SA that must be used. The HA next uses the identified IPSec SA to verify the
authenticity and integrity of the BU message. The HA then uses the sequence
number enclosed in the BU to check the freshness of the message, i.e. the HA
confirms that the given sequence number is greater than the sequence number
carried in the last valid BU from this HoA (if any).
If all verifications are positive, i.e. the received BU message is valid, the HA
will decide whether it needs to perform a Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
test [20] for the MN’s HoA. The HA runs the DAD test for a given HoA only if
it does not have an existing Binding Cache entry for that HoA. The DAD test is
done to ensure that no other node on the home link is using the MN’s HoA when
the BU arrives.
If the DAD test succeeds (or if there is no need to perform the DAD test),
the HA will create, update, or delete a Binding Cache entry for the received
HoA. If the BU deletes an existing binding entry, the HA will delete any existing
entry in its Binding Cache for this HoA and will stop intercepting packets on
the home link that are addressed to the HoA. In addition, the HA will return
an accepted BA message to the MN acknowledging the deletion of the binding.
If the BU creates a new binding entry or updates an existing one, the HA will
store the CoA and sequence number carried in the BU message and will grant
a binding lifetime in its Binding Cache entry for the given HoA. The granted
binding lifetime is set by the HA depending on the binding lifetime requested
in the BU and on the remaining valid lifetime for the subnet prefix of the given
HoA. The HA determines the remaining valid lifetime for this prefix based on
its own Prefix List entry [18]. The HA then sends an accepted BA message to
the MN acknowledging the binding of the CoA. The BA message contains the
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MN’s HoA, the granted binding lifetime, a sequence number that is equal to the
sequence number enclosed in the BU, and optionally, a binding refresh advice.
The binding refresh advice, which must be shorter than the granted binding
lifetime, may be included in the BA message suggesting the MN refresh its home
registration at this shorter interval.
On the other hand, if any of the above verifications is negative or if the DAD
test fails, the HA will reject the binding and will reply with a BA message in
which the status field is set to a value indicating the rejection of the binding and
the cause of the rejection.
Figure 2.9: Home registration
Upon receiving the BA message from the HA, the MN identifies the IPSec
SA that must be used. The MN next verifies the authenticity and integrity of
the BA message. The MN then verifies that the sequence number enclosed in the
BA matches the sequence number sent by the MN to this HA as maintained in
the corresponding Binding Update List entry. If any of the above verifications
is negative, the MN will discard the BA message without any further action.
Otherwise, the MN will examine the status field of the message. If the status
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field indicates that the BU was accepted, then the MN will stop retransmitting
the BU and will update the corresponding entry in its Binding Update List to
indicate that the BU has been acknowledged. In addition, if the given granted
binding lifetime is less than the requested binding lifetime sent in the BU being
acknowledged, the MN will subtract the difference between these two lifetime
values from the remaining binding lifetime. On the other hand, if the status field
indicates that the BU was rejected, then the MN will take steps to fix the error
and retransmit the BU with a new sequence number.
The use of the IPSec ESP protocol and sequence numbers can partially protect
home registrations against the attacks mentioned in Section 2.2.1. Specifically, it
can prevent attackers from sending spoofed or replayed BU messages. In addition,
it can prevent a legitimate MN from sending a BU on behalf of another MN that is
using the same HA. However, as it cannot authenticate the claimed CoA, it cannot
prevent a legitimate MN from lying about its current location by providing a false
CoA and thus causing the HA to redirect traffic to this address. This weakness
was previously ignored as the MIPv6 protocol assumed that an MN could only
register one CoA, and if the MN cheated the HA with a fake CoA then the MN
would lose the communication with the HA, thus losing its mobility. However,
recent research [30, 31] has suggested that MNs could be multi-homed. In such
a scheme, a multi-homed MN can (1) have multiple HoAs connected to different
home links, and (2) bind a HoA to multiple CoAs. As a result, the MN may cheat
one or more of its HAs with victim addresses while maintaining mobility through
other HAs. If this cheating is successful, it is possible for the cheated HAs to
flood the victims located at the fake CoAs with unwanted packets. Therefore,
the home registration must enable HAs to verify the authenticity of the claimed
CoAs to prevent these attacks.
2.5 Standard Correspondent Registration
Correspondent registration is a process that is initialized by an MN to notify a
CN about the MN’s current location while away from home link. It is performed
through the use of a return routability (RR) procedure and a registration, an
exchange of a BU message and an optional BA message. When the MN receives
a tunnelled packet from its HA, it infers that the CN that sent the original
packet is unaware of the MN’s current location. Therefore, the MN may initiate
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the process to inform the CN of its location. The process also allows the MN to
update and/or delete binding information in the CN.
The purpose of the RR procedure is to assure the CN that the MN is able
to receive messages sent to the claimed HoA as well as the claimed CoA. It is
also used to establish a session key between the MN and the CN, which is used
to protect the subsequent registration. The RR procedure consists of two tests:
a home address test and a care-of address test. The MN can initiate the two
tests simultaneously by sending a Home Test Init (HoTI) message and a Care-of
Test Init (CoTI) message to the CN. The CoTI message is sent directly to the
CN, while the HoTI message is ‘reversed tunnelled’ from the MN to the HA,
which then forwards it to the CN. The CN responds to the HoTI message by
sending a Home Test (HoT) message containing a secret home keygen token.
The HoT message is addressed to the MN’s HoA and is forwarded by the HA to
the MN’s current CoA. In addition, the CN responds to the CoTI message by
sending a Care-of Test (CoT) message containing a secret care-of keygen token.
The CoT message is routed directly to the MN’s CoA. If the MN really owns
both addresses, it will receive the two tokens from which it can compute a session
key. The session key is used by the MN and the CN to protect subsequent BU
and BA messages. The correspondent registration for updating a CN with an
MN’s location while away from the home link is shown in Figure 2.10 and can be
summarised as follows.
• Steps 1 and 2:
After the MN has completed a home registration, it can initiate a correspondent
registration with a specific CN. The MN first creates a Binding Update List entry
for the CN and sets it in a ‘Route Pending’ state. The MN then sends a HoTI
message to the CN (via the home link) requesting a home keygen token, where
HoTI = {Src=HoA, Des=CN, Cookie1}. At the same time, the MN also sends a
CoTI message directly to the CN requesting a care-of keygen token, where CoTI
= {Src=CoA, Des=CN, Cookie2}. The cookies, Cookie1 and Cookie2, are 64-bit
random numbers generated by the MN. The MN stores the cookies at the list
entry and compares them later with the responses from that CN to verify that
responses match with requests.
• Steps 3 and 4:
Upon receiving a HoTI message, the CN generates a home keygen token (Token1)
and sends a HoT message to the MN (via the home link). Specifically, the CN
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Figure 2.10: Standard correspondent registration - including the RR procedure
first selects a home nonce NI that is identified by a home nonce index I. The CN
next generates the home keygen token, i.e. Token1 = First (64, HMAC SHA1
(KCN , (HoA || NI || 0))), where || denotes string concatenation; KCN is a secret
random value generated and only known by the CN (CN’s key); ‘0’ is a single zero
octet that is used to distinguish home keygen and care-of keygen tokens from each
other; HMAC SHA1 ( ) denotes a keyed hashing MAC scheme using hash function
SHA1; and First (n, M) denotes the first n bits of message M. The CN then
sends out the HoT message to the MN’s HoA, i.e. HoT = {Src=CN, Des=HoA,
Cookie1, Token1, I}. The HA intercepts the HoT message and forwards it to the
MN’s registered CoA via a secure tunnel.
Similarly, upon receiving a CoTI message, the CN first generates a care-of
keygen token (Token2), i.e. Token2 = First (64, HMAC SHA1 (KCN , (CoA ||
NJ || 1))), where NJ is a care-of nonce that is selected by the CN and identified
by a care-of nonce index J. The home and care-of nonces, i.e. NI and NJ , may
be the same. The CN then sends out a CoT message directly to the MN, i.e.
CoT = {Src=CN, Des=CoA, Cookie2, Token2, J}. The home and care-of nonce
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indices, i.e. I and J, will be returned later by the MN to remind the CN of which
nonce value is used in generating Token1 and Token2.
The KCN is a 160-bit random number generated by the CN. It is called the
‘node key’ and is used to produce the keygen tokens sent to the MNs. The KCN
is not shared with any other entity, i.e. it is known only to the CN. Generating
tokens using KCN allows the CN to verify that the keygen tokens used by the MN
in authorizing a BU are indeed its own without forcing the CN to remember a list
of all tokens it has handed out. The KCN can either be a fixed value or regularly
updated. An update of KCN can be done at the same time as an update of a
nonce, e.g. NI , so that the index I identifies both the nonce and the key. A CN
can generate a fresh KCN at any time; this avoids the need for secure persistent
key storage for KCN .
• Step 5:
Upon receiving a HoT or a CoT message, the MN uses the CN’s address, i.e. the
source address of the message, as an index to search its Binding Update List. If
a list entry is found with a ‘Route Pending’ status, the MN will verify that the
cookie enclosed in the message matches the cookie sent by the MN to this CN as
maintained in the list entry. If no entry is found (or if the matched entry is not
in a ‘Route Pending’ status), the MN will discard the received message without
any further action. Otherwise, the MN will record the given keygen token and
nonce index in the list entry and wait for the second message. When the MN
receives both the HoT and CoT messages, it hashes the two tokens together to
form a 160-bit binding management key KBM , i.e. KBM = SHA1 (Token1 ||
Token2). KBM is the shared secret key established between the MN and the CN
via the RR procedure. The MN then sends a BU message to the CN, i.e. BU =
{Src=CoA, Des=CN, HoA, CoA, Seq, Ack, LTBReq, I, J, MACKBM (BU)}, where
Seq is a sequence number that is greater than the sequence number sent in the
previous BU to this CN (if any); Ack is an acknowledge bit that may be set by the
MN to request a BA message returned by the CN; LTBReq is a binding lifetime
request; I and J are the home and care-of nonce indices received previously from
the CN; and MACKBM (BU) is a keyed hash value, i.e. MACKBM (BU) = First
(96, HMAC SHA1 (KBM , (CoA || CN || BU))), where BU indicates the binding
update message itself. In addition, the MN will change the status of the list entry
to indicate the completion of the RR procedure. Specifically, if the MN sets the
Ack bit, then it will change the status to a ‘Binding Pending’ indicating that
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it is waiting for an acknowledgement; otherwise, it will change the status to a
‘Binding Complete’ indicating that the correspondent registration is complete.
• Step 6:
When the CN receives a BU message, it first searches its Binding Cache for an
entry indexed by the HoA. If no entry exists, the CN will accept any sequence
number value enclosed in the received BU message. Otherwise, the CN verifies
that the given sequence number is greater than the sequence number received in
the last valid BU from this HoA. If the verification fails, then the CN will send
back a rejected BA message that contains the last accepted sequence number.
If the verification succeeds, the CN will use the home and care-of nonce indices
enclosed in the BU message (i.e. I and J) to regenerate the two tokens (i.e.
Token1 and Token2). The CN then hashes the two tokens together to form KBM
and verifies the validity of the received BU message, as shown in Figure 2.11.
If the verification succeeds, the CN will update the entry with the CoA and
sequence number carried in the BU message. In addition, the CN will grant a
binding lifetime in the entry based on the binding lifetime requested by the MN
in the BU message. Finally, the CN checks the Ack bit given in the BU message;
if it is set (i.e. the MN requests an acknowledgement), the CN will send back
an accepted BA message, i.e. BA = {Src= CN, Des= CoA, HoA, Seq, LTBGrant,
MACKBM (BA)}, where Seq is a sequence number that is equal to the sequence
number given in the BU being acknowledged; LTBGrant is the granted binding
lifetime; and MACKBM (BA) = First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBM , (CN || CoA ||
BA)), where BA indicates the binding acknowledgement message itself.
The CN may decide to refuse the BU for many reasons, such as when it does
not have sufficient resources, when one or both of the given nonce indices are not
recognizable, or when the validity verification fails. If this is the case, the CN will
return a rejected BA message in which the status field is set to a value indicating
the cause of the rejection.
• Step 7:
Upon receiving a BA message, the MN uses the CN’s address, i.e. the source
address of the message, as an index to search its Binding Update List. If a
list entry is found, the MN will verify that the sequence number enclosed in
the message matches the last sequence number sent by the MN to this CN as
maintained in the list entry. If the verification succeeds, the MN will use KBM
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Figure 2.11: Verification of a BU in standard correspondent registration
to verify the validity of the received BA message as shown in Figure 2.12. If
any of the above verifications is negative or if no list entry exists for that CN,
the MN will discard the received message without any further action. Otherwise,
the MN will examine the status field of the message. If the status field indicates
that the BU was accepted, the MN will update the status of the list entry to
‘Binding Complete’, indicating that the BU has been acknowledged. In addition,
the MN adjusts the remaining binding lifetime depending on the given granted
binding lifetime. On the other hand, if the status field indicates that the BU was
rejected, the MN will examine the cause of the rejection and take steps to fix the
error and retransmit the BU with a sequence number value greater than that used
for the previous transmission of that BU. However, if the rejection indicates that
the CN cannot provide route optimization, the MN will stop trying to initiate
route optimization and will revert back to the use of bidirectional tunnelling.
The MN is responsible for retransmissions in the standard correspondent reg-
istrations [5]. If the MN sends a HoTI message or a CoTI message to the CN
and does not receive a matching response within a retransmission interval, the
MN will resend the corresponding message with a new cookie value. Similarly, if
the MN sends a BU message in which the Ack bit is set and does not receive a
matching BA message within a retransmission interval, the MN will resend the
BU message with a new sequence number value greater than that used for the
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Figure 2.12: Verification of a BA in standard correspondent registration
previous transmission of this BU. In all cases, the initial retransmission interval
is one second and is doubled upon each retransmission, until either a matched
response is received or the retransmission interval reaches a maximum retrans-
mission interval of 32 seconds. The MN may continue to send HoTI, CoTI, and
BU messages at this slower rate indefinitely [5].
If the correspondent registration is meant to delete a previously established
binding, then the CoTI and CoT messages are omitted from the RR procedure.
The MN initiates the procedure by sending a HoTI message, and the CN re-
sponds by returning a HoT message that contains a secret home keygen token,
i.e. Token1. The session key is generated through hashing the token, i.e. KBM
= SHA1 (Token1). Furthermore, in the BU message, the MN sets the CoA equal
to its HoA and the binding lifetime request to ‘zero’.
If the CN is also mobile, then all mobility messages (i.e. HoTI, CoTI, and
BU messages) are sent to the CN’s home address. In this case, if the mobile
CN is currently located in its home link, it will receive the messages directly.
Otherwise, the CN’s home agent will intercept and forward the messages to the
CN’s current care-of address. In addition, while the mobile CN is away from its
home link, it sends all of its responses (i.e. HoT, CoT, and BA messages) via its
home agent (reverse tunnelling) as shown in Figure 2.13. Apart from these, the
RR procedure for the stationary CN and the mobile CN cases are alike.
The RR procedure protects correspondent registrations from all attacks, ex-
cept where on-path attackers are concerned [5]. It protects CNs against replayed
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Figure 2.13: Standard correspondent registration - mobile to mobile
BUs through the use of the sequence number; an attacker cannot replay a pre-
viously authenticated BU message due to the sequence number included in the
message. Also, the attacker cannot modify a BU message since the MAC verifica-
tion would fail after such a modification. In addition, the RR procedure protects
CNs against resource exhaustion DoS attacks. Specifically, the CN does not re-
tain any state about individual MNs until it receives an authentic BU from that
MN. Furthermore, it does not maintain the value for the KBM , instead it forms
the KBM based on its secret key (KCN), the given nonce indices, and the MN’s
addresses. Finally, as the RR procedure is dependent on the use of symmetric
cryptography, it requires very little processing at the CN and at the MN.
The RR procedure increases the registration delay because the MN must wait
for both address tests to conclude before it can register its CoA. As a result, a
registration consumes about 1.5 round-trip times between an MN and its CN. The
delay can be higher than 1.5 round-trip due to the home address test being relayed
through the home link. In addition, the RR procedure requires the exchange of
an extra four messages per registration, which increases signalling overhead.
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Considering the on-path attackers, the RR procedure fails to provide sufficient
protection for correspondent registrations. The RR procedure only limits the
potential attackers from any node in the Internet to those that are on the route
between the CN and the MN’s home link. Attackers that can capture both the
HoT and CoT messages can obtain the two tokens. Hence, they can hash the two
tokens to form the session key and send a fake BU on behalf of the MN.
To limit the on-path attacks, the MIPv6 protocol requires the mobility mes-
sages tunnelled through the HA (i.e. the HoTI and HoT messages) during the RR
procedure to be encrypted. This prevents attackers located on the MN’s current
foreign link from capturing the two tokens and launching attacks based on it.
Furthermore, the MIPv6 protocol requires the MN to periodically (at most every
seven minutes) rerun the RR procedure even with the absence of IP connectively
change. This prevents attackers from launching attacks after moving away, i.e.
attackers must be present on the path between the CN and the MN’s home link
to be able to launch the attack.
Based on the above discussion, we conclude that the RR procedure is ineffi-
cient as it fails to protect against on-path attacks; it requires the exchange of an
extra four messages; it requires about 1.5 round-trip times between an MN and
its CN; and it needs to be re-executed every few minutes. In other words, the
RR procedure does not address the security problems efficiently and causes high
registration delay as well as signalling overhead.
2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented an overview of the Mobile IPv6 protocol. Based
upon the location management feature of the protocol, the security threats and
attacks have been analysed, and the security services and performance require-
ments needed to address these attacks have been outlined. Finally, the chapter
studied the standard home and correspondent registrations and highlighted their
strengths and limitations in providing the required security services.
Before describing our proposed solutions for securing home and correspondent
registrations in the MIPv6 protocol, the next chapter will investigate and discuss
the existing correspondent registration security solutions.
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Chapter 3
A Survey of Correspondent
Registration Protocols
This chapter surveys existing protocols for protecting correspondent registrations
in an attempt to identify their strengths and weaknesses with respect to the
security risks and attacks mentioned in Section 2.2.1, as well as the security
services and performance requirements mentioned in Section 2.2.2. The main
goal of these correspondent registration protocols is to reduce registration delays
and/or signalling overheads caused by the RR procedure (see Section 2.5) in a
secure manner. Most of these protocols do not require frequent computation of
fresh keys, thus reducing the number of redundant signalling messages generated
by the RR procedure. They also have built-in security measures to offer additional
security benefits over the RR procedure. The protocols can largely be divided into
two classes. The first class is referred to as the ‘infrastructure-less correspondent
registration protocols’. The protocols in this class are suited to cases where
participants do not have prior relationships among them. The second class of
protocols relies on security infrastructure support and is, therefore, referred to as
‘infrastructure-based correspondent registration protocols’.
Before surveying the existing correspondent registration protocols, we first
present an overview of cryptographically generated IPv6 addresses.
3.1 Cryptographically Generated Addresses
The concept of cryptographically generated addresses (CGAs) was proposed to
prevent stealing and spoofing of existing IPv6 addresses [32]. The basic idea is
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to create a part of the IPv6 address from the address owner’s public key, i.e. to
bind the IPv6 address of an entity to the entity’s public key [33, 34, 35].
A 128-bit IPv6 address consists of a 64-bit subnet prefix, which is used for
routing, and a 64-bit interface identifier, which identifies a specific node in a
network [36]. The interface identifier is normally derived from the node’s link-
layer address [36], but actually, almost any value is valid. Only two bits of the
interface identifier have a special meaning, the ‘U/L’ bit (Universal/Local bit)
and the ‘I/G’ bit (Individual/Group bit), which means that the remaining 62-
bits can be generated by any method providing the resulting interface identifier
is unique in the network.
A CGA-based address is an IPv6 address for which the interface identifier
part is generated using a cryptographic one-way hash function that takes the
address owner’s public key and some auxiliary parameters as its input. The
auxiliary parameters are a 128-bit random number, called a modifier, an eight-
bit number, called a collision count, and a 64-bit subnet prefix of the CGA-based
address [33]. The address owner can protect a message sent from the address by
digitally signing it with the corresponding private key and sending the public key
and the auxiliary parameters along with the signed message [33]. Upon receipt
of the signed message, the recipient verifies the binding between the public key
and the address by re-computing and comparing the hash value with the interface
identifier part of the address. In addition, it authenticates the address by verifying
the signature.
The early proposals of CGA suffered from “the small number of bits of the
address to accommodate the result of the hash function”, i.e. at most, 62 bits of
the address can be used for the hash [32, 35]. If an attacker wished to impersonate
a given CGA-based address, he/she would only need to attempt about 261 (i.e.
approximately 2.3 * 1018) tries to find an alternative public key that hashed to
this address. This would leave open the possibility of brute-force attacks during
the lifetime of the IPv6 protocol [37]. The shortage in the hash length problem
is solved by Aura in [33] by using hash extensions.
The hash extension method [33] embeds a security parameter (Sec) into the
CGA-based address. The Sec is a three-bit unsigned integer encoded in the three
leftmost bits of the interface identifier that determines the strength of the address
against brute-force attacks. This leaves just 59 bits for the actual hash output.
The hash extension method applies a second hash function until the leftmost
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16*Sec bits of the hash value are zero. This increases the cost of both address
generation and brute-force attacks by the same factor while keeps the cost of
address verification constant. In this way, the attacker would need to attempt
about 2((59+16*Sec)-1) tries to be able to bind its public key to a given CGA-based
address.
Figure 3.1: CGA-based address generation algorithm
The hash extension method theoretically solved the main weakness of the
CGA-based method, especially when the address was generated oﬄine by an
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entity that had sufficient computing power. However, for Sec values greater than
0, the second hash function is nondeterministic, i.e. not guaranteed to terminate
after a certain number of iterations, and when the Sec value equals 0, the cost of
brute-force attacks is decreased to about 258.
A detailed process of generating and verifying a CGA-based address is given
in [33] and can be illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
Figure 3.2: CGA-based address verification algorithm
The CGA-based technique provides public-key authentication for IPv6 ad-
dresses without using trusted third parties or PKI to convince others that the
addresses are used by the owner of the public keys. As a result, the CGA-based
technique suffers from the following limitations [38]. Firstly, it does not guar-
antee the owner’s reachability at the address, i.e. an attacker can use its own
public key to cryptographically generate a non-used address with a subnet prefix
from a victim network. Secondly, although it can effectively stop attackers from
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impersonating valid IPv6 addresses to launch attacks, it cannot thwart attacks
on an entire network by redirecting data to a non-used address. Thirdly, it relies
on public-key operations (in particular, digital signatures), which require heavy
computations both to compute and verify the signature. Thus, it could expose
the participants to denial-of-service attacks, especially when the participant is a
mobile device with limited computational power or when the participant needs
to verify digital signatures for a large number of peers at the same time. Fi-
nally, as a message needs to carry the address owner’s public key and signature
as well as auxiliary parameter values that are used to generate the address cryp-
tographically, there is a certain amount of overhead incurred to the bandwidth
consumption.
3.2 Infrastructure-less Correspondent Registra-
tion Protocols
The infrastructure-less correspondent registration protocols are proposed for use
on a global basis between MNs and CNs belonging to different administrative
domains. These protocols have a wide applicability and can be used generally on
the Internet; they enable CNs to authenticate MNs without requiring any security
infrastructure support.
3.2.1 Early Binding Update (EBU) Protocol
The Early Binding Update (EBU) protocol [39] is proposed to reduce the high
registration delay caused by the RR procedure. It enhances the RR procedure
by moving home address and care-of address tests to a handover phase where
they do not impact the registration delay. The home address test occurs while
the MN can still use its old CoA (i.e. performed before the handover), and the
care-of address test runs in parallel with data transfer to and from the new CoA
(i.e. done after the handover). It also utilises a Credit-Based Authorisation
technique [39, 40] to limit the amount of data that the CN can send to the new
CoA while concurrently running the care-of address test. This technique limits
the data a CN can send to an MN’s unconfirmed CoA by the data recently sent
to or received from that MN. In this technique, the CN grants the MN credit
for packets it sends to or receives from a confirmed CoA. When the MN sends
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an early binding update message for registering a new CoA, subsequent packets
consume the credit that the MN has collected up to then. The EBU protocol is
shown in Figure 3.3 and is detailed in Appendix B.
Compared to the RR procedure, the EBU protocol reduces registration delay
of correspondent registrations to about one one-way time between the MN and
the CN. However, there is a cost for this reduction in delay. First, one or two
additional messages are required per correspondent registration. Secondly, the
MN may need to run the home address test periodically, which could increase the
signalling overhead. Thirdly, complexity at the CN is increased for implementing
the Credit-Based Authorisation technique. In addition to these costs, the EBU
protocol suffers from the same on-path attacks applicable to the RR procedure.
Figure 3.3: A correspondent registration protected by the EBU protocol
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3.2.2 Purpose-Built Key (PBK) Protocol
The Purpose-Built Key (PBK) protocol [41] aims to authenticate the initiator
of a network communication where the actual identity of the initiator is not
important, but successive packets must come from the same initiator. Therefore,
the protocol is suitable to use in correspondent registrations where a CN needs
to be assured that a correspondent registration is actually coming from the same
MN that initiates the communication. The PBK protocol is detailed in Appendix
B.
The PBK protocol requires four messages during any correspondent registra-
tion, which reduces signalling overhead compared to the RR procedure. However,
it cannot improve registration delay as it requires about 1.5 round-trip times be-
tween the MN and the CN. It also increases the CN’s vulnerabilities to resource
exhaustion DoS attacks; the CN is required to create a state and to perform
two digital signature verifications during a protocol execution. The protocol is
also vulnerable to return-to-home spoofing attacks as it cannot authenticate the
claimed HoA. It is also vulnerable to MITM attacks affecting its initialisation.
An attacker needs to be on the path during the initialisation phase to be able to
intercept the hash of the public key, i.e. PBID, and send the hash of a different
key. Finally, the protocol requires each of the MN and the CN to perform two
public key operations per correspondent registration.
3.2.3 Child-proof Authentication for MIPv6 (CAM) Pro-
tocol
The Child-proof Authentication for MIPv6 (CAM) protocol [32] aims to authen-
ticate correspondent registrations in Mobile IPv6 networks. In this protocol, an
MN has a self-generated public/private key pair, and it configures its HoA as a
CGA-based address (see Section 3.1).
The MN runs a correspondent registration by sending just one BU mes-
sage to a CN, i.e. BU = {Src=CoA, Des=CN, HoA, PKMN , Modifier, TSMN ,
SIGMN [H(CoA || CN || HoA || TSMN)]} where PKMN is the MN’s public key;
Modifier is a random number indicating the value of the modifier used while con-
figuring the HoA; TSMN is MN’s timestamp; H() denotes a hash function; and
SIGMN [] denotes MN’s signature using the private key SKMN .
When the CN receives the signed BU message, it first compares TSMN against
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its own clock to detect replayed BUs. The CN next verifies the binding between
the PKMN and the HoA by re-computing and comparing the hash value with the
interface identifier part of the HoA. The CN then verifies the signature and the
authenticity of the HoA by using the PKMN . If any of the above verifications
fails, the CN will reject the message. Otherwise, the CN will accept the message,
create/update a Binding Cache entry, and store the binding between the MN’s
HoA and CoA.
An entire run of the CAM protocol requires one message and one one-way
time between the MN and the CN, causing minimal signalling overhead as well as
registration delay. However, the protocol is vulnerable to malicious MNs flooding
attacks as it cannot authenticate the claimed CoA. In addition, as the protocol
uses timestamps to detect replayed BUs, it requires the clocks of the MN and
the CN to be synchronised. It also suffers from the same weaknesses of the
CGA-based technique mentioned in Section 3.1.
3.2.4 Unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman-based Binding Up-
date (UDHBU) Protocol
The Unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman-based Binding Update (UDHBU) protocol
[42] makes use of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to derive a shared
session key between an MN and a CN. The two nodes then use the shared secret
in authenticating subsequent correspondent registrations. The UDHBU protocol
is divided into two cases: an initial correspondent registration and a subsequent
correspondent registration. It is shown in Figure 3.4 and is detailed in Appendix
B.
The UDHBU protocol requires four messages during the initial correspondent
registration and two messages during subsequent ones. It also reduces the reg-
istration delay of subsequent registrations to one one-way time between the MN
and the CN. In addition, it protects CNs against resource exhaustion DoS attacks;
the CN does not create any state for individual MNs until it receives an authen-
tic BU from that MN in Message3. Furthermore, the CN is required to perform
just two exponential calculations during the initial correspondent registration; all
other calculations performed by the CN are based on MAC operations, which are
considered lightweight operations. Finally, it establishes a long-term shared key
between the MN and the CN, which reduces the number of redundant signalling
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messages caused by the RR procedure for frequently generating a fresh shared
key.
Figure 3.4: The UDHBU protocol
The UDHBU protocol is vulnerable to malicious MNs flooding attacks as it
cannot authenticate the claimed CoA. In addition, it is vulnerable to MITM and
false BU attacks as it involves an unauthenticated DH key exchange between the
MN and the CN. An attacker on the path during the initial correspondent reg-
istration is able to intercept the DH public values and send its own DH public
values. Furthermore, the attacker can initialise the protocol instead of the legiti-
mate MN and gain the session key; subsequently it can use the key to send false
BUs.
3.2.5 Optimizing Mobile IPv6 (OMIPv6) Protocol
The Optimizing Mobile IPv6 (OMIPv6) protocol [43] combines the use of the RR
procedure and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to derive a shared session
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key between an MN and a CN. It is similar to the UDHBU protocol mentioned
in Section 3.2.4 and is also designed into an initial correspondent registration
case and a subsequent correspondent registration case. However, in the initial
correspondent registration, the MN and the CN first run the RR procedure to
establish a shared secret. The two nodes then run the DH key exchange that is
authenticated by the shared secret established from the RR procedure to derive
a long-term shared session key. Apart from this, the OMIPv6 protocol is the
same as the UDHBU protocol; subsequent correspondent registrations in the two
protocols are identical.
The OMIPv6 protocol requires eight messages and about 2.5 round-trip times
between the MN and the CN during the initial correspondent registration. How-
ever, it requires only two messages and about one one-way time between the
MN and the CN during subsequent correspondent registrations. It also increases
the protection, compared to the UDHBU protocol, provided to the CN against
resource exhaustion DoS attacks by signing the DH messages with the shared
secret established from the RR procedure. Apart from these, the OMIPv6 pro-
tocol has the same features, pros, and cons as the UDHBU protocol mentioned
in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.6 Applying CGAs to Optimize Mobile IPv6 (CGA-
OMIPv6) Protocol
The CGA-OMIPv6 protocol [44] combines the use of the RR procedure and the
CGA-based technique. It applies the following set of optimizations to the Mobile
IPv6 protocol: (1) an MN has a self-generated public/private key pair; (2) the
MN configures its HoA based on the concept of CGAs mentioned in Section 3.1;
(3) the MN provides a care-of address reachability proof by exchanging CoTI and
CoT messages with a CN every time a new CoA is claimed; and (4) the MN
provides initial HoA ownership and reachability proofs at initial correspondent
registration with the CN. The MN provides the initial HoA ownership proof by
signing the first BU message with its private key and by sending its public key
along with the signed message. The initial HoA reachability proof is provided by
exchanging HoTI and HoT messages with the CN. The CGA-OMIPv6 protocol
is divided into two cases: an initial correspondent registration and a subsequent
correspondent registration. The former enables the CN to authenticate the MN’s
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HoA and to verify the MN’s reachability at the HoA as well as the CoA. It also
enables the two nodes to securely exchange a secret session key. The latter is
performed every time the MN wants to register a new CoA at the CN. It enables
the CN to verify the MN’s reachability at the new CoA. The CGA-OMIPv6
protocol is shown in Figure 3.5 and is detailed in Appendix B.
Figure 3.5: The CGA-OMIPv6 protocol
The CGA-OMIPv6 protocol requires five messages during the initial corre-
spondent registration and four messages during subsequent ones. It also requires
about 1.5 round-trip times between the MN and the CN during any correspondent
registration. It employs a CGA-based HoA together with an initial HoA reach-
ability test for authenticating the HoA, which partially protects against return-
to-home spoofing attacks. It also employs a CoA reachability test whenever a
new CoA is to be claimed, which partially protects third parties against DoS at-
tacks. It also partially protects CNs against resource exhaustion DoS attacks; the
CN uses KBM established from the RR procedure to verify the authenticity and
integrity of the BU message before running the CGA-based address verification
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algorithm. In addition, it requires each of the MN and the CN to perform two
public key operations during the initial correspondent registration.
3.2.7 Enhanced Route Optimization for Mobile IPv6 (ERO-
MIPv6) Protocol
The ERO-MIPv6 protocol [45] combines the use of the EBU and the CGA-
OMIPv6 protocols (see Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.6). It is shown in Figure 3.6 and is
detailed in Appendix B.
Figure 3.6: The ERO-MIPv6 protocol
The ERO-MIPv6 protocol requires six messages during the initial correspon-
dent registration and four messages during subsequent ones. It optimises the reg-
istration delay to about one one-way time between the MN and the CN during
any correspondent registrations. Apart from this optimisation, the ERO-MIPv6
protocol has the same pros and cons of the CGA-OMIPv6 protocol mentioned in
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Section 3.2.6. In addition, it increases complexity for implementing the Credit-
Based Authorisation technique at the CN, as in the EBU protocol.
3.3 Infrastructure-based Correspondent Regis-
tration Protocols
The infrastructure-based correspondent registration protocols rely on security
infrastructure support for protecting correspondent registrations. These protocols
can largely be divided into two subclasses. The first subclass is referred to as the
secret-key based protocols, as they protect correspondent registrations based on a
secret key shared between the participants. The second subclass relies on having
a certified public/private key pair and is, therefore, referred to as the public-key
based protocols. The infrastructure-based correspondent registration protocols
assure the CN that a specific home address is used by the right MN, i.e. the
shared secret key (or the public key of the public/private key pair) is related to
the MN’s HoA. In addition, they remove the need for a home address test leading
to a reduction in registration delay and signalling overhead.
3.3.1 Secret-Key based Protocols
Secret-Key based protocols require the establishment of a shared secret between
an MN and a CN. Therefore, the applicability of these protocols is limited to
scenarios when the MN and the CN know each other in advance and can agree
on a secret. A typical scenario where these protocols are applicable is within a
corporation or among users who know each other.
3.3.1.1 Static Shared Key version 1 (SSKv1) Protocol
The Static Shared Key version 1 (SSKv1) protocol [46] is based on the pre-
configuration of the data needed for creating the binding management key (KBM).
These data include a secret key (KCN), a home nonce (NI), and a care-of nonce
(NJ). The SSKv1 protocol protects correspondent registrations in the same way
as specified in the base specification of the MIPv6 protocol ([5], see also Sec-
tion 2.5). However, there are two differences. First, KCN is a shared secret
known to both the CN and the MN. Second, NI and NJ are shared secrets as
well. Therefore, the SSKv1 protocol omits the RR procedure; the MN generates
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the home and care-of keygen tokens instead of requesting them from the CN. As a
result, an entire correspondent registration process only requires one BU message
and, optionally, one BA message.
The SSKv1 protocol requires only two messages during any correspondent
registration, which reduces signalling overhead compared to the RR procedure.
It also reduces registration delay to about one one-way time between the MN
and the CN. Furthermore, it increases the security strength by ensuring the home
address ownership, as the shared secrets are related to the MN’s HoA. Therefore,
it protects against return-to-home spoofing attacks. However, the SSKv1 protocol
is vulnerable to malicious MNs flooding attacks as it cannot authenticate the
claimed CoA. It also requires the MN to store different secrets for each CN and
the CN to store different secrets for each MN. In addition, it requires the CN to
keep track of the most recent value of the sequence number for BU messages from
each MN to protect against replay attacks. If the CN does not maintain the value
of the sequence number from a particular MN, then the CN could be fooled into
accepting a replayed BU message. Finally, it requires a manual reconfiguration
for the shared key (KCN) and the associated nonces (NI , and NJ) at the MN and
the CN whenever sequence numbers roll over, so that a new KBM is computed
and replay attacks are prevented.
3.3.1.2 Static Shared Key version 2 (SSKv2) Protocol
The Static Shared Key version 2 (SSKv2) protocol [47] enhances the SSKv1
protocol by applying a care-of address reachability test. It aims to verify MNs’
reachability at claimed CoAs to partially protect third parties against malicious
MNs flooding attacks. The SSKv2 protocol can be summarised as follows. Upon
receiving a BU message from an MN, a CN rejects the message and returns a BA
message to the claimed CoA containing a fresh token. When the MN receives
the rejected BA message, it retransmits the BU message with the exact received
token. When the CN receives the augmented BU message, it validates the received
token; the CN re-computes the token and compares it to the received one. If the
validation succeeds, the CN infers that the MN is reachable at the claimed CoA.
Therefore, the CN accepts the binding and returns a normal BA message.
The SSKv2 protocol verifies the MNs’ reachability at claimed CoAs, thus par-
tially protecting third parties against malicious MNs flooding attacks. However,
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it adds two additional messages and one additional round-trip time, i.e. it re-
quires four messages and about 1.5 round-trip times between the MN and the
CN during any correspondent registration. Apart from these, the SSKv2 proto-
col has the same features, pros, and cons as the SSKv1 protocol mentioned in the
previous section.
3.3.1.3 Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAK-based)
Binding Update Protocol
The PAK-based BU protocol [48] requires an MN to share a password with a CN.
It applies an optimised PAK scheme to enable the CN and the MN to authenti-
cate each other, establish a one-time binding management key for protecting the
subsequent correspondent registration, and verify the correctness of the home
address as well as the location of the MN.
In the PAK-based BU protocol, an MN performs a correspondent registra-
tion by exchanging four messages with a CN. The first two messages are the
optimised PAK scheme [48], in which the MN and the CN run a Diffie-Hellman-
based password authenticated key exchange scheme [49]. The other two messages
are the normal BU and BA, which are protected using the key established from
the optimised PAK scheme.
The PAK-based BU protocol requires four messages and about 1.5 round-trip
times between the MN and the CN during any correspondent registration. It also
verifies the MN’s reachability at the CoA, thus partially protecting third parties
against malicious MNs flooding attacks. In addition, it increases the security
strength by ensuring the home address ownership, as the password is related to
the MN’s HoA. Therefore, it protects against return-to-home spoofing attacks.
However, it requires the MN to store a different password for each CN and the
CN to store a different password for each MN. It also requires both the MN and
the CN to perform two exponential calculations per correspondent registration.
3.3.1.4 Ticket-based Binding Update (TBU) Protocol
The TBU protocol [50] requires that the connection between an MN’s home link
and a CN is protected securely using IPSec ESP tunnel. It also requires that
an HA’s duty is extended to testify the legitimacy of an MN’s HoA, facilitate
mutual authentication between the MN and a CN, and establish a secret key and
ticket between the two nodes. The TBU protocol is divided into two cases: an
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initial correspondent registration and a subsequent correspondent registration. It
is shown in Figure 3.7 and is detailed in Appendix B.
Figure 3.7: The TBU protocol
The TBU protocol requires only two messages and about one one-way time
between the MN and the CN during subsequent correspondent registrations. This
introduces low signalling overhead and registration delay. It also increases the
security strength by ensuring the home address ownership, i.e. it protects against
return-to-home spoofing attacks. In addition, it establishes a long-term secret key
and ticket between the MN and the CN, thus reducing the number of redundant
signalling messages caused by the RR procedure for frequently generating a fresh
shared key.
The TBU protocol requires four messages and about one one-way time be-
tween the MN and the HA plus one one-way time between the HA and the CN
during the initial correspondent registration. The TBU protocol also requires the
clocks of the MN, the HA, and the CN to be synchronised as it uses timestamps
to detect replayed messages. In addition, it increases the complexity at the HAs
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for supporting correspondent registrations of MNs. Furthermore, it is vulnerable
to malicious MNs flooding attacks as it cannot authenticate claimed CoAs.
3.3.2 Public-Key based Protocols
Public-key based protocols require that an MN (or an MN’s home link) has a
certified public/private key pair. They assume that the public key has been
issued by a trusted CA and that a PKI is in place to provide the services of
certificate application, issuance and revocation.
3.3.2.1 Certificate-based Binding Update (CBU) Protocol
The CBU protocol [51, 52] makes use of a digital signature scheme and a unilateral
authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to derive a long-term shared
secret between an MN and a CN. It requires that each home link has a certified
public/private key pair (PKH , SKH) where the private key is kept by the HAs in
the home link. It also requires that an HA’s duty is extended to handle strong
authentication on behalf of the MN during correspondent registrations. The HA
testifies the legitimacy of the MN’s HoA, facilitates authentication of the MN to
the CN, and establishes a shared secret session key between the two nodes. The
CBU protocol is shown in Figure 3.8 and is detailed in Appendix B.
The CBU protocol has the same pros as the TBU protocol mentioned in
Section 3.3.1.4. In addition, it oﬄoads public key operations and DH exponential
calculations from MNs to their HAs. Furthermore, it partially protects HAs and
CNs against resource exhaustion DoS attacks through the use of cookies during
the key exchange, and through the prevention of the CN from retaining any state
of individual MNs until it receives an authentic EXCH0 message from that MN’s
home link.
The CBU protocol requires eight messages and about one round-trip time
between the MN and the HA, plus two round-trip times between the HA and
the CN, plus one one-way time between the MN and the CN during the initial
correspondent registration. In addition, it has the same cons as the TBU protocol,
but synchronised clocks are not required.
73
3.3. INFRASTRUCTURE-BASED PROTOCOLS
Figure 3.8: The CBU protocol
3.3.2.2 Hierarchical Certificate-based Binding Update (HCBU) Pro-
tocol
The HCBU protocol [23] enhances the CBU protocol by assuring an MN’s own-
ership of a claimed CoA. It further extends an HA’s duty to cover all the nodes
currently under its home link, i.e. the HA’s duty covers not only MNs belonging
to its home link but also roaming MNs from other foreign links. In HCBU, when
an MN roams to a foreign link and is configured a new CoA, it additionally ob-
tains the foreign link’s signature on the binding of (HoA, CoA). The signature
convinces the MN’s home link that the MN actually owns the claimed CoA. Sub-
sequently, the home link proves the MN’s ownership of both the HoA and CoA
to the CN. The HCBU protocol is designed into an initial correspondent regis-
tration case and a subsequent correspondent registration case, where the former
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case is designed into two steps: a pre-handover step and a post-handover step.
The HCBU protocol is shown in Figure 3.9 and is detailed in Appendix B.
Figure 3.9: The HCBU protocol
The HCBU protocol has the same pros as the CBU protocol mentioned in the
previous section. In addition, it authenticates the claimed CoA, thus achieving
much stronger security strength by protecting third parties against malicious MNs
flooding attacks. Furthermore, it reduces registration delay during the initial
correspondent registration by taking advantage of the EBU protocol, i.e. the
pre-handover step is performed before the handover. However, the MN may
periodically need to repeat the pre-handover step (such as when handovers cannot
be anticipated), which could increase the signalling overhead. The protocol also
requires the use of trusted third parties (i.e. foreign links) to verify the CoAs
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used by the MNs; it requires an infrastructure that supports this authentication
service. Furthermore, it further increases the complexity at the HAs by extending
their duty to additionally cover roaming MNs from other foreign links. Finally,
as it requires foreign HAs to compute a signature for each roaming MN, this can
significantly reduce throughput at foreign networks.
3.3.2.3 Extended Ticket-based Binding Update (ETBU) Protocol
The ETBU protocol [53] extends the TBU protocol (see Section 3.3.1.4) to handle
with the case of two mobile nodes in simultaneous movement, i.e. when the
CN is also mobile, and when the two nodes move simultaneously to different
foreign links. It also makes use of a digital signature scheme and the CGA-
based technique to provide mutual authentication between an MN and a CN.
Specifically, it requires that (1) each home link has a certified public/private key
pair where the private key is kept by HAs in the home link; (2) each mobile
node has a self-generated public/private key pair; and (3) both the HoA and
CoA of each mobile node are configured as CGA-based addresses with the same
public key. In addition, it uses tickets issued by the MN and the CN instead of
signatures to minimise the computing costs that are needed to verify the CGA-
based addresses; a ticket is used instead of a new signature when the MN obtains a
new CoA. Furthermore, it utilises the smooth handoff mechanism [54] to solve the
simultaneous movement problem. That is, when an MN moves to a new foreign
link, the home agent of the previous link intercepts and forwards the messages
destined for the MN’s previous CoA to the MN’s new CoA.
The participants of the ETBU protocol are an MN, an MN’s HA (HAMN), a
CN, and a CN’s HA (HACN). Each HA executes the role of a verification server
that checks on the validity of the messages forwarded from the other node, which
oﬄoads public-key operations from both the MN and the CN to its respective HA.
The ETBU protocol is divided into two cases: an initial correspondent registration
and a subsequent correspondent registration. It is shown in Figure 3.10 and is
detailed in Appendix B.
The ETBU protocol does not require the MN to create a signature each time
it obtains a new CoA. It also utilises the smooth handoff mechanism to handle
the case of two mobile nodes in simultaneous movement. However, it requires
six messages and about one one-way time between the MN and the HAMN , plus
one one-way time between the HAMN and the HACN , plus one one-way time
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between the HACN and the CN during the initial correspondent registration.
In addition, it increases the HACN ’s vulnerabilities to resource exhaustion DoS
attacks; the HACN is required to perform digital signature verification during the
initial correspondent registration. An attacker can start an excessive number of
protocol runs by spoofing a large number of signed messages, which causes the
HACN to verify the signatures before rejecting the messages. Apart from these,
the ETBU protocol has all the pros and cons of the CBU protocol mentioned in
Section 3.3.2.1.
Figure 3.10: The ETBU protocol
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3.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented a survey of the existing protocols for protecting
correspondent registrations in the MIPv6 protocol. The studied protocols in-
clude two classes: ‘infrastructure-less correspondent registration protocols’ and
‘infrastructure-based correspondent registration protocols’. Furthermore, the lat-
ter class includes secret-key based and public-key based protocols. Tables 3.1, 3.2,
3.3, and 3.4 summarise how well each of the studied protocols meets the security
services and the performance requirements set out in Section 2.2.2. Based on
this, we conclude that:
1. It is preferable to design a correspondent registration protocol into cases
to reduce iterating courses of the entire protocol; to avoid unnecessarily re-
peating some sections of the protocol. That is, designing the protocol into
an initial correspondent registration case, a subsequent correspondent reg-
istration case, and a correspondent registration deletion case could elevate
efficiency by reducing iterating registration courses.
2. A correspondent registration protocol could be designed in a way that the
registration procedure is completed with the help of HAs to reduce the
computing costs of the MNs.
3. None of the protocols, except the HCBU, are capable of guaranteeing the
authenticity of the claimed care-of address, thus they cannot protect third
parties against DoS attacks and malicious MNs flooding attacks. In addi-
tion, the HCBU protocol requires an infrastructure, i.e. the use of trusted
third parties (foreign links), to support this authentication service. Further-
more, the HCBU protocol requires both a foreign access router and a CN
to perform computationally expensive signature generation and verification
operations each time an MN moves to a different foreign link. This can
significantly reduce throughput at both the foreign network and the CN.
The next chapter presents a novel protocol for securing home registrations in
the MIPv6 protocol; it presents the design and evaluation of the Enhanced Home
Registration (EHR) protocol.
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Chapter 4
The Enhanced Home
Registration (EHR) Protocol
Section 2.4 investigated the basic home registration process included in the MIPv6
protocol to enable an MN to register its current CoA with an HA. The investi-
gation showed that the HA could not authenticate the given CoA. Therefore, the
MN could lie about its current location and lure the HA to redirect traffic to a
third party causing a DoS attack against that third party.
This chapter presents an enhanced home registration process to support loca-
tion authentication of MNs to their respective HAs. This is called the Enhanced
Home Registration (EHR) protocol. The EHR protocol allows an HA to verify
that a claimed CoA is indeed an MN’s real location. As a result, the EHR pro-
tocol can reduce the likelihood of a malicious MN being successful in luring an
HA to flood a third party with useless traffic using the MIPv6 protocol.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 gives an overview of the EHR
protocol and details the design of its three building blocks: the symmetric CGA-
based technique, the concurrent CoA reachability test, and the segmenting IPv6
address space method. Section 4.2 presents a detailed description of the EHR
protocol and its informal security analysis in comparison to the basic home regis-
tration protocol. Section 4.3 presents the simulation and evaluation of the EHR
protocol compared to the basic home registration protocol. It first discusses the
design and construction of the simulation model. It next validates the simulation
model. It then presents the simulation results, discusses the implications of the
results and draws conclusions. Finally, Section 4.4 summarises the chapter.
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4.1 The EHR Protocol Overview
The EHR protocol extends the basic home registration protocol defined in the
MIPv6 base document [5] by making use of a combination of three ideas. Firstly,
it uses a novel lightweight version of the traditional CGA-based technique to
cryptographically generate and verify MNs’ CoAs. This is called the symmetric
CGA-based technique. This technique makes use of a secret key shared between
an MN and its HA in the CoA generation and verification processes. It is used
to reduce the likelihood of a malicious MN being successful in stealing other
nodes’ addresses. Secondly, the EHR protocol applies a novel concurrent CoA
reachability test to verify an MN’s reachability at a claimed CoA. The test enables
an HA to register and use an MN’s new CoA while concurrently verifying the
MN’s reachability at that CoA. Thirdly, the EHR protocol optionally uses a novel
method called the segmenting IPv6 address space method to differentiate between
hosts based on their IPv6 address. The method divides the IPv6 address space
into three parts: home addresses, care-of addresses, and stationary addresses.
Therefore, it reduces the number of targets that are vulnerable to DoS attacks
launched by malicious MNs.
4.1.1 The Symmetric CGA-based Technique
The symmetric CGA-based technique is a novel lightweight CGA-based technique
that is used for the cryptographic generation and verification of an IPv6 address.
It requires a secret key to be shared between the participants, i.e. address owner
and address verifier, and is thus suitable for use between MNs and their respective
HAs.
If an MN wants to cryptographically generate a CoA that could be verified
by a number of HAs, the key used in the address generation and verification
processes must be shared with all of the HAs. To achieve this, when the MN is
in an initial state (not registered with any HA), it generates a random number
that represents a new key. The MN uses this key to cryptographically generate
subsequent CoAs when roaming away from home and securely sends this key
to each HA when first registering with that HA. The HA stores this key in its
Binding Cache entry for the MN’s HoA and uses it to verify the MN’s claimed
CoA as well as subsequent CoAs. Using this method, the MN can register any
of its CoAs with all of its home links. In addition, the original pre-shared secret
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key with each of the home links (if any) is protected from brute force attacks, as
it is not used in the address generation or verification processes.
The details of the generation and verification processes of the symmetric CGA-
based technique are largely similar to those described by Aura [33] and mentioned
in Section 3.1. When generating a CGA-based CoA, an MN uses two input val-
ues: (1) a 64-bit subnet prefix, and (2) a secret key shared between the MN and
its HA. The generation process is depicted in Figure 4.1 and detailed as follows:
Figure 4.1: Symmetric CGA-based address generation algorithm
Symmetric CGA-based Generation Algorithm:
1. Generate a random 128-bit number, called a modifier. This modifier is used
to further randomise the addresses generated from the same subnet prefix
and shared key.
2. Concatenate from left the modifier and the subnet prefix. Execute the
HMAC SHA1 function on the concatenation using the secret key shared
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with the HA and get the leftmost 64 bits of the output. The result is H,
i.e. H = First (64, HMAC SHA1 (shared key, (modifier || subnet prefix))).
3. Form an interface identifier from H by setting U/L and I/G bits to zero and
zero, respectively.
4. Concatenate the 64-bit subnet prefix and the 64-bit interface identifier to
form a 128-bit IPv6 address with the subnet prefix to the left and the
interface identifier to the right.
5. Perform a Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) test. If an address collision
is detected, increment the modifier by one and go back to step 2.
The outputs of the address generation algorithm are (1) a new CGA-based
IPv6 address (i.e. a CoA), and (2) a 128-bit number representing the final value
of the modifier. The modifier is carried in BU messages that are sent by MNs to
their HAs in order to convey the modifier value. In addition, if a BU message is
to create a new binding, the secret key is also encrypted and attached to the BU
message; the MN encrypts the secret key using the IPSec secret key shared by
the MN and the HA.
When an HA receives a BU message from an MN, it verifies the claimed
CGA-based CoA. The verification process requires the inputs of an IPv6 address,
a 128-bit modifier, and a shared secret key. The process is depicted in Figure 4.2
and detailed as follows:
Symmetric CGA-based Verification Algorithm:
1. Divide the IPv6 address into 64-bit subnet prefix and 64-bit interface iden-
tifier.
2. Concatenate from left the modifier and the subnet prefix. Execute the
HMAC SHA1 function on the concatenation using the secret key shared
with the MN and get the leftmost 64 bits of the output. The result is H,
i.e. H = First (64, HMAC SHA1 (shared key, (modifier || subnet prefix))).
3. Compare the calculated hash value (H) obtained from step 2 with the 64-
bit interface identifier obtained from step 1; differences in the U/L and I/G
bits are ignored. If the calculated hash value differs, the verification fails.
Otherwise, the verification succeeds.
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Figure 4.2: Symmetric CGA-based address verification algorithm
If the verification fails, the HA will reject the received BU message and reply
with a BA message indicating that the binding is rejected due to a failure in CoA
verification. However, if the verification succeeds, the HA will gain confidence
that the CGA-based CoA was generated by the MN within that specific foreign
link and that it either belongs to the MN itself or it is a non-used address. This
is because with the symmetric CGA-based technique in place, a malicious MN
will need to attempt about (261) tries to be able to produce a CoA that matches
a third-party’s IPv6 address.
Compared to the traditional CGA-based technique, the symmetric CGA-
based technique has the following advantages. Firstly, the MN (i.e. address
owner) and the HA (i.e. address verifier) are not required to generate and verify
a digital signature, respectively, in order to verify the authenticity of the CoA
(i.e. CGA-based address). Therefore, it reduces the computational overhead im-
posed on the MN and the HA, which also protects the MN and the HA against
DoS attacks (see Section 3.1). Secondly, it removes the need to include the MN’s
public key and signature in BU messages sent to the HA to be able to verify the
CoA, and this could reduce signalling overhead. On the other hand, the symmet-
ric CGA-based technique cannot overcome the following limitations that exist in
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the traditional CGA-based technique. Firstly, it does not guarantee the MN’s
reachability at the CoA, i.e. a malicious MN can use the shared secret key to
cryptographically generate a non-used address with a subnet prefix from a victim
network. Secondly, it cannot thwart attacks on an entire network by redirecting
data to a non-used address. Furthermore, it suffers from the same hash-length
shortage problem that exists in the early CGA-based techniques, i.e. at most, 62
bits of the address can be used for the hash. Basically, 62 bits are not sufficient to
provide strong security and real protection against brute force attacks [55, 56, 57].
If a malicious MN wishes to steal a third party’s IPv6 address, the MN will need
to attempt about (261) tries to find a modifier that, when used with the subnet
prefix and the shared secret key, produces the same address.
One possible way to increase the hash length is to use the hash extension
method proposed by Aura in [33] (see Section 3.1). However, this method also
increases the cost of address generation, thus increasing the latency in config-
uring a new CoA. Moreover, one of the hash functions included in this method
is nondeterministic, i.e. not guaranteed to terminate after a certain number of
iterations, thus the hash extension method is not suitable for use in the context of
generating CoAs. A second possibility is to make use of the idea of lossless com-
pression proposed by Hwang in [58]. A lossless compression algorithm allows the
exact original data to be reconstructed from the compressed data; it guarantees
that the original and the decompressed data are identical. When an MN gener-
ates a CGA-based CoA, it calculates a longer hash value and then compresses
it to 62 bits. Specifically, in step 2 of the symmetric CGA-based generation al-
gorithm, the MN gets the leftmost X bits of the keyed hash, i.e. H = First (X,
HMAC SHA1 (shared key, (modifier || subnet prefix))) where 64 ≤ X ≤ 160. The
MN then compresses H to 62 bits using a lossless compression algorithm. In the
same way, when an HA verifies a CGA-based CoA, it decompresses the 62 bits
from the interface identifier part of the CoA to obtain the original X bits again.
The HA then compares these X bits with a freshly calculated hash value. In this
way, the MN will need to attempt about (2X-1) tries to be successful in stealing
a third party’s IPv6 address. An initial experiment that attempted to use the
second technique has not resulted in any compression occurring. The reason for
this is currently unknown.
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4.1.2 The Concurrent CoA Reachability Test
The idea of generating CoAs cryptographically is complemented by the idea of
concurrent CoAs reachability tests to validate the MNs’ reachability at claimed
CoAs. A concurrent CoA reachability test allows an HA to register and use an
MN’s new CoA while concurrently verifying an MN’s reachability at that CoA.
The reachability test uses two additional messages: a Binding Acknowledgement
with Care-of Token (BACoT) message and a Binding Update with Care-of Token
(BUCoT) message.
Figure 4.3: Procedure 1 - executed by an HA upon receipt of a valid BU message
The reachability test is initiated as soon as an HA receives a valid BU message
from an MN. The HA replies by sending a BACoT message to the MN. The
BACoT message acknowledges the binding of the new CoA and delivers a fresh
care-of token to the MN. The MN uses the received token to show its presence
at the new CoA, i.e. the MN sends a BUCoT message containing the received
token to the HA. When the test concludes, the HA sends a BA message to the
MN acknowledging the receipt of the token; hence, the successful completion of
the reachability test.
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A care-of token is a 64-bit number that is produced using the idea of a ‘node
key’ [5]. The node key is only known to an HA, and it allows the HA to verify that
a token enclosed in a BUCoT message is indeed its own. The HA generates a fresh
node key at regular intervals and identifies it by an index. The HA produces a
fresh care-of token based on its active node key as well as values of the MN’s HoA,
the MN’s claimed CoA, and the sequence number received in a valid BU message.
The HA may use the same node key with all of the MNs it is in communication
with to avoid the need to store a token per MN.
Figure 4.4: Procedure 2 - executed by an HA upon receipt of a valid BUCoT
message
The reachability test limits the number of valid BU messages that can be
received from an unreachable CoA as well as the amount of traffic that can be
sent to an unreachable CoA. While running the test, i.e. after sending a BACoT
message and before receiving a BUCoT message, an HA is not yet able to vali-
date an MN’s reachability at a claimed CoA. Therefore, the test allows the HA
to limit the number of BUs that can be received from that unreachable CoA to
a MAX ATTEMPT value, which prevents the MN from bypassing the test by
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continuously sending BUs without involving the test. In addition, the test allows
the HA to set the granted binding lifetime between the MN’s HoA and the un-
reachable CoA to a MIN BINDING LIFETIME value, which limits the amount
of data sent to the unreachable CoA.
The operational procedure of the concurrent CoA reachability test is summarised
as follows:
1. When an HA receives a valid BU message from an MN, the HA performs
Procedure 1, which is also shown in Figure 4.3:
Procedure 1:
1.1 The HA checks whether it has a Binding Cache entry for the HoA
enclosed in the message. If the HA does not have one (i.e. the MN
wants to create a new binding), then go to step 1.4.
1.2 The HA checks the state of the entry. If the state is reachable (i.e. the
previous run of the reachability test concluded successfully), then go to
step 1.4.
1.3 The HA checks number of attempts in the entry. If MAX ATTEMPT
is reached, then the HA rejects the message and replies to the MN
with a BA message in which the binding status field is set to ‘Rejected
due to maximum attempts from unreachable CoA has been reached’.
Otherwise, the HA continues to step 1.4.
Part B:
1.4 The HA creates/updates a Binding Cache entry with the claimed CoA
and the value of sequence number (Seq) received. The HA puts the
entry in an unreachable state and sets the granted binding lifetime in
the entry to a MIN BINDING LIFETIME value. In addition, the HA
either sets the value of the number of attempts in the entry to zero (if
a new entry is created) or increments it by one (if an existing entry is
updated).
1.5 The HA then uses its active node key (KHA) as well as the values of
the HoA, CoA, and Seq enclosed in the BU message to generate a fresh
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care-of token CoT, i.e. CoT = First (64, HMAC SHA1 (KHA, (HoA ||
CoA || Seq))).
1.6 Finally, the HA sends a BACoT message to the MN in which the binding
status field is set to ‘Accepted for limited period’. The BACoT message
contains the fresh CoT and the index (I) of the current node key. The
granted binding lifetime and the binding refresh advice fields, in this
BACoT message, are set to a MIN BINDING LIFETIME value, which
indicates that the MN must send a BUCoT message as soon as possible.
2. Upon receipt of a valid BACoT message from an HA, the MN sends a
BUCoT message, which contains the CoT and I, back to the HA requesting
a longer lifetime by the binding lifetime request field.
3. Upon receipt of a valid BUCoT message from an MN, the HA performs
Procedure 2, which is also shown in Figure 4.4:
Procedure 2:
2.1 The HA checks whether it has a Binding Cache entry for the HoA
enclosed in the message. If the HA does not have one, then the HA
considers the received message a BU message, not a BUCoT message,
and responds by performing part B of Procedure 1.
2.2 The HA checks the state of the Binding Cache entry. If the state is
reachable, then the HA compares the values of the CoA enclosed in
the message and the CoA registered at the HA for that MN. If they
are matched, which means the MN is resending the BUCoT message
because it did not receive a BA message, the HA replies to the MN
by sending a BA message that contains a ‘Binding accepted’ value in
the binding status field and the remaining binding lifetime value in
the granted binding lifetime field. Otherwise, if the two CoAs are not
matched, the HA again considers the received message a BU message
and responds by performing part B of Procedure 1. On the other hand,
if the state of the entry is unreachable, the HA continues to step 2.3.
2.3 The HA uses the index (I) enclosed in the received message to retrieve
its node key (KHA). The HA next generates a CoT using the retrieved
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node key, as well as the value of the HoA enclosed in the received
message and the values of the CoA and Seq retrieved from the Binding
Cache entry for that HoA, i.e. CoT = First (64, HMAC SHA1 (KHA,
(HoA || CoA || Seq))).
2.4 The HA then verifies that the generated CoT matches the received
CoT (Verification-1). If the verification succeeds, the HA will (1)
reset the value of the number of attempts in the cache entry to zero;
(2) extend the binding lifetime in the cache entry by setting the granted
binding lifetime to a BINDING LIFETIME value; and (3) send a BA
message that contains a ‘Binding accepted’ value in the binding status
field and a BINDING LIFETIME value in the granted binding lifetime
field. Otherwise, if the verification fails, the HA will send a BACoT
message containing the generated CoT and the index (I) of the current
node key to the MN. The granted binding lifetime and the binding
refresh advice fields are set to the remaining binding lifetime in this
BACoT message.
4. Upon receipt of a valid BA message with a ‘Binding accepted’ status from
an HA, the MN accepts the message and the current run of the test ends.
4.1.3 The Segmenting IPv6 Address Space Method
As just discussed, by generating CoAs cryptographically and by testing MNs’
reachability at claimed CoAs, HAs gain confidence that CoAs claimed by MNs
match with the MNs’ real locations. However, there is still a chance that a
malicious MN could falsely claim a third party’s address as its CoA. To do this,
the third party’s address must have a long lifetime, and the malicious MN must be
located on the path between an HA and the third party. In this case, the malicious
MN could attempt about (261) tries to cryptographically generate a CoA that
matches the third party’s IPv6 address. Furthermore, as the malicious MN is on
the path between the HA and the third party, it would be able to intercept the
BACoT message and send the BUCoT message. Therefore, the ideas mentioned
in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 are complemented with the idea of segmenting IPv6
address space into three parts (home addresses, care-of addresses, and stationary
addresses) to reduce the number of targets that are vulnerable to DoS attacks
launched by malicious MNs.
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The segmenting IPv6 address space method distinguishes the addresses used
by MNs from those used by stationary nodes (SNs). Furthermore, it distinguishes
the addresses used by MNs as HoAs from those used by MNs as CoAs. This can
be done by dividing the IPv6 addresses into two groups: those that identify
SNs (group 1) and those that identify MNs (group 2). Furthermore, group 2
can be further divided into those that identify MNs located at their home links
(group 2.1) and those that identify MNs located at foreign links (group 2.2). In
this way, the IPv6 addresses that are vulnerable to flooding attacks launched by
malicious MNs are scoped to group 2.2 addresses. In other words, this method
(i.e. segmenting IPv6 address space) on its own can protect the IPv6 addresses
in group 1 and group 2.1 against malicious MNs flooding attacks.
The segmenting IPv6 address space method uses two bits of the IPv6 64-
bits interface identifier field to distinguish between SNs’ addresses and MNs’
addresses, and between MNs’ HoAs and MNs’ CoAs. As shown in Table 4.1,
the first bit, i.e. the Mobile/Stationary (M/S) bit, is used to indicate whether
an address is for a mobile or a stationary node, and the second bit, i.e. the
Home/Care-of (H/C) bit, is used to indicate whether the address is for a mobile
node at its home link or at a foreign link. The M/S and H/C bits are part of the
addresses; hence if a malicious MN changes them that will change the address and
the address owner will not be flooded by any directed packets. Consequently, the
proposed method prevents malicious MNs from impersonating either stationary
nodes or other MNs located at their home links. In addition, the method does
not impact the availability of the IPv6 address space. It divides the address space
into two groups, but the availability of the address space remains the same.
M/S H/C
0 X Stationary nodes (stationary IPv6 addresses)
1 0 Mobile nodes at foreign links (CoAs)
1 1 Mobile nodes at home links (HoAs)
X means either 0 or 1.
Table 4.1: M/S and H/C bits
The use of the proposed method must be deployed on a global scale on the
IPv6 Internet. It requires changing the way every IPv6 node in the world chooses
an IPv6 address, which seems unrealistic. However, the author can argue this
requirement as follows. Firstly, “IPv6 is still in its infancy in terms of general
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worldwide deployment” [59, 60] which makes it possible to be changed to support
the proposed method. Specifically, 5.5% of networks on the Internet could handle
IPv6 traffic by early 2010. Additionally, only 1.45% of the top 1000 websites had
an IPv6 website in January 2010. Secondly, the current IPv6 lacks any way
to know about a node from its address making it necessary to find a way to
differentiate between nodes, especially with the rapid growth of the number of
mobile devices connected to the Internet. Thirdly, the author believed that the
benefits of the proposed method far outweigh the costs, as it will not only be
used to support location authentication of mobile nodes but will also be used
in other applications to differentiate between redirectable and non-redirectable
IPv6 addresses, such as in MIPv6 route optimization, in protecting against future
address stealing [61], and in future protocols that allow redirecting of IP packets
from one IPv6 address to another one.
In summary, in the context of supporting location authentication of MNs to
HAs, the segmenting IPv6 address space method could protect nodes that use
stationary IPv6 addresses as well as MNs’ HoAs from being attacked as the result
of using MIPv6 protocol. This is because, with this method in place, it is not
possible for an MN to falsely claim that a SN’s address or another MN’s HoA is
its CoA.
4.2 The EHR Protocol Description
The EHR protocol is based on three ideas that (1) cryptographically generate
MNs’ CoAs based on a shared secret key; (2) verify MNs’ reachability at claimed
CoAs; and (3) differentiate between different address types. The EHR protocol
adds the three ideas mentioned above to the basic home registration protocol (see
Section 2.4) to help HAs authenticate MNs’ CoAs. The whole picture of the EHR
protocol is illustrated in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 and is detailed as follows.
1. When the MN roams into a foreign link, it uses a secret key along with the
foreign link’s subnet prefix to configure a new CoA using the symmetric
CGA-based generation algorithm. The MN also sets the M/S and the H/C
bits in the new CoA to one and zero, respectively. The MN then sends a BU
message to notify the HA about the new CoA. The BU message contains a
128-bit number representing the value of the modifier generated by the MN
while running the symmetric CGA-based generation algorithm. In addition,
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if the current run of the EHR protocol is to create a new binding at the
HA, the secret key is encrypted and carried in the BU message. If the
MN does not receive a matching response within a retransmission interval
of one second, the MN will resend the BU message to the HA. The MN
doubles the retransmission interval upon each retransmission in the same
way, as specified in the base specification of the MIPv6 protocol ([5], see
also Section 2.4).
2. Upon receipt of a BU message, the HA verifies the authenticity, integrity,
and freshness of the message, using an IPSec SA and a sequence number,
as in the basic home registration protocol. If any of these verifications
fails, the HA will discard the received message without any further action.
Otherwise, the HA will check that the values of the M/S and H/C bits
in the claimed CoA are ‘one’ and ‘zero’, respectively. If positive, the HA
will execute the symmetric CGA-based verification algorithm described in
Section 4.1.1 (see Figure 4.2). If the outcome of the algorithm is positive,
the HA will perform Procedure 1 described in Section 4.1.2 (see Figure 4.3),
which results in either (1) rejecting the received BU message and sending
a BA message to the MN with the binding status field set to ‘Rejected
due to maximum attempts from unreachable CoA has been reached’, or
(2) accepting the received BU message and sending a BACoT message to
the MN with the binding status field set to ‘Accepted for limited period’.
Otherwise, if the values of the M/S and H/C bits are not ‘one’ and ‘zero’,
respectively, and/or the address verification fails, the HA will reject the
received BU message and reply with a BA message in which the binding
status field is set to ‘Rejected due to failure in CoA verification’.
3. Upon receipt of a BACoT message, the MN verifies the authenticity, in-
tegrity, and freshness of the message as in the basic home registration pro-
tocol. If positive, the MN will send a BUCoT message, which contains the
CoT and I, back to the HA requesting a longer binding lifetime. Otherwise,
if any of these verifications is negative, the MN will discard the received
message without any further action. If the MN does not receive a matching
response within a retransmission interval of one second, the MN will resend
the BUCoT to the HA.
96
4.2. THE EHR PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
4. Upon receipt of a BUCoT message, the HA verifies the authenticity, in-
tegrity, and freshness of the message as in the basic home registration pro-
tocol. If any of these verifications is negative, the HA will discard the
received message without any further action. Otherwise, the HA will per-
form Procedure 2 (described in Section 4.1.2, see Figure 4.4), which results
in either (1) accepting the received BUCoT message and sending a BA mes-
sage to the MN with the binding status field set to ‘Binding Accepted’, or
(2) accepting the received BUCoT message and sending a BACoT message
to the MN with the binding status field set to ‘Accepted for limited period’.
5. Upon receipt of a BA message, the MN verifies the authenticity, integrity,
and freshness of the message as in the basic home registration protocol.
If negative, the MN will discard the received message without any further
action. Otherwise, the MN will check the status of the message. If the status
is ‘Binding accepted’, the MN will accept the message and the current run
of the protocol will end. Otherwise, the MN will take steps to fix the error
and retransmit the BU message, or will reinitiate the home registration by
instead trying a different HA.
Figure 4.5: EHR protocol at mobile node side
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Figure 4.6: EHR protocol at home agent side
The EHR protocol is based on the BHR protocol; it also uses IPSec ESP and
sequence numbers to protect home registrations. Therefore, the EHR protocol
has the same security protection as the BHR protocol. Specifically, it can protect
home registrations against outsider attacks; an attacker cannot send a spoofed
or a replayed BU message instead of the MN. It also can prevent malicious MNs
from falsely sending BU messages on behalf of other MNs.
Furthermore, the EHR protocol extends the BHR protocol to support the lo-
cation authentication of MNs to their HAs. It adds the novel ideas of segmenting
the IPv6 address space, using a symmetric CGA-based technique for generating
CoAs, and applying concurrent CoAs reachability tests to the basic home registra-
tion protocol. As a result, the EHR protocol reduces the likelihood of a malicious
MN being successful in luring an HA to flood a third party. Specifically, when
the BHR protocol is in place, a malicious MN can be anywhere on the Internet
and launch an attack against any node; all Internet nodes are potential targets.
On the other hand, when the EHR protocol is in place, a malicious MN would
need to (1) attempt about (261) tries to be able to produce a CoA that matches a
third-party’s IPv6 address; and (2) be on the path between the HA and the third
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party. In addition, the malicious MN cannot target stationary nodes or other
MNs at their home links.
4.3 Performance Evaluation
This section reports the performance evaluation of the EHR protocol by compar-
ing it to the basic home registration (BHR) protocol. This is done by using the
OPNET Modeler simulation package and the CryptoSys Cryptography Toolkit.
A brief description of these is given in Appendix C. The performance is measured
in terms of home registration delay (HR-Delay) measured in seconds and control
signalling overhead measured in bits per second. The HR-Delay is defined as the
total amount of time taken for the MN to receive an acknowledgement message
(i.e. a BACoT in the EHR protocol or a BA in the BHR protocol) from the HA,
once a BU message has been sent. The control signalling overhead is the total
amount of Mobile IPv6 signalling traffic sent and received by the MN and the
HA.
4.3.1 Simulation Modelling
In order to measure the performance of the EHR protocol, OPNETTM Modeler
version 14.5 has been used to simulate the performance of the protocol under
varying network conditions. In particular, the performance is investigated when
varying levels of background traffic on the network are applied and when various
numbers of simultaneously roaming MNs are served by the same HA. The sim-
ulation results obtained are then compared to those when the BHR protocol is
run.
The network model, depicted in Figure 4.7, is composed of three CNs that are
connected via routers (R1 to R3) to the Internet. An HA and three access routers
(AR1 to AR3) each one representing a different IPv6 subnet are also connected
to the Internet. MNs, initially located at a home subnet, move to foreign subnets
and return back to the home subnet along the same route. When the MNs are
away from the home subnet, they register with the HA; i.e. the same HA serves
all the MNs. The MNs are initially located at the same position; move from one
subnet to another at the same speed; and wait the same interruption time at each
subnet before moving to the next subnet. In this way, all the MNs will perform
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handoff and consequently initiate the home (de)registration process at the same
time.
The HA, the Rs, and the ARs are placed at a fixed distance of 1 km (kilometre)
apart from the Internet. The value of 1 km has been chosen to make the validation
of the simulation model straightforward, but without loss of generality. The HA
and the ARs have been positioned in such a way that provide a continuous wireless
coverage area for the MNs. Each MN is communicating with the three CNs at
the same time and running three Internet applications, i.e. web browsing, email
and file transfer. These applications are selected because they are likely to be
the dominant applications in the Internet [62]. The MNs perform one hundred
passes (movement between HA and AR3) with six handoffs in each pass (five
registrations and one deregistration). The OPNET Modeler’s documentation
recommends thirty as an initial rule of thumb for the number of repetitions to use.
However, one hundred passes have been chosen (i.e. five hundreds registrations)
in the hope of averaging out any possible fluctuating factors.
Figure 4.7: Simulation model
Three separate simulation studies are performed. The first one is created to
investigate the impact of the EHR protocol on HR-Delay, i.e. whether the EHR
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protocol has led to any performance degradation through increasing HR-Delay.
In this study, ten background traffic scenarios ranging from 0% to 90% at 10%
increments are applied to investigate how different volumes of traffic may affect
the results of the HR-Delay. The second simulation study is to investigate the
impact of number of MNs served by an HA on the performance of the EHR pro-
tocol. In this study, the number of simultaneously roaming MNs varied between
one and one hundred as this is the default value for the maximum number of
MNs that can be served by one HA (maximum Binding Cache size). The third
simulation study is to investigate the control signalling overhead produced at the
MN and the HA when both of EHR and BHR protocols are executed.
4.3.2 Simulation Model Validation
This section validates the simulation model so that any collected results could be
considered reliable. For doing so, a validation process that consists of two phases
is adopted. The first phase involves the use of the OPNET debugger to prove that
the EHR protocol operates correctly. The OPNET debugger is applied to output
the processes of generating and verifying both a CoA and a CoT. In addition,
relevant packets’ information (i.e. source address, destination address, value of
modifier, value of CoT, and packet size) has been inspected during runtime. The
second phase involves deriving a theoretical equation for the calculation of the
HR-Delay under the condition that the underlying network is unloaded, i.e. the
only traffic in the network is the home registration signalling messages. Next
theoretical results are calculated. These are compared to the simulation results
collected under the same conditions to validate the correctness of the simulation
model.
4.3.2.1 The Validation Process: Phase One
The output from the OPNET debugger during simulation runtime is illustrated
in Appendix C. Trace labels have been defined in the code to request output of
specific information while monitoring simulation output. By observing the out-
put, the messages exchanged were confirmed to be consistent with the expected
mobility signalling exchanged between the MN and the HA.
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4.3.2.2 The Validation Process: Phase Two
A simplified simulation model and a theoretical validation model are constructed
to measure and calculate, respectively, the HR-Delay for the EHR protocol. The
theoretically calculated results are compared to the simulation results collected
under the same conditions, i.e. under the same assumptions and parameter value
settings, to validate the correctness of the simulation model.
Theoretical Model
For the purpose of simulation and validation, the equation for calculating theo-
retical value of the HR-Delay is as follows:
HR−Delay = Delay for BU message + Delay for BACoT message
+ Delay for HoA DAD test (4.1)
The delays for BU and BACoT messages are functions of four delays, i.e. trans-
mission delay, propagation delay, queuing delay, and processing delay. The BU
and BACoT messages are exchanged between various nodes before they reach
their final destination. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 illustrate the HR-Delay for each node
involved in processing and/or forwarding of the BU and BACoT messages. These
figures illustrate how the various delays that are experienced at each node are
combined together to calculate the total HR-Delay for the validation model. The
remainder of this section details how theoretical values for the five main delays
are calculated.
Figure 4.8: Theoretical delay for BU message
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Figure 4.9: Theoretical delay for BACoT message
• Transmission Delay
Transmission delay is the amount of time required to transmit all of the packet’s
bits onto the link. The equation for calculating transmission delay is as follows:
Transmission−Delay = Packet Size / Bandwidth (4.2)
Packet Size refers to the total amount of bits in a packet; whereas, Bandwidth
specifies the data transmission rate of a link.
• Propagation Delay
Propagation delay is the time taken by the packet’s bits to propagate from one
network node to another. The equation for calculating propagation delay is as
follows:
Propagation−Delay = Distance / Propagation Speed (4.3)
Distance in metres refers to the distance between the two network nodes.
Propagation Speed is usually equivalent to the Speed of Light which equals
300,000,000 metres per second in a vacuum (wired-link) and equals 299,702,547
metres per second in airspace (wireless-link).
• Queuing Delay
Queuing delay consists of message arrival queuing delay and message transmis-
sion queuing delay. The former is the amount of time that an arrived message
waits at the inbound network interface before being processed. The latter is
the amount of time that a processed message spent waiting at the outbound
network interface for transmission. The two delays depend entirely on the
level of packet congestion at the interface. By assuming a ‘zero’ background
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traffic, there are no extra packet queued at either the inbound interface or
the outbound interface, hence queuing delays are considered as insignificant
and negligible in this case. Therefore, the queuing delay is set to zero in the
theoretical validation model.
• Processing Delay
Processing delay refers to the amount of time taken to process an outgoing or in-
coming packet at the sender or receiver node respectively. The processing delay
for the EHR protocol is based on a HMAC SHA1 delay. The HMAC SHA1 de-
lay depends on processor speed whereby an increase in processor power leads to
a decrease in the HMAC SHA1 delay and vice versa. The HMAC SHA1 func-
tion is used by the HA twice to verify MN’s CoA and to generate a fresh CoT.
The HMAC SHA1 delay is measured on a DELL computer with the following
configuration:
Operating System: Window XP professional
Installed Memory: 2.00 GB
Processor Class: Pentium D
Processor Speed: 3.00 GHz.
1. The HMAC SHA1 delay for generating ID of CoA = 5.011 microseconds
2. The HMAC SHA1 delay for generating CoT = 4.966 microseconds
• HoA Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) Delay
HoA DAD delay is the amount of time taken by an HA, upon receipt of a BU
message, to perform a DAD test on the MN’s home link before sending back
a BACoT message. The HA performs the DAD test to ensure that no other
node on the home link is using the MN’s HoA when the BU message arrives.
The HA needs to perform a DAD test for an MN’s HoA when it creates a new
binding for that HoA. In other words, if the HA already has a Binding Cache
entry for a HoA, it means that the HA has already performed the required
DAD test before and there is no need to repeat it. The equation for calculating
HoA DAD delay is as follows [63]:
HoA DAD Delay = TRT + TWT (4.4)
TRT is the delay time in seconds that the HA must randomly wait after re-
ceiving a BU message before initializing the DAD test. Whereas, TWT is the
waiting time in seconds that the HA must wait after sending a neighbour so-
licitation message that includes MN’s HoA, as the solicitation’s target address,
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without receiving a neighbour advertisement reply to indicate DAD test suc-
cess. According to [20] the value of TRT is between 0 and 1000 milliseconds
and the value of TWT is about 1000 milliseconds. Consequently, the minimum
value of HoA DAD Delay is 1.0 seconds and the maximum value is 2.0 seconds.
Therefore the theoretical value of the HoA DAD Delay is calculated as 1.5
seconds when the MN is roaming from the home link to a foreign link and is 0
seconds when the MN is either roaming from a foreign link to another foreign
link or roaming back from a foreign link to the home link.
Figure 4.10: Simplified simulation model
Simplified Simulation Model
The simplified simulation model, depicted in Figure 4.10, is composed of a single
MN that is located at a home link, an HA that represents the home link, and an
access router (AR) that represents a foreign link. The model has the following
assumptions. (1) The underlying network is unloaded, i.e. background traffic is
set to 0%. (2) The HA and the AR are placed at a fixed distance (wired-distance)
of 1000 metres apart from the Internet. (3) The distance between the MN and the
AR (wireless-distance) is 300 metres. (4) The propagation speed in wired-links is
set to 300,000,000 metres per second. (5) The propagation speed in wireless-links
is set to 299,702,547 metres per second. (6) The IPv6 Internet cloud has a single
router. (7) The amount of time taken by the HA to perform a DAD test on the
MN’s HoA is set to 1.5 seconds. (8) The secret key used in the CoA generation
and verification processes is shared between the MN and the HA in advance. (9)
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The wired-link bandwidth and the wireless-link bandwidth are variable, i.e. a
different set of wired and wireless data transmission rates are applied.
Comparing Theoretical and Simulated Results
To validate the simulation model, Equation 4.1 is used to calculate a theoretical
value for the HR-Delay at 0% background traffic load. This value is then com-
pared to that obtained when the simulation model is run at 0% load. In order to
further confirm the accuracy of the simulation model, it was validated at different
wireless and wired data transmission rates. The validation results are shown in
Figures 4.11 and 4.12. The results show a gap between the theoretical results
and the simulation results. This gap is probably due to the processing delay
that was used in the theoretical model. To validate this suspicion, the processing
delay from Intel Pentium-133 was obtained and used to produce some adjusted
theoretical results illustrated in Figures 4.13 and 4.14. The HMAC SHA1 Delay
was re-measured on a DELL computer with the following configuration:
Operating System: Window 95
Installed Memory: 16 MB
Processor Class: Pentium I
Processor Speed: 133 MHz.
1. The HMAC SHA1 delay for generating ID of CoA = 155.47 microseconds
2. The HMAC SHA1 delay for generating CoT = 155.42 microseconds
The adjusted theoretical results show that the gap between theoretical and
simulation results has narrowed; hence, it confirmed that this insignificant gap is
due to the value of the processing delay that was used in the theoretical model.
As a result of the success of the adopted validation process, the simulation model
has been successfully validated; hence any results collated by the simulation could
be considered reliable.
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Figure 4.11: Theoretical and simulated results for HR-Delay at different wireless
links’ data transmission rates (wired data transmission rate is 1,544,000 bps)
Figure 4.12: Theoretical and simulated results for HR-Delay at different wired
links’ data transmission rates (wireless data transmission rate is 11,000,000 bps)
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Figure 4.13: Adjusted validation results at different wireless data transmission
rates (wired data transmission rate is 1,544,000 bps)
Figure 4.14: Adjusted validation results at different wired data transmission
rates (wireless data transmission rate is 11,000,000 bps)
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4.3.3 Simulation Results
This section presents and analyses simulation results obtained from the simulation
study of both the HR-Delay and the control signalling overhead. It compares the
results of both the EHR protocol and the BHR protocol.
4.3.3.1 Home Registration Delay
This section presents an analysis of the HR-Delay simulation results. A selection
of the simulation results are shown in Figure 4.15 to Figure 4.25. In these results,
the HoA DAD delay is set to zero even during the first registration of a CoA at
an HA, i.e. when an MN roams from a home subnet to a foreign subnet. The
reason for this is that the OPNET calculates this delay using a random number
generator, which affects the accuracy of the collected results.
Figures 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 show the HR-Delay during registration (handovers
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) and deregistration (handover 6) processes at different network
loads. The figures show that (1) in each of the two protocols, the HR-Delays at
handovers number 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are nearly identical, i.e. during registration
process; (2) the EHR protocol has a higher HR-Delay than the BHR protocol
at handovers number 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, i.e. during registration process; and (3)
the HR-Delay is identical in the two protocols at handover number 6, i.e. during
deregistration process. The reason for this is that in the deregistration process
the two protocol operate the same way, i.e. there is no difference between them.
In order to further compare performance of the EHR protocol against perfor-
mance of the BHR protocol, the average HR-Delays for registration and dereg-
istration at different network loads are measured and illustrated in Figure 4.18
and Figure 4.19, respectively. As shown, the HR-Delays for registration and
deregistration increase exponentially as the network load increases. This pattern
is caused by the increase in the queuing delay experienced at each node. Fig-
ure 4.18 shows that, on average, the EHR protocol takes 3.76% longer than the
BHR protocol to allow an MN to register a CoA. This is caused by (1) the ad-
ditional two (computationally light) HMAC SHA1 operations performed by the
HA, and (2) the increase in the size of the BU and BACoT messages exchanged
in the EHR protocol compared to the BU and BA messages exchanged in the
BHR protocol. Figure 4.19 shows that, on average, the EHR protocol is identical
to the BHR protocol in allowing the MN to deregister the CoA.
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Figure 4.15: HR-Delay for BHR and EHR protocols vs. handover (one MN,
three CNs, 0% load)
Figure 4.16: HR-Delay for BHR and EHR protocols vs. handover (one MN,
three CNs, 30% load)
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Figure 4.17: HR-Delay for BHR and EHR protocols vs. handover (one MN,
three CNs, 80% load)
Figure 4.18: Average HR-Delay (registration) for BHR and EHR protocols vs.
load (one MN, three CNs)
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Figure 4.19: Average HR-Delay (deregistration) for BHR and EHR protocols vs.
load (one MN, three CNs)
The effect of the number of simultaneously roaming MNs on the performance
of the EHR protocol is depicted in Figures 4.20 to 4.23. In these figures, the
mean result (Average), the minimum result (Min), the maximum result (Max),
the mean result minus the standard deviation (Lower), and the mean result plus
the standard deviation (Upper) are all presented. It can be seen from these
figures that the HR-Delays for registration and deregistration increase linearly
as the number of simultaneously roaming MNs increases. That is, the HR-Delay
is proportional to the number of simultaneously roaming MNs. In addition, it
can be seen that as the number of simultaneously roaming MNs increases, the
deviation from the mean result increases. These are caused by the increased
queuing time on the HA side, as a high number of simultaneously roaming MNs
means a high number of BU messages to be processed at the HA.
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Figure 4.20: HR-Delay (registration) for EHR protocol vs. number of MNs (0%
load)
Figure 4.21: HR-Delay (registration) for EHR protocol vs. number of MNs (90%
load)
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Figure 4.22: HR-Delay (deregistration) for EHR protocol vs. number of MNs
(0% load)
Figure 4.23: HR-Delay (deregistration) for EHR protocol vs. number of MNs
(90% load)
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Figure 4.24 and Figure 4.25 compare the performance of the BHR and EHR
protocols as the number of simultaneously roaming MNs increases. As shown, the
EHR protocol has higher rates of increase of HR-Delay than the BHR protocol
during registration. This is because HAs in the EHR protocol are required to
perform more operations during registration than in the BHR protocol. Conse-
quently, the queuing time on the HA side in the EHR protocol increases faster
than it does in the BHR protocol. Therefore, as the number of simultaneously
roaming MNs increases, the HR-Delay in the BHR protocol increases less quickly
than in the EHR protocol.
Figure 4.24: HR-Delay (registration) for BHR and EHR protocols vs. number of
MNs (0% load)
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Figure 4.25: HR-Delay (registration) for BHR and EHR protocols vs. number of
MNs (90% load)
4.3.3.2 Control Signalling Overhead
This section presents an analysis of control signalling overhead results for the
BHR and EHR protocols. Figure 4.26 and Figure 4.27 show control signalling
overheads at the MN side and HA side, respectively. Generally, the reason for
any differences in control signalling overhead between BHR and EHR at an entity
is due to the difference in the number and length of signalling messages received
and/or sent at that entity. The following two observations can be made from
these figures: (1) the amount of control signalling overhead at both the MN and
HA are identical in the two protocols during deregistration processes; and (2)
while registering a new CoA, control signalling overhead at both the MN and HA
in EHR is about 126% higher than in BHR.
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Figure 4.26: Control signalling overhead (bits/sec) for BHR and EHR protocols
at MN
Figure 4.27: Control signalling overhead (bits/sec) for BHR and EHR protocols
at HA
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4.3.3.3 Discussions
From the simulation results presented, the following observations can be made:
• Firstly, the performance of the two protocols are identical during the dereg-
istration process.
• Secondly, the performance of the EHR protocol and the BHR protocol in
terms of HR-Delay is comparable.
• Thirdly, the impact of the increase in number of simultaneous roaming MNs
that are served by the same HA on the performance of the EHR protocol
is higher than in the BHR protocol.
• Fourthly, the EHR protocol doubles the control signalling overheads at both
the MN and the HA as a price to pay for supporting the location authen-
tication of MNs to their HAs.
Overall, the author concludes that if a comparison between both the EHR pro-
tocol and the BHR protocol is performed on the basis of efficiency as well as
security, the EHR protocol renders itself superior.
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented the design of a novel enhanced home registration
(EHR) protocol that allows HAs to verify MNs’ ownership of claimed CoAs. The
EHR protocol makes use of a combination of three ideas. Firstly, it generates
CoAs cryptographically using a symmetric CGA-based technique. Secondly, it
applies a concurrent CoA reachability test to verify MNs’ reachability at claimed
CoAs. Thirdly, it uses a novel method to determine hosts’ types based on their
IPv6 addresses.
A simulation model of EHR has been constructed using the OPNET Modeler.
The model has been validated using the OPNET Modeler debugger and using
theoretical calculations. The analysis of simulation results has demonstrated
that EHR only introduces a marginal increase in the registration delay, but a
significant increase in the signalling overhead as a cost of supporting the location
authentication of MNs.
In the next chapter, a family of correspondent registration protocols is pre-
sented. These protocols require the use of the EHR protocol between MNs and
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their HAs in registering MNs’ CoAs. They rely on the assistance of HAs to
confirm the MNs’ ownership of the claimed CoAs and HoAs to the CNs.
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A Family of Correspondent
Registration Protocols
This chapter presents the design of a family of correspondent registration pro-
tocols. Section 5.1 describes the design objectives for the protocols. Section 5.2
outlines the design principles for the protocols and the common assumptions on
which the design is based. Section 5.3 gives an overview of the protocols and
their three phases: the creation phase, the update phase, and the deletion phase.
Section 5.4 presents detailed descriptions of the protocols. Finally, Section 5.5
summarises the chapter.
5.1 Design Requirements
The security and performance requirements mentioned in Section 2.2.2 have been
identified as the design objectives for the protocols. These requirements are:
• (S1) To provide authenticity of the claimed home address to assure the CN
that the binding request has originated from the entity that owns the home
address.
• (S2) To provide authenticity of the claimed care-of address to assure the CN
that the entity that sent the binding request is actually located at the care-of
address.
• (S3) To provide integrity of the binding request to detect the unauthorised
modification of binding data.
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• (S4) To provide freshness of the binding request to prevent replay attacks.
• (S5) To provide protection for all involved entities against resource exhaustion
DoS attacks.
• (P1) To minimize delay introduced as a result of securing correspondent reg-
istrations.
• (P2) To minimize the number of expensive operations performed by the mobile
node.
• (P3) To minimize the number and length of messages sent/received by the
mobile node.
5.2 Design Preliminaries
Before presenting the design of the protocols, we first highlight the assumptions
and principles behind their design.
5.2.1 Design Assumptions
The following assumptions have been used in the design of the protocols.
• (A1) The protocols are designed for both stationary and mobile CNs. When
the CN is stationary, hereafter referred to as the stationary CN case, the pro-
tocol entities are an MN, an HA, and a CN. When the CN is also mobile,
hereafter referred to as the mobile CN case, the protocol entities are an MN,
an MN’s HA (denoted as HAMN), a CN, and a CN’s HA (denoted as HACN).
• (A2) A mobile node and its home agent have a preconfigured bidirectional
security association for encrypted and authenticated communication. They use
IPSec ESP protocol to protect mobility-related messages exchanged between
them. Therefore, (1) in the stationary CN case: the MN and HA share a
secret key (KMN−HA); and (2) in the mobile CN case: the MN and HAMN
share a secret key (KMN−HAMN ) and the CN and HACN share a secret key
(KCN−HACN ).
• (A3) A mobile node and its home agent agree on a validity period, where any
mobility-related messages received by the home agent after this validity period
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will be rejected. This validity period is to protect the home agent against
replay attacks and should be kept reasonably short.
• (A4) A mobile node’s home agent is a trusted entity. The mobile node and
the correspondent node trust that the home agent does not misbehave on its
own (both in the stationary and mobile CN cases).
• (A5) Cryptographic primitives are secure. That is, well-known primitives such
as the AES secret-key algorithm [64], the RSA public-key algorithm [65], and
the SHA-512 hash algorithm [66], are secure.
5.2.2 Design Principles
The following measures have been taken in the design of the correspondent reg-
istration protocols in order to satisfy the requirements mentioned in Section 5.1.
• Measure 1: The enhanced home registration (EHR) protocol, detailed in
Chapter 4, is used between the MN and its HA. When the MN roams away
from its home link, it uses the EHR protocol to register its new CoA with the
HA. The EHR protocol enables the HA to securely authenticate the MN’s own-
ership of the CoA. Therefore, it enables the HA to participate in correspondent
registrations by confirming the MN’s CoA to the CN.
• Measure 2: The idea of early binding updates ([39], see also Section 3.2.1)
is used to minimise registration delay in the update phase. That is, when the
CN receives an authentic binding update request from the MN, it registers the
claimed CoA enclosed in the request and sends subsequent packets destined
for the MN to that CoA while concurrently confirming the correctness of that
CoA with the MN’s home link. The CN limits the amount of data sent to the
unconfirmed CoA through granting a short binding lifetime instead of using
a Credit-Based Authorization technique ([39], see also Section 3.2.1). In this
way, the complexity at the CN is not increased as it does not implement the
technique.
• Measure 3: The remaining lifetime (LTBRem) for the binding of HoA and CoA
at the HA’s Binding Cache entry for the MN, and at the MN’s Binding Update
List entry for the HA, is used as a timestamp to protect the HA against replay
attacks. That is, as the HA is involved in the protocols, the HA is enabled to
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verify the freshness of binding creation and confirmation requests received from
the MN and the CN, respectively, through the use of LTBRem. Specifically, the
value of LTBRem is enclosed in binding creation requests sent by the MN to
the HA. It is also enclosed in binding confirmation requests sent by the CN
to the HA. In the latter case, the MN encrypts the values of its HoA and
CoA, the CN’s address, and the LTBRem using a secret key shared with the
HA (Assumption A2). The MN then encloses the coded data to the binding
update request sent to the CN, which forwards it to the HA in the binding
confirmation request. In this way, the HA can detect replay attacks without
the need of clock synchronization; the only requirement is having accurate
clocks at the HA and the MN.
• Measure 4: The idea of increasing the maximum binding lifetime is used to
reduce the number of redundant binding refreshes, thereby reducing signalling
overheads. However, increasing the maximum binding lifetime could enable
malicious MNs to flood foreign networks. For example, the MN could send a
binding creation/update request to the CN requesting the maximum binding
lifetime for its CoA. The MN would next start to download a heavy stream of
data from the CN. The MN would then roam to a different network without
informing the CN. As a result, the CN would continue to send subsequent traffic
to the MN’s old CoA, flooding the MN’s old foreign network with excessive
unwanted data. Therefore, it is recommended that the CN periodically run a
care-of address reachability test, every few minutes, especially when the CN is
sending heavy streams of data to the MN’s CoA. That is, the CN generates
and sends a fresh token to the MN’s CoA for reachability reconfirmation. If
the CN does not receive a response within a specific interval, it deactivates its
cache entry for the MN and sends subsequent data to the MN’s HoA.
5.3 Protocols Overview
The proposed correspondent registration protocols rely on the assistance of the
MN’s home link to enable the CN to securely authenticate the MN’s ownership
of the HoA and the CoA; the HA of the MN asserts to the CN that the MN is
the legitimate owner of the HoA and it is indeed connected to the CoA. These
protocols are in three categories depending on the relationship between MNs’
home links and CNs: (1) the SK-based protocol for use when a secret key is
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shared, (2) the PK-based protocol for use when the home link has a certified
public/private key pair, and (3) the INF-based protocol for use when no prior
relationship exists.
The three protocols are designed as shown in Figure 5.1. Each protocol is
divided into three phases: the creation phase, the update phase, and the deletion
phase. Each of the protocols has its own creation phase. However, they all have
the same update and deletion phases. The creation phase is to allow the CN to
securely identify the MN and to establish a session key between the two nodes.
It also allows the MN to create a new binding at the CN. The update phase is
to allow the MN to securely update the CN with its new CoA after roaming to
a new foreign link. It also allows the MN to securely extend the lifetime of an
existing binding that is about to expire at the CN. The deletion phase is to allow
the MN to securely delete its binding at the CN.
The creation phase: The creation phase is executed only once to provide au-
thentication of the MN and its home link to the CN, and the establishment of
registration session keys. Specifically, the creation phase consists of three steps.
In the first step, the CN verifies the MN’s reachability at the HoA and/or the
CoA. In the second step, the CN securely identifies and establishes session keys
with the MN and the home link. The CN also creates a new binding between
the HoA and the CoA. In the third step, the MN confirms the binding creation
request to the CN and the CN acknowledges it to the MN. This extra confirma-
tion is to assure the CN that the MN did not roam to a new CoA while the HA
and the CN were running the protocol. The creation phase runs parallel to data
transfer between the MN and the CN through the MN’s home link; thus, a high
delay is acceptable during this phase.
The update phase: The update phase is executed every time the MN needs
to update its binding at the CN. It consists of three steps. In the first step, the
MN sends an early binding update request to the CN. Upon receipt of this re-
quest, the CN registers the claimed CoA and sends subsequent packets destined
for the MN to that CoA. In the second step, the CN verifies the request with
the home link. In the third step, the CN returns an optional acknowledgement
to the MN. The early binding update request, the request verification, and the
acknowledgement messages are protected using the session keys established in the
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Figure 5.1: Overview of correspondent registration protocols - stationary CN case
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creation phase. The communication between the MN and the CN is interrupted
during the update phase (if the MN changes its CoA), and thus, the proposed
correspondent registration protocols use an early binding update to minimise the
delay during this phase.
The deletion phase: The deletion phase is executed every time the MN wants
to remove its binding at the CN. It consists of two steps. In the first step, the
MN sends a binding deletion request to the CN. In the second step, the CN
returns an optional acknowledgement to the MN. The binding deletion request
and the acknowledgement messages are protected using the session key established
between the MN and the CN in the creation phase.
5.4 Protocols Design
This section describes the design of the three protocols. As each of the three
protocols has its own creation phase, the section is divided into five subsections:
(1) the creation phase for the SK-based protocol (CRE-SK phase); (2) the creation
phase for the PK-based protocol (CRE-PK phase); (3) the creation phase for the
INF-based protocol (CRE-INF phase); (4) the update (UPD) phase; and (5) the
deletion (DEL) phase.
5.4.1 The Creation Phase for the SK-based Protocol
The following additional assumption has been used in the design of the SK-based
protocol.
• (SK1) A mobile node’s home link shares a long-term secret key with a cor-
respondent node before an invocation of the protocol. Specifically, (1) in the
stationary CN case: the HA and CN share a secret key (KHA−CN); and (2) in
the mobile CN case: the HAMN and CN share a secret key (KHAMN−CN).
The creation phase for the SK-based protocol in the stationary CN case is de-
signed as shown in Figure 5.2. It consists of eight messages, M1-SK to M8-SK,
and nine steps, S1-SK to S9-SK. Each of these messages is given a specific name:
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• M1-SK: Care-of Test Init - denoted as CoTI.
• M2-SK: Care-of Test - denoted as CoT.
• M3-SK: Binding Request - denoted as BReq.
• M4-SK: Binding Reply - denoted as BRep.
• M5-SK: Early Binding Creation - denoted as EBC.
• M6-SK: Early Binding Acknowledgement - denoted as EBA.
• M7-SK: Binding Creation Confirmation - denoted as BCC.
• M8-SK: Binding Acknowledgement - denoted as BA.
Figure 5.2: Creation phase for the SK-based protocol - stationary CN case
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• Step S1-SK: The MN sends message M1-SK to initiate the creation phase
and to check whether the CN supports route optimization.
• Step S2-SK: The CN sends message M2-SK, which contains a fresh token
(Token2), to the MN. Token2 will be returned to the CN later to protect the
CN against replay attacks and prove the MN’s reachability at the claimed CoA.
• Step S3-SK: The MN securely sends message M3-SK to request binding cre-
ation with the CN from the HA. The MN includes the CoA, the CN’s address,
an initial sequence number (Seq), a binding lifetime request (LTBReq), Token2,
and the remaining lifetime for the binding of HoA and CoA at both the MN and
the HA (LTBRem) in the message. LTBRem is used as a timestamp to protect
the HA against replay attacks.
• Step S4-SK: Upon receipt of message M3-SK, the HA checks the values of
the LTBRem and CoA to verify the freshness of the message and correctness
of the claimed CoA, respectively. The HA also checks the value of LTBReq to
confirm that the MN is not requesting a binding lifetime that is greater than
the remaining binding lifetime at the HA. Upon positive verifications, the HA
generates two keys (KBC1 and KBC2) from fresh nonces and the secret key
shared with the CN. The HA then securely sends message M4-SK to the MN
to deliver key KBC1. The HA includes the Seq and CN’s address in message
M4-SK. At the same time, the HA sends message M5-SK to the CN to request
binding creation on behalf of the MN. The HA includes the fresh nonces, the
MN’s HoA and CoA, the Seq, the LTBReq, and Token2 in message M5-SK. In
addition, the HA protects message M5-SK using key KBC2.
• Step S5-SK: Upon receipt of message M4-SK, the MN checks the value of
Seq to verify freshness of the message. Upon positive verification, the MN
stores key KBC1 in the Binding Update List entry for the CN.
• Step S6-SK: Upon receipt of message M5-SK, the CN checks the value of
Token2 to verify freshness of the message and reachability of the MN at the
claimed CoA. Upon positive verification, the CN generates KBC1 and KBC2
from the secret key shared with the MN’s home link and the fresh nonces
enclosed in the message. The CN then verifies the integrity and authenticity of
message M5-SK using key KBC2. Upon positive verification, the CN generates
a fresh key (KMN−CN), creates a Binding Cache entry, and stores the binding
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between the MN’s HoA and CoA as well as the values of Seq, LTBReq, and
KMN−CN at the entry. The CN also sets granted binding lifetime (LTBGrant)
in the entry to a MIN BINDING LIFETIME value to handle the case of the
MN roaming to a new CoA while the HA and the CN are running the protocol.
Finally, the CN sends message M6-SK to the MN to deliver key KMN−CN
and to acknowledge the binding of the CoA. The CN includes Seq, LTBGrant,
and the encryption of key KMN−CN using key KBC1 in message M6-SK. In
addition, the CN protects the message using key KMN−CN .
• Step S7-SK: Upon receipt of message M6-SK, the MN checks the value of
the Seq to verify the freshness of the message. Upon positive verification, the
MN decrypts key KMN−CN using key KBC1. The MN then verifies the integrity
and authenticity of message M6-SK using key KMN−CN . Upon positive ver-
ification, the MN updates the value of KBC1 with the value of KMN−CN and
sends message M7-SK to the CN requesting a greater binding lifetime, con-
firming the receipt of KMN−CN and showing the existence at the CoA. The MN
includes a new sequence number (Seqnew) that is greater than the value of the
Seq sent by the MN in message M3-SK. In addition, the MN protects message
M7-SK using key KMN−CN .
• Step S8-SK: Upon receipt of message M7-SK, the CN checks the value of
the Seqnew to verify the freshness of the message. Upon positive verification,
the CN verifies the integrity and authenticity of message M7-SK using key
KMN−CN . Upon positive verification, the CN updates the Binding Cache entry
for the MN by storing the value of Seqnew enclosed in the message and by
setting LTBGrant to a value that is less than or equal to LTBReq. Finally, the
CN sends message M8-SK to the MN to acknowledge the binding of the CoA.
The CN includes the Seqnew and LTBGrant in message M8-SK. In addition,
the CN protects message M8-SK using key KMN−CN .
• Step S9-SK: Upon receipt of message M8-SK, the MN checks the value of
the Seqnew to verify the freshness of the message. Upon positive verification,
the MN verifies the integrity and authenticity of message M8-SK using key
KMN−CN . Upon positive verification, the MN updates the value of LTBGrant
in the Binding Update List entry for the CN.
A more detailed description of these execution steps is given in Appendix D.
129
5.4. PROTOCOLS DESIGN
Figure 5.3: Creation phase for the SK-based protocol - mobile CN case
The creation phase for the SK-based protocol in the mobile CN case is shown in
Figure 5.3. In this case, the CN is also mobile and could be away from its home
link. As a result, the MN and the HAMN send different binding-related messages
to the CN’s home address. If the CN is located in its home link, it will receive the
messages directly. Otherwise, the HACN will intercept and forward the messages
to the CN’s current care-of address via an IPSec ESP secure tunnel. In addition,
the CN sends different binding-related messages while it is away from home via
HACN (‘reverse tunnelling’). Apart from these points, the creation phases for
SK-based protocol in the stationary and mobile CN cases are the same.
5.4.2 The Creation Phase for the PK-based Protocol
The following additional assumption has been used in the design of the PK-based
protocol.
• (PK1) A mobile node’s home link has a certified public/private key pair (PKH ,
SKH); a trusted CA has issued the home link’s public key and a PKI is in place.
The home link possesses the key pair before an invocation of the protocol.
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The creation phase for the PK-based protocol in the stationary CN case is de-
signed as shown in Figure 5.4. It consists of eight messages, M1-PK to M8-PK,
and nine steps, S1-PK to S9-PK. Each of these messages is given a specific name:
Figure 5.4: Creation phase for the PK-based protocol - stationary CN case
• M1-PK: Care-of Test Init - denoted as CoTI.
• M2-PK: Care-of Test - denoted as CoT.
• M3-PK: Binding Request - denoted as BReq.
• M4-PK: Early Binding Creation - denoted as EBC.
• M5-PK: Early Binding Acknowledgement - denoted as EBA.
• M6-PK: Binding Reply - denoted as BRep.
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• M7-PK: Binding Creation Confirmation - denoted as BCC.
• M8-PK: Binding Acknowledgement - denoted as BA.
• Steps S1-PK and S2-PK: Steps S1-PK and S2-PK are identical, respec-
tively, to Steps S1-SK and S2-SK mentioned in Section 5.4.1.
• Step S3-PK: Step S3-PK is identical to Step S3-SK, but the MN includes
the hash value of Token2 (KBM = SHA1 (Token2)) instead of Token2 in message
M3-PK sent to the HA.
• Step S4-PK: The first part of Step S4-PK is identical to the first part of
Step S4-SK. Specifically, upon receipt of message M3-PK, the HA checks
the values of LTBRem, CoA, and LTBReq to verify the freshness of the message,
correctness of the claimed CoA, and to confirm that the binding lifetime re-
quested by the MN is not greater than the remaining binding lifetime at the
HA, respectively. However, upon positive verifications, the HA sends message
M4-PK to the CN to request binding creation on behalf of the MN. The HA
includes a fresh nonce (NHA), the MN’s HoA and CoA, the Seq, the LTBReq,
the HA’s signature on the message using the home link’s private key, and a
keyed hash value using key KBM in message M4-PK. This keyed hash value
is to protect the CN against replay attacks and resource exhaustion DoS at-
tacks. The HA also temporary stores the values of NHA and KBM to verify the
freshness, integrity, and authenticity of the response from that CN.
• Step S5-PK: Upon receipt of message M4-PK, the CN generates key KBM
from token Token2, and then verifies the freshness of the message and reachabil-
ity of the MN at the claimed CoA using key KBM . Upon positive verification,
the CN verifies the signature to confirm the integrity and authenticity of the
message. Upon positive verification, the CN generates two fresh session keys
(KMN−CN and KHA−CN), creates a Binding Cache entry, and stores the bind-
ing between the MN’s HoA and CoA, as well as the values of Seq, LTBReq,
KMN−CN , and KHA−CN at the entry. The CN also sets LTBGrant in the entry
to a MIN BINDING LIFETIME value to handle the case of the MN roaming to
a new CoA while the HA and the CN are running the protocol. Finally, the CN
sends message M5-PK to the MN’s HoA to deliver the two session keys and
to acknowledge the binding of the CoA. The CN includes NHA, Seq, LTBGrant,
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and the encryption of the two session keys using the home link’s public key in
message M5-PK. In addition, the CN protects the message using key KBM .
• Step S6-PK: The HA intercepts message M5-PK and checks the value of
NHA to verify the freshness of the message. Upon positive verification, the HA
verifies the integrity and authenticity of the message using key KBM . Upon
positive verification, the HA decrypts the session keys, KMN−CN and KHA−CN ,
using the home link’s private key. The HA then securely sends message M6-
PK to the MN to deliver key KMN−CN and to acknowledge the binding of the
CoA. The HA also stores the value of KHA−CN and discards the values of NHA
and KBM .
• Step S7-PK: Step S7-PK is identical to Step S5-SK, but the key stored
by the MN at the Binding Update List entry for the CN is KMN−CN instead
of KBC1.
• Steps S8-PK and S9-PK: Steps S8-PK and S9-PK are identical, respec-
tively, to Steps S8-SK and S9-SK mentioned in Section 5.4.1.
A more detailed description of these execution steps is given in Appendix D.
The creation phase for the PK-based protocol in the mobile CN case is shown in
Figure 5.5. As in the SK-based protocol, the MN and the HAMN send binding-
related messages to the CN’s home address. In addition, the CN sends binding-
related messages while it is away from home via HACN (‘reverse tunnelling’).
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Figure 5.5: Creation phase for the PK-based protocol - mobile CN case
5.4.3 The Creation Phase for the INF-based Protocol
The following additional assumptions have been used in the design of the INF-
based protocol.
• (INF1) A mobile node’s home link has a self-generated public/private key pair
(PKH , SKH) where the private key (SKH) is kept securely by HAs in the home
link.
• (INF2) A mobile node’s HoA is configured as a CGA-based address using
the home link’s public key (PKH). In addition, the CGA parameters (see
Section 3.1) are distributed between the MN and the home link. Specifically,
as the subnet prefix and the public key used are the same for all MNs belonging
to the same home link, they are kept at the home link. The modifier and the
collision count differ from one MN to another; thus, they are kept at the MN.
The creation phase for the INF-based protocol in the stationary CN case is de-
signed as shown in Figure 5.6. It consists of nine messages, M1-INF to M9-INF,
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and nine steps, S1-INF to S9-INF. Each of these messages is given a specific
name:
Figure 5.6: Creation phase for the INF-based protocol - stationary CN case
• M1-INF: Home Test Init and Care-of Test Init - denoted as HoTI&CoTI.
• M2-INF: Home Test - denoted as HoT.
• M3-INF: Care-of Test - denoted as CoT.
• M4-INF: Binding Request - denoted as BReq.
• M5-INF: Early Binding Creation - denoted as EBC.
• M6-INF: Early Binding Acknowledgement - denoted as EBA.
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• M7-INF: Binding Reply - denoted as BRep.
• M8-INF: Binding Creation Confirmation - denoted as BCC.
• M9-INF: Binding Acknowledgement - denoted as BA.
• Step S1-INF: Step S1-INF is identical to Step S1-SK and Step S1-PK,
but the MN’s HoA is also enclosed in message M1-INF sent from the MN to
the CN.
• Step S2-INF: Step S2-INF is identical to Step S2-SK and Step S2-PK,
but the CN generates two tokens (Token1 and Token2) and sends two messages:
message M2-INF is sent to the MN’s HoA and message M3-INF is sent to
the MN’s CoA.
• Step S3-INF: Step S3-INF is identical to Step S3-PK, but the MN hashes
the two tokens to generate key KBM , i.e. KBM = SHA1 (Token1 || Token2).
In addition, the MN includes the values of Modifier and Collision-Count in
message M4-INF sent to the HA.
• Step S4-INF: Step S4-INF is identical to Step S4-PK, but the HA con-
catenates the values of Modifier, Subnet Prefix, and Collision-Count to form
the CGA parameters used in generating the MN’s HoA. In addition, the HA
includes the CGA parameters and the home link’s self-generated public key in
message M5-INF sent to the CN.
• Step S5-INF: Step S5-INF is identical to Step S5-PK, but the CN gen-
erates KBM from tokens Token1 and Token2. In addition, the CN runs the
CGA-based address verification algorithm (see Figures 3.2 in Section 3.1) to
confirm the authenticity of HoA.
• Steps S6-INF, S7-INF, S8-INF, and S9-INF: Steps S6-INF, S7-INF,
S8-INF, and S9-INF are identical, respectively, to Steps S6-PK, S7-PK,
S8-PK, and S9-PK mentioned in Section 5.4.2.
A more detailed description of these execution steps is given in Appendix D.
The creation phase for the INF-based protocol in the mobile CN case is shown
in Figure 5.7. As in the SK-based and the PK-based protocols, the MN and the
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HAMN send binding-related messages to the CN’s home address. In addition,
the CN sends binding-related messages while it is away from home via HACN
(‘reverse tunnelling’).
Figure 5.7: Creation phase for the INF-based protocol - mobile CN case
5.4.4 The Update Phase
The MN initiates the update phase either to inform the CN with its new CoA
after roaming to a new foreign link, or to extend the lifetime of an existing binding
that is about to expire at the CN. The update phase for the proposed protocols
in the stationary CN case is designed as shown in Figure 5.8. It consists of four
messages, M1-UPD to M4-UPD, and five steps, S1-UPD to S5-UPD. Each
of these messages is given a specific name:
• M1-UPD: Binding Update - denoted as BU.
• M2-UPD: Binding Confirmation Request - denoted as BCReq.
• M3-UPD: Binding Confirmation Reply - denoted as BCRep.
• M4-UPD: Binding Acknowledgement - denoted as BA.
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Figure 5.8: Update phase for the proposed protocols - stationary CN case
• Step S1-UPD: The MN generates a new sequence number (Seqnew) and a fresh
key (KBM). The key KBM is generated from the shared session key established
between the MN and the CN in the creation phase (KMN−CN). The MN also
calculates a coded value (Authenticator) by encrypting the values of its HoA
and CoA, the CN’s address, and the LTBRem using the secret key shared with
the HA (KMN−HA). This Authenticator is to protect the MN’s HA against
replay attacks. Finally, the MN sends message M1-UPD to the CN to request
binding update. The MN includes its HoA and CoA, the Seqnew, a binding
lifetime request (LTBReq), and the Authenticator in message M1-UPD. In
addition, the MN protects the message using key KBM .
• Step S2-UPD: Upon receipt of message M1-UPD, the CN checks the value
of Seqnew to verify the freshness of the message. Upon positive verification,
the CN generates key KBM . The CN then verifies the integrity and authen-
ticity of message M1-UPD using KBM . Upon positive verification, the CN
registers and uses the claimed CoA and concurrently requests home network’s
confirmation of that CoA. That is, the CN updates the Binding Cache entry
for the MN with the values of CoA and Seqnew. The CN also sets the entry
in an unconfirmed state and sets the granted binding lifetime (LTBGrant) to a
MIN BINDING LIFETIME value. The CN then generates a fresh key KBC
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from a fresh nonce (NCN) and the secret key (KHA−CN) shared with the MN’s
home network. Finally, the CN sends message M2-UPD to the MN’s HoA
requesting home network’s confirmation of the claimed CoA. The CN includes
the claimed CoA, NCN , LTBReq, and Authenticator in message M2-UPD. In
addition, the CN protects the message using key KBC .
• Step S3-UPD: The HA intercepts message M2-UPD and generates key KBC
based on key KHA−CN shared with the CN and on items enclosed in the mes-
sage. The HA then verifies the integrity and authenticity of the message using
key KBC . Upon positive verification, the HA decrypts Authenticator enclosed
in the message using key KMN−HA shared with the MN. The HA next checks
the values of LTBRem and CoA to verify the freshness of the message and cor-
rectness of the claimed CoA, respectively. The HA also checks the value of
LTBReq to confirm that the MN is not requesting a binding lifetime that is
greater than the remaining binding lifetime at the HA. Upon positive verifica-
tions, the HA sends message M3-UPD to the CN to confirm the claimed CoA.
The HA includes CoA, NCN , and LTBReq in message M3-UPD. In addition,
the HA protects the message using key KBC .
• Step S4-UPD: Upon receipt of message M3-UPD, the CN checks the value
of NCN to verify the freshness of the message. Upon positive verification, the
CN verifies the integrity and authenticity of message M3-UPD using key KBC .
Upon positive verification, the CN updates the Binding Cache entry for the MN
by changing its status to be confirmed and by setting LTBGrant to a value that
is less than or equal to LTBReq. Finally, the CN sends message M4-UPD to
the MN for acknowledging the binding of the CoA. The CN includes Seqnew
and LTBGrant in message M4-UPD. In addition, the CN protects message
M4-UPD using key KBM .
• Step S5-UPD: Upon receipt of message M4-UPD, the MN checks the value
of Seqnew to verify the freshness of the message. Upon positive verification,
the MN verifies the integrity and authenticity of message M4-UPD using key
KBM . Upon positive verification, the MN updates the value of LTBGrant in the
Binding Update List entry for the CN.
A more detailed description of these execution steps is given in Appendix D.
139
5.4. PROTOCOLS DESIGN
The update phase for the proposed protocols in the mobile CN case is shown in
Figure 5.9. Again, the MN and the HAMN send binding-related messages to the
CN’s home address. In addition, the CN sends binding-related messages while it
is away from home via HACN (‘reverse tunnelling’).
Figure 5.9: Update phase for the proposed protocols - mobile CN case
5.4.5 The Deletion Phase
The MN initiates the deletion phase to remove its binding at the CN. The deletion
phase for the proposed protocols in the stationary CN case is designed as shown
in Figure 5.10. It consists of two messages, M1-DEL and M2-DEL, and three
steps, S1-DEL to S3-DEL. Each of the two messages is given a specific name:
• M1-DEL: Binding Update - denoted as BU.
• M2-DEL: Binding Acknowledgement - denoted as BA.
• Step S1-DEL: Step S1-DEL is identical to Step S1-UPD, but the Au-
thenticator is not enclosed in message M1-DEL sent from the MN to the CN.
In addition, the MN sets the CoA equal to its HoA and the binding lifetime
request (LTBReq) to ‘zero’.
• Step S2-DEL: The first part of Step S2-DEL is identical to the first part
of Step S2-UPD. Specifically, the CN uses the MN’s HoA as an index to
search its Binding Cache. Then, the CN performs Verifications CN1-DEL
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and CN2-DEL, which are identical to Verifications CN1-UPD and CN2-
UPD, respectively. In addition, the CN deletes the Binding Cache entry for
the MN and, if requested, sends Seqnew and MACKBM (BA) to the MN in mes-
sage M2-DEL for acknowledging the deletion of the binding, where MACKBM
(BA) is a keyed hash value used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of
message M2-DEL; MACKBM (BA) = First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBM , (HoA ||
CN || Seqnew))).
• Step S3-DEL: Step S3-DEL is identical to Step S5-UPD, but after Veri-
fication MN1-DEL, which is identical to Verification MN1-UPD, the MN
will delete the Binding Update List entry for the CN.
Figure 5.10: Deletion phase for the proposed protocols - stationary CN case
A more detailed description of these execution steps is given in Appendix D.
The deletion phase for the proposed protocols in the mobile CN case is shown
in Figure 5.11. The MN sends message M1-DEL to the CN’s home address. In
addition, the CN sends message M2-DEL while it is away from its home link
via HACN (‘reverse tunnelling’).
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Figure 5.11: Deletion phase for the proposed protocols - mobile CN case
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented the design of a family of correspondent registration
protocols: (1) the SK-based protocol for use when a secret key is shared between
the home link and the CN; (2) the PK-based protocol for use when the home
link has a certified public/private key pair; and (3) the INF-based protocol for
use when no prior relationship exists. In addition, the proposed protocols are
designed in three phases: the creation phase, the update phase, and the deletion
phase. Although the protocols have different creation phases, they all have iden-
tical update and deletion phases.
The features of the proposed correspondent registration protocols can be sum-
marized as follows:
• They handle the case of the MN roaming to a different CoA while the HA
creates a new binding with the CN on behalf of the MN. They do this by
limiting the binding lifetime of the claimed CoA at the CN and by requesting
the MN send a confirmation from that CoA.
• They use an early binding update to minimise the registration delay in the
update phase. The CN registers the new CoA and sends subsequent packets
destined for the MN to it for a limited time, while concurrently verifying the
CoA with the home link.
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• They use the remaining lifetime (LTBRem) for the binding of the HoA and CoA
at the HA’s Binding Cache entry for the MN as a timestamp to protect the
HA against replay attacks.
• They allow the MN’s home link to verify the claimed care-of address (CoA)
and the requested binding lifetime (LTBReq) to prevent the MN from cheating
the CN with a fake CoA and/or a long binding lifetime request.
• They increase the maximum binding lifetime to reduce the number of redundant
binding refreshes and thus reduce signalling overheads.
In the following chapter, we analyse the protocols against various security attacks,
prove security features, evaluate performance, and compare them with related
work.
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Security and Performance
Analyses of the Protocols
This chapter is devoted to the informal security analysis, formal security verifica-
tion, and performance evaluation of the protocols presented in Chapter 5. Specif-
ically, Section 6.1 presents informal analyses of the protocols against the security
requirements specified in Section 5.1 and against the well-known security attacks
specified in Section 2.2.1. To provide further proof of the security of the proto-
cols, Section 6.2 presents formal verifications of the protocols using the framework
of Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) and Casper/FDR2 model checker. Sec-
tion 6.3 presents the simulation and performance evaluation of the protocols and
their comparisons with the most related work. Namely, Section 6.3.1 discusses
the design and construction of the simulation model, Section 6.3.2 validates the
simulation model, and Section 6.3.3 presents the simulation results and draws
conclusions. Finally, Section 6.4 summarises the chapter.
6.1 Informal Analysis of Protocols
In this section, we informally analyse the protocols presented in the previous
chapter, and detailed in Appendix D, to demonstrate that they satisfy the se-
curity requirements specified in Section 5.1 and are resistant to the well-known
security attacks specified in Section 2.2.1.
(S1) Authenticity of home address: The CN confirms whether the MN owns
the claimed HoA. If not confirmed, an attacker can launch a false binding update
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attack and/or a return-to-home spoofing attack. The authenticity of the HoA is
assured to the CN through the following measures.
1. The CRE-SK phase achieves the authenticity of the HoA by using a keyed
hash function that is generated based on the secret key shared between the
home link and the CN. Specifically, Verification CN2-SK ensures that
message M5-SK is indeed from the home link of the MN and has not been
altered in transit. Therefore, the CN is convinced that the MN actually
owns the HoA.
2. The CRE-PK phase achieves the authenticity of the HoA by using the home
link’s public key signature over message M4-PK using the home link’s
private key. Specifically, Verification CN2-PK ensures that message M4-
PK is indeed from the home link of the MN and has not been altered in
transit. Therefore, the CN is convinced that the MN actually owns the
HoA.
3. The CRE-INF phase employs a CGA-based HoA together with an initial
HoA reachability test to authenticate the HoA. The MN configures its HoA
as a CGA-based address using the home link’s self-generated public key.
The MN also provides an initial HoA reachability proof. Specifically, (1)
Verification CN2-INF ensures that message M5-INF is from a node that
is reachable at the HoA enclosed in the message; (2) Verification CN3-
INF ensures that the public key and the HoA enclosed in message M5-INF
are bound; and (3) Verification CN4-INF ensures that message M5-
INF is from a node that knows the private key corresponding to the public
key used in generating the HoA. These verifications together prevent false
binding update attacks and alleviate return-to-home spoofing attacks. As
a result, the CRE-INF phase is still vulnerable to return-to-home spoofing
attacks as it does not assure the CN that the public key enclosed in message
M5-INF is authentic. An attacker, on the path between the CN and a
victim network, could use its own public key and a spoofed subnet prefix to
cryptographically generate a non-used (home) address with a subnet prefix
from the victim network.
4. In the UPD phase, Verification CN2-UPD ensures that the keyed hash
function enclosed in message M1-UPD is generated using a key (KBM)
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that is generated from the secret key KMN−CN shared between the CN and
the MN. In addition, Verification CN3-UPD ensures that the keyed hash
function enclosed in message M3-UPD is generated using a key (KBC) that
is generated from the secret key KHA−CN shared between the CN and the
MN’s home link. These two verifications enable the CN to confirm the
authenticity of the HoA.
5. In the DEL phase, the validity of the keyed hash function enclosed in mes-
sage M1-DEL is verified in Verification CN2-DEL with a key (KBM)
that is generated from the secret key KMN−CN shared between the CN
and the MN. Therefore, the authenticity of the HoA enclosed in message
M1-DEL is ensured.
(S2) Authenticity of care-of address: The CN confirms whether the MN is
indeed connected to the claimed care-of address. If not confirmed, a malicious MN
and an attacker can launch a malicious MN flooding attack and a false binding
update attack, respectively. The CN is assured of the authenticity of the care-of
address by obtaining a confirmation from the home link. This is achieved through
the following measures.
1. In the CRE-SK and CRE-PK phases, the MN provides an initial CoA reach-
ability proof. In addition, the home link confirms to the CN that the MN
is connected to the CoA. Specifically, verifications CN1-SK and CN1-
PK ensure that messages M5-SK and M4-PK, respectively, are from a
node that is reachable at the CoA. In addition, verifications CN2-SK
and CN2-PK ensure that messages M5-SK and M4-PK, respectively,
are indeed from the home link of the MN and have not been altered in
transit. As a result, the CN is convinced that the MN is connected to the
CoA.
2. The authenticity of the CoA in the CRE-INF phase is achieved in the same
way as in the CRE-SK and CRE-PK phases, i.e. by an initial CoA reach-
ability proof and a confirmation from the home link. Therefore, the MN
cannot launch a malicious MN flooding attack. In addition, an attacker
cannot impersonate a legitimate MN to launch a false binding update at-
tack. However, the attacker that had used its own public key to generate a
non-used (home) address could launch a false binding update attack. This
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is because the CN has not been ensured that the confirmation is indeed
coming from the home link due to the use of the unauthentic public key.
3. In the UPD phase of the SK-based and PK-based protocols, the home link
confirms to the CN that the MN is connected to the CoA. Specifically,
Verification CN3-UPD ensures that message M3-UPD is coming from
the home link and has not been altered in transit. Therefore, the CN is
convinced that the CoA claimed by the MN in message M1-UPD matches
with the CoA registered at the home link for that MN and thus the CN is
assured that the MN is connected to the CoA.
4. The authenticity of the CoA in the UPD phase of the INF-based protocol
is achieved in the same way as in the SK-based and PK-based protocols,
i.e. by a confirmation from the home link. However, due to the use of the
unauthentic public key in the CRE-INF phase, an attacker could launch
a false binding update attack as the CN has not been ensured that the
confirmation is indeed coming from the home link.
(S3) Integrity of binding data: The CN confirms the integrity of the bind-
ing data to detect any unauthorised modification of the home address and/or
the care-of address. This requirement is achieved through the use of keyed hash
functions. The analysis given for the authentication of home address and care-of
address applies here.
(S4) Freshness of binding data: The CN confirms the freshness of the binding
data received from the MN and home link through the use of cryptographically
protected tokens, sequence numbers, and nonces. If not confirmed, an attacker
can launch a replay attack by replaying a previously authenticated binding cre-
ate/update request. This requirement is achieved through the following measures.
1. The CN confirms whether the tokens enclosed in the early binding creation
messages, i.e. messages M5-INF, M5-SK, and M4-PK, match the tokens
sent by the CN in the home test and/or care-of test messages, i.e. messages
M2-INF and M3-INF, M2-SK, and M2-PK. Specifically, Verification
CN2-INF ensures that the keyed hash function enclosed in message M5-
INF is generated using a key (KBM) that is generated from fresh tokens,
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Token1 and Token2, and thus, message M5-INF is fresh. Also, Verifica-
tion CN1-SK ensures that the token (Token2) enclosed in message M5-
SK is fresh, and thus, message M5-SK is fresh. In addition, Verification
CN1-PK ensures that the keyed hash function enclosed in message M4-
PK is generated using a key (KBM) that is generated from a fresh token
(Token2), and thus, message M4-PK is fresh.
2. The CN confirms whether the sequence number (Seqnew) enclosed in mes-
sages M8-INF, M7-SK, M7-PK, M1-UPD, and M1-DEL is greater
than the sequence number (Seq) received in the previous valid binding cre-
ate/update request from the MN. The sequence number (Seqnew) is pro-
tected using KMN−CN or KBM ; thus without the corresponding key, it would
be difficult for an attacker to change Seqnew without being detected.
3. The CN confirms whether the nonce (NCN) enclosed in message M3-UPD
matches the nonce sent by the CN in message M2-UPD.
(S5) Protection against resource exhaustion DoS attacks: The CN does
not retain any state about individual MNs until it authenticates them first, which
protects the CN from memory exhaustion DoS attacks. In addition, the CN is
protected against CPU exhaustion DoS attacks as following: (1) most of the
verifications done by the CN are based on cheap operations; and (2) the CN
performs expensive operations (if any) only after a positive outcome from cheap
ones, which gives the CN some assurance about the MN before performing heavy
computations.
To summarise (shown in Table 3.1), the SK-based protocol and the PK-based-
protocol achieve all the security requirements stated in Section 5.1 and protect
against all well-known attacks stated in Section 2.2.1. The INF-based protocol
achieves the security requirements and protects against well-known attacks, ex-
cept where on-path attackers that could use their own public key to generate a
non-used (home) address are concerned. Considering those on-path attackers,
the INF-based protocol cannot provide sufficient protection due to the use of the
unauthentic public key; it fails to authenticate the HoA and CoA. As a result,
the author decides to exclude the INF-based protocol from the security formal
verification and the performance evaluation discussed in the rest of this chapter.
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6.2 Formal Verification of Protocols
This section formally verifies the security properties of the SK-based and PK-
based correspondent registration protocols presented in Chapter 5. A formal
verification of a security protocol is useful for identifying security flaws that are
subtle and hard to find [67]. Formal methods are more effective than informal
methods. For example, the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol [68] suc-
ceeded in informal analysis, but failed in formal verification [69, 70].
Various formal methods have been successfully used to verify and debug se-
curity protocols. Generally, a formal method uses the following approach for
verification of a security protocol. High-level formal notations are used in the
first three steps to (1) formally model the protocol, (2) formally state the in-
variants and preconditions of the protocol, and (3) formally specify the security
properties against which the protocol is to be checked. In step 4, the protocol
is verified against its properties using either a manual tool or an automated tool
that understands these notations.
In this thesis, two formal methods are used to verify the SK-based and PK-
based protocols: the protocol composition logic (PCL) method and the Casper-
/FDR2 model checker. These formal methods have proved successful for mod-
elling and verifying several security protocols; they have been used to verify au-
thentication, secrecy, and other security properties [71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78].
Thus, we consider them also appropriate for the verification of the SK-based and
PK-based protocols. The Casper/FDR2 model checker is used to verify the se-
curity properties of the protocols. If the protocols do not satisfy the specified
security properties, then the FDR2 checker shows a counterexample which repre-
sents the reason against vulnerability. Although Casper/FDR2 model checker has
shown that the SK-based and PK-based protocols are not vulnerable to attacks,
it does not validate the correctness of the protocols. This validation is performed
using the PCL method.
6.2.1 Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) is a logic for stating and proving security
properties of network protocols that use key cryptography operations [71, 72,
74]. PCL has an axiomatic system and inference rules about individual protocol
actions and temporal reasoning that yield assertions about protocols composed
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of multiple steps. PCL also uses a novel form of induction, called the “honesty
rule”, for combining facts about one role with inferred actions of other roles. For
example, if Alice receives a response from a message sent to Bob. Alice may use
properties of Bob’s role to infer that Bob must have performed certain actions
before sending his reply. PCL proofs usually use modal formulas of the form θ
[P]X φ. This form means that starting from a state where formula θ is true, after
actions P are executed in thread X, the formula φ is true in the resulting state.
6.2.1.1 Formal Verification using PCL
This section presents a formal correctness proof of the UPD phase using the PCL
method. It first models the UPD phase using a simple “protocol programming
language” based on [14] and summarised in Appendix E. It then formulates the
security properties that the phase ought to satisfy from the CN’s point of view.
Finally, it proves the correctness of the phase using a proof system based on
[14, 71, 72, 73, 74] and summarised in Appendix E. The verification of the other
phases can be found in Appendix F.
Modelling the UPD phase
The UPD phase is formally described by three roles (MobileNode, HomeAgent,
and CorrespondentNode), each specifying a sequence of actions to be executed
by an honest principal. This is illustrated in Table 6.1.
UPD : MobileNode =
(MN, CˆN , LTBRem, LTBReq , HoA, CoA, CNA, Ack, seq, KMN−HA, KMN−CN )
[ new seqnew such that seqnew := succ(seq);
KBM := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN );
authenticator := enc HoA || CoA || CNA || LTBRem, KMN−HA;
macBU := hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator, KBM );
msg1 := HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, authenticator, macBU ; send MˆN , CˆN , msg1;
receive CˆN , MˆN , msg4; match msg4 / seqnew, LTBGrant, macBA;
match seqnew / seqnew;
match macBA / hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew || LTBGrant, KBM );
]MN
UPD : HomeAgent = (HA, LTBRem, HoA, CoA, KMN−HA, KHA−CN )
[ receive CˆN , HˆA, msg2;
match msg2 / HoA, CoA, LTBReq , authenticator, NCN , macBCReq ;
KBC := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NCN , KHA−CN );
match macBCReq / hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || authenticator || NCN , KBC);
values := dec authenticator, KMN−HA; match values as HoA || CoA || CNA || LTBRem;
match HoA / HoA; match CoA / CoA;
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match LTBRem / LTBRem; isLess(LTBReq , LTBRem);
macBCRep := hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN , KBC);
msg3 := CoA, LTBReq , NCN , macBCRep; send HˆA, CˆN , msg3;
]HA
UPD : CorrespondentNode = (CN, CNA, LTBGrant, KMN−CN , KHA−CN )
[ receive MˆN , CˆN , msg1;
match msg1 / HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, authenticator, macBU ;
isLess(seq, seqnew); KBM := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN );
match macBU / hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator, KBM );
new NCN ; KBC := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NCN , KHA−CN );
macBCReq := hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || authenticator || NCN , KBC);
msg2 := HoA, CoA, LTBReq , authenticator, NCN , macBCReq ; send CˆN , HˆA, msg2;
receive HˆA, CˆN , msg3; match msg3 / CoA, LTBReq , NCN , macBCRep;
match NCN / NCN ; match macBCRep / hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN , KBC);
macBA := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew || LTBGrant, KBM );
msg4 := seqnew, LTBGrant, macBA; send CˆN , MˆN , msg4;
]CN
Table 6.1: UPD phase written in PCL language
Security Properties
The security properties that the UPD phase ought to satisfy from the CN’s point
of view include the following: (1) the CN agrees on the identities of the MN and
the HA, i.e. session authentication; (2) the derived KBM and KBC keys should
not be known to any principal other than the MN and the CN, and the HA and
the CN, respectively, i.e. key secrecy; and (3) the HA should confirm the MN’s
current CoA to the CN. These properties are formulated in Definitions 1 and 2,
where the predicate ActionsInOrder(a1, a2, ..., an) means that the actions a1, a2,
..., an were executed in that order.
Definition 1 (Session Authentication for the CN)
The authentication property in PCL is formulated as matching conversations
[14, 72]. The basic idea of matching conversations is that after execution of
the CorrespondentNode role, it is proven that there exist roles of the intended
MobileNode and HomeAgent with corresponding views of the interactions. For
CorrespondentNode CˆN , communicating with MobileNode MˆN and HomeAgent
HˆA, matching conversations are formulated as φUPD,CN−auth defined below, where
msg1, msg2, msg3, and msg4 represent the corresponding UPD messages in Table
6.1. Note that the receive action corresponding to the last message sent by the
CN, i.e. msg4, is not part of the guarantee as the CN received no acknowledgement
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for this message.
φUPD,CN−auth ::= Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ⊃
∃(MˆN ∧ HˆA).ActionsInOrder(
Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1), Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1),
Send(CN, CˆN , HˆA, msg2), Receive(HA, CˆN , HˆA, msg2),
Send(HA, HˆA, CˆN , msg3), Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg3),
Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg4))
Definition 2 (Key Secrecy for the CN)
The UPD phase is said to provide key secrecy for the CN if φUPD,CN−sec1 and
φUPD,CN−sec2 hold, where:
φUPD,CN−sec1 ::= (Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KBM)) ⊃
Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = MˆN
φUPD,CN−sec2 ::= (Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KBC)) ⊃
Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
Security Guarantee
Theorem 1 states the security guarantee for the CN. It states that starting from
a state in which the invariants and preconditions (defined in Table 6.2) of the
UPD phase hold, if the CorrespondentNode role is executed, then the desired
authentication and secrecy properties are guaranteed in the resulting state. In-
formally, the formula of theorem 1 guarantees that the CN, the MN and the HA
have consistent views of protocol runs. In addition, it states that only the CN
and the MN possess key KBM , and only the CN and the HA possess key KBC .
The CN deduces its security properties based on the actions that it performs, the
properties of certain cryptographic primitives, i.e. keyed hashes, and knowledge
of the behaviour of honest MN and HA (by definition, an honest principal be-
haves in accordance with the protocol).
Theorem 1 (CN Security Guarantee)
After execution of the CorrespondentNode role, session authentication and key
secrecy are guaranteed if the formulas in Table 6.2 hold. Formally,
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ΓUPD1 ∧ ΓUPD2 ∧ θUPD1 ∧ θUPD2 ∧ θUPD3 `[UPD : CorrespondentNode]CN Honest(CˆN)
∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ CˆN 6= MˆN 6= HˆA ⊃
φUPD,CN−auth ∧ φUPD,CN−sec1 ∧ φUPD,CN−sec2
Where:
− ΓUPD1 is the first invariant of the UPD. It states that the CN and the MN
derive key KBM locally and do not reveal it.
− ΓUPD2 is the second invariant of the UPD. It states that the CN and the
HA derive key KBC locally and do not reveal it.
− θUPD1 is the first precondition of the UPD. It requires that key KMN−HA is
only known to the MN and the HA.
− θUPD2 is the second precondition of the UPD. It requires that key KMN−CN
is only known to the CN and the MN.
− θUPD3 is the third precondition of the UPD. It requires that key KHA−CN
is only known to the CN and the HA.
θUPD1 := (Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KMN−HA)) ⊃
Zˆ = MˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
θUPD2 := (Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KMN−CN )) ⊃
Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = MˆN
θUPD3 := (Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KHA−CN )) ⊃
Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
ΓUPD1 := Computes(Zˆ, HASH(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN )) ⊃
¬(Send(Zˆ, m) ∧ Contains(m, HASH(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN )))
ΓUPD2 := Computes(Zˆ, HASH(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || CNA || NCN , KHA−CN )) ⊃
¬(Send(Zˆ, m) ∧ Contains(m, HASH(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || CNA || NCN , KHA−CN )))
Table 6.2: UPD phase preconditions and invariants
Proof of Theorem 1
The secrecy of KBM (φUPD,CN−sec1) and KBC (φUPD,CN−sec2) are proved first,
and are then used in proving the authentication property (φUPD,CN−auth). The
secrecy properties are formalized using the Has(X, s) predicate and require that
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X refers only to honest principals that shared the secret s. In φUPD,CN−sec1, X is
either the MN or the CN, and s is the key KBM . Similarly, in φUPD,CN−sec2, X is
either the HA or the CN, and s is the key KBC .
An induction on the basic sequences of various UPD roles is performed to
show that honest principals do not perform actions that compromise the secrecy
of the key KBM (and KBC). Informally, each induction step in the proof asserts
that if, at the beginning of a basic sequence, the key KBM has not already been
compromised, i.e. SafeNet(KBM) holds, then the basic sequence executed by a
thread Z does not perform any actions that compromise the secrecy of the key
KBM , i.e. SendSafeMsg(Z, KBM). The secrecy of the key KBM is reasoned as
follows:
1. Let MobileNode1 be the first basic sequence of the MN role. Though Mobile-
Node1 sends out a keyed hash (recall that the KBM is a hash keyed by the
KMN−CN), as the key hash has a structure different from that used for the
KBM , the SH4 axiom can be used to argue that the send action is safe, as
indicated in lines (1)-(4).
2. The basic sequence MobileNode2 is the easy case; it contains no send action.
3. The proof for the remaining basic sequences follows a similar approach.
4. From (4), (6), (10), (14), and (18), and by application of the NET rule and
the HPOS axiom, if an entity Z has KBM , it implies that Z has KMN−CN ,
as indicated in line (19).
5. Finally, according to (19) and using the secrecy of KMN−CN , θUPD2, the
proof of secrecy of KBM is concluded, as indicated in line (20).
Let [MobileNode1]MN : [new seqnew such that seqnew := succ(seq);
KBM := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN );
authenticator := enc HoA || CoA || CNA || LTBRem, KMN−HA;
macBU := hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenti-
cator, KBM );
msg1 := HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, authenticator, macBU ;
send MˆN , CˆN , msg1;]MN
(1)
SH4 [MobileNode1]MN (HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew) 6= (HoA || CoA ||
seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator) ⊃ Safe(macBU , KBM )
(2)
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SH*, (2) [MobileNode1]MN Safe(MˆN , CˆN , msg1, KBM )
(3)
(3) SafeNet(KBM ) [MobileNode1]MN SendsSafeMsg(MˆN , KBM )
(4)
Let [MobileNode2]MN : [receive CˆN , MˆN , msg4;
match msg4 / seqnew, LTBGrant, macBA; match seqnew / seqnew;
match macBA / hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew || LTBGrant,
KBM );]MN
(5)
SafeNet(KBM ) [MobileNode2]MN SendsSafeMsg(MˆN , KBM )
(6)
Let [HomeAgent]HA : [receive CˆN , HˆA, msg2;
match msg2 / HoA, CoA, LTBReq , authenticator, NCN , macBCReq ;
KBC := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NCN , KHA−CN );
match macBCReq / hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || authenticator ||
NCN , KBC); values := dec authenticator, KMN−HA;
match values as HoA || CoA || CNA || LTBRem;
match HoA / HoA; match CoA / CoA;
match LTBRem / LTBRem; isLess(LTBReq , LTBRem);
macBCRep := hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN , KBC);
msg3 := CoA, LTBReq , NCN , macBCRep; send HˆA, CˆN , msg3;]HA
(7)
SH4 [HomeAgent]HA (HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN ) 6= (HoA || CoA ||
seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator) ⊃ Safe(macBCRep, KBM )
(8)
SH*, (8) [HomeAgent]HA Safe(HˆA, CˆN , msg3, KBM )
(9)
(9) SafeNet(KBM ) [HomeAgent]HA SendsSafeMsg(HˆA, KBM )
(10)
Let [CorrespondentNode1]CN : [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg1;
match msg1 / HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, authenticator,
macBU ; isLess(seq, seqnew);
KBM := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN );
match macBU / hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || au-
thenticator, KBM );
new NCN ; KBC := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NCN , KHA−CN );
macBCReq := hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || authenticator || NCN ,
KBC);
msg2 := HoA, CoA, LTBReq , authenticator, NCN , macBCReq ;
send CˆN , HˆA, msg2;]CN
(11)
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SH4 [CorrespondentNode1]CN (HoA || CoA || LTBReq || authenticator ||
NCN ) 6= (HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator) ⊃
Safe(macBCReq , KBM )
(12)
SH*, (12) [CorrespondentNode1]CN Safe(CˆN , HˆA, msg2, KBM )
(13)
(13) SafeNet(KBM ) [CorrespondentNode1]CN SendsSafeMsg(CˆN , KBM )
(14)
Let [CorrespondentNode2]CN : [receive HˆA, CˆN , msg3; match msg3 / CoA, LTBReq , NCN ,
macBCRep; match NCN / NCN ;
match macBCRep / hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN , KBC);
macBA := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew || LTBGrant, KBM );
msg4 := seqnew, LTBGrant, macBA; send CˆN , MˆN , msg4;]CN
(15)
SH4 [CorrespondentNode2]CN (HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew || LTBGrant)
6= (HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator) ⊃
Safe(macBA, KBM )
(16)
SH*, (16) [CorrespondentNode2]CN Safe(CˆN , MˆN , msg4, KBM )
(17)
(17) SafeNet(KBM ) [CorrespondentNode2]CN SendsSafeMsg(CˆN , KBM )
(18)
(4), (6), (10), (14), (18),
NET, HPOS
Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Z, KBM ) ⊃
Has(Z, KMN−CN )
(19)
(19), θUPD2 Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Z, KBM ) ⊃
Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = MˆN ⊃ φUPD,CN−sec1
(20)
The authentication property (φUPD,CN−auth) is formulated as matching conversa-
tions. It can be asserted only when the secrecy of KBM and KBC are guaranteed
and is reasoned as follows:
1. Since the CN is honest, obviously it knows that its own actions are in order,
i.e. axioms AA1, AR1, AA4 are used in line (1) to conclude that the CN
has performed a certain sequence of actions.
2. Since the CN received and verified msg1, there must be some entity Xˆ that
has HASHkBM{HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator} and
that sends out msg1 at a previous stage, as indicated in line (2).
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3. The entity Xˆ has HASHkBM{HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || au-
thenticator}, which implies that Xˆ either computes HASHkBM{HoA || ...
|| authenticator} itself, or there must be a third entity Yˆ that computes
and sends HASHkBM{HoA || ... || authenticator} at a previous stage, as
indicated in line (3).
4. For an entity Zˆ ∈ {Xˆ, Yˆ } to be able to compute HASHkBM{HoA || ... ||
authenticator}, it must have the key KBM , as indicated in line (4).
5. From (4) and φUPD,CN−sec1, Zˆ must be either the CN itself or the MN, as
indicated in line (5).
6. The CN knows that it does not send out msg1 by itself; thus, it must be
the MN that had computed and sent out msg1. Furthermore, according to
(2) and (5), the CN can conclude that the MN sends msg1 before the CN
receives it, as indicated in line (6).
7. Due to the freshness of the nonce NCN generated by the CN, the HA can
only receive msg2 after the CN sends it, as indicated in lines (7)-(9).
8. The CN assumes that the honest HA acts honestly by obeying the protocol.
Therefore, the HA must receive msg2 before sending msg3, as indicated in
line (10).
9. Steps 11 to 15 are similar to steps 2 to 6, but HA, msg3, KBC , HASHkBC{HoA
|| CoA || LTBReq || NCN}, and φUPD,CN−sec2 are used instead of MN, msg1,
KBM , HASHkBM{HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator},
and φUPD,CN−sec1, respectively. Also, the CN can conclude that the HA
sends msg3 before the CN receives it.
10. According to (1), (6), (9), (10), and (15), all the actions are matched as in
line (16). Hence, the CN can conclude that the security property of session
authentication is guaranteed in the UPD phase.
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AA1, AR1,
AA4
[UPD : CorrespondentNode]CN Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Send(CN, CˆN , HˆA,
msg2) < Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg3) < Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg4)
(1)
AR1,
HASH3,
ΓUPD1
θUPD2 [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg1; match msg1 / HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, au-
thenticator, macBU ; isLess(seq, seqnew); KBM := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew,
KMN−CN ); match macBU / hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator,
KBM );]CN Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, authenticator,
HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator} ⊃
(∃X.Has(X, HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator}) ∧ Send(X,
HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator})) ∧
(Send(X, HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator}) <
Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1))
(2)
(2), HASH4 Has(X, HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator}) ⊃ Com-
putes(X, HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator}) ∨
∃Y,m.Computes(Y, HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator})
∧ Send(Y, m) ∧ Contains(m, HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authen-
ticator})
(3)
(3), HASH1 Computes(Z, HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator}) ⊃
Has(Zˆ, KBM ) ∧ Has(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator)
(4)
(4),
φUPD,CN−sec1
θUPD2 [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg1; match msg1 / HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, au-
thenticator, macBU ; isLess(seq, seqnew); KBM := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew,
KMN−CN ); match macBU / hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator,
KBM );]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KBM ) ⊃ Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = MˆN
(5)
(2), (5) θUPD2 [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg1; match msg1 / HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, au-
thenticator, macBU ; isLess(seq, seqnew); KBM := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew,
KMN−CN ); match macBU / hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || authenticator,
KBM );]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ⊃ Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Receive(CN,
MˆN , CˆN , msg1)
(6)
AN3 [new NCN ;]CN Fresh(CN, NCN )
(7)
(7), FS1, P1,
ΓUPD2
[KBC := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NCN , KHA−CN ); macBCReq := hash(HoA || CoA ||
LTBReq || authenticator || NCN , KBC); msg2 := HoA, CoA, LTBReq , authenticator, NCN ,
macBCReq ; send CˆN , HˆA, msg2;]CN FirstSend(CN, NCN , msg2)
(8)
(1), (8), FS2,
ΓUPD2
θUPD2 ∧ θUPD3 [new NCN ; KBC := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NCN , KHA−CN );
macBCReq := hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || authenticator || NCN , KBC); msg2 := HoA,
CoA, LTBReq , authenticator, NCN , macBCReq ; send CˆN , HˆA, msg2;]CN Receive(HA,
CˆN , HˆA, msg2) ∧ HˆA 6= CˆN ⊃ Send(CN, CˆN , HˆA, msg2) < Receive(HA, CˆN , HˆA,
msg2)
(9)
(9), HON,
AA4, P1
Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ⊃ Receive(HA, CˆN , HˆA, msg2) < Send(HA, HˆA, CˆN , msg3)
(10)
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AR1,
HASH3
θUPD3 [receive HˆA, CˆN , msg3; match msg3 / CoA, LTBReq , NCN , macBCRep; match
NCN / NCN ; match macBCRep / hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN , KBC);]CN
Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , CoA, LTBReq , NCN , HASHkBC {HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN} ⊃
(∃X.Has(X, HASHkBC {HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN}) ∧ Send(X, HASHkBC {HoA ||
CoA || LTBReq || NCN})) ∧ (Send(X, HASHkBC {HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN}) <
Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg3))
(11)
(11), HASH4 Has(X, HASHkBC {HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN})⊃ Computes(X, HASHkBC {HoA || CoA
|| LTBReq || NCN}) ∨ ∃Y,m.Computes(Y, HASHkBC {HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN}) ∧
Send(Y, m) ∧ Contains(m, HASHkBC {HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN})
(12)
(12), HASH1 Computes(Z, HASHkBC {HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN}) ⊃ Has(Zˆ, KBC) ∧ Has(Zˆ, HoA
|| CoA || LTBReq || NCN )
(13)
(13),
φUPD,CN−sec2
θUPD3 [receive HˆA, CˆN , msg3; match msg3 / CoA, LTBReq , NCN , macBCRep; match
NCN / NCN ; match macBCRep / hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN , KBC);]CN
Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KBC) ⊃ Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
(14)
(11), (14) θUPD3 [receive HˆA, CˆN , msg3; match msg3 / CoA, LTBReq , NCN , macBCRep; match
NCN / NCN ; match macBCRep / hash(HoA || CoA || LTBReq || NCN , KBC);]CN
Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ⊃ Send(HA, HˆA, CˆN , msg3) < Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg3)
(15)
(1), (6), (9),
(10), (14)
θUPD2 ∧ θUPD3 [CorrespondentNode]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ⊃
Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) <
Send(CN, CˆN , HˆA, msg2) < Receive(HA, CˆN , HˆA, msg2) <
Send(HA, HˆA, CˆN , msg3) < Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg3) <
Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg4) ⊃ φUPD,CN−auth
(16)
6.2.2 Casper Tool and FDR2 Model Checker
Casper is a compiler for the analysis of security protocols [16]. It provides a
concise notation for specifying protocols and security properties. It accepts a
script containing an abstract description of a protocol as well as an intruder
and produces a CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) [79] code which is
verified using the FDR2 (Failure-Divergence Refinement) model checker [17]. The
translation of the Casper script to the CSP code is made automatically and
transparently to the user, and the results of the verification are presented in
terms of the Casper model.
A Casper script defines not only the operation of a protocol but also the
system to be checked. It contains a number of sections, including the following.
The ‘Free variable’ section declares the types of variables and functions that are
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used in the protocol definition. For example, in Table 6.3, the variables ‘seq1’
and ‘ncn’ have been declared as a sequence number and a nonce, respectively.
The ‘Processes’ section represents the roles played by the different honest
principals. The parameters and the variables following the keyword ‘knows’ define
the knowledge that the principal in question is expected to have at the beginning
of the protocol run.
The ‘Protocol description’ section defines the sequence of messages in the
protocol. For example, in Table 6.3, the notation ‘{hoa, coa, seq1}{kmnha} %
authenticator’ represents that the values of hoa, coa, and seq1 are encrypted with
key kmnha. In addition, this notation also means that the recipient should not
attempt to decrypt this coded value, but should instead store it in the variable ‘au-
thenticator’. Similarly, the notation ‘authenticator % {hoa, coa, seq1}{kmnha}’
indicates that the sender should send the value stored in the variable ‘authenti-
cator’, but the recipient should expect a value of the form given by ‘{hoa, coa,
seq1}{kmnha}’.
The ‘Specification’ section is used to specify security properties of the protocol.
For example, the line starting with ‘Agreement (mn, cn, [hoa, coa])’ defines the
authentication property associated with the authentication of an MN to a CN; it
means that “the MN is correctly authenticated to the CN, and they agree upon
the values of HoA and CoA.”
The ‘Actual variables’ and ‘System’ sections represent the actual system to be
checked. The type of variables to be used in the system to be checked is defined
in the former section; whereas, the number and the role of the principals involved
in the system are defined in the latter section. Finally, the ‘Intruder Information’
section defines the intruder’s identity and his/her initial knowledge.
6.2.2.1 Formal Verification using Casper/FDR2
This section presents a formal verification of the update (UPD) phase using the
Casper/FDR2 model checker. The verification of the other phases can be found
in Appendix G. The first step of the verification is to specify the UPD phase
and its security properties in a Casper script as shown in Table 6.3. The second
step is to run the Casper tool to automatically translate the script to a CSP
code. Finally, the CSP code is run in the FDR model checker. The result of the
verification is shown in Table 6.4, which confirms that the UPD phase enables a
CN to securely authenticate an MN and a home link.
160
6.2. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF PROTOCOLS
# Free variables
mn : MNode
cn : CNode
ha : HomeAgent
hoa, coa : IPv6Address
seq1 : SequenceNumber
ncn : Nonce
kmnha, khacn, kmncn : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (kmnha, kmnha),(khacn, khacn),(kmncn, kmncn)
HMAC : HashFunction
# Processes
MOBILENODE(mn, cn, hoa, coa, seq1, kmnha, kmncn) knows HMAC
CORRESNODE(cn, ha, ncn, khacn, kmncn) knows HMAC
HOMEAGENT(ha, hoa, coa, kmnha, khacn) knows HMAC
# Protocol description
0. → mn : cn
1. mn → cn : hoa, coa, seq1, {hoa, coa, seq1}{kmnha} % authenticator, HMAC(kmncn, hoa, coa, seq1)
2. cn → ha : hoa, coa, ncn, authenticator % {hoa, coa, seq1}{kmnha}, HMAC(khacn, hoa, coa, ncn)
3. ha → cn : hoa, coa, HMAC(khacn, hoa, coa)
4. cn → mn : hoa, coa, HMAC(kmncn, hoa, coa)
# Specification
Agreement(mn, cn, [hoa, coa])
Agreement(ha, cn, [hoa, coa])
# Actual variables
MN, Mallory : MNode
CN : CNode
HA : HomeAgent
HoA, CoA, MalA : IPv6Address
Seq1, Seqm : SequenceNumber
Ncn, Nm : Nonce
Kmnha, Khacn, Kmncn, Kmala : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Kmnha, Kmnha),(Khacn, Khacn),(Kmncn, Kmncn), (Kmala, Kmala)
# System
MOBILENODE(MN, CN, HoA, CoA, Seq1, Kmnha, Kmncn)
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CORRESNODE(CN, HA, Ncn, Khacn, Kmncn)
HOMEAGENT(HA, HoA, CoA, Kmnha, Khacn)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {MN, CN, HA, Mallory, HoA, CoA, MalA, Seqm, Nm, Kmala}
Table 6.3: Casper specification of the UPD phase
Initialising; please wait.... Ready.
Casper version 1.8
Parsing...
Type checking...
Consistency checking...
Compiling...
Writing output...
Output written to /mnt/ntfs/Casper/UPD.csp
Done
Starting FDR
Checking /mnt/ntfs/Casper/UPD.csp
Checking assertion AUTH1 M::AuthenticateMOBILENODEToCORRESNODEAgreement hoa coa
T= AUTH1 M::SYSTEM 1
No attack found
Checking assertion AUTH1 M::AuthenticateHOMEAGENTToCORRESNODEAgreement hoa coa
T= AUTH2 M::SYSTEM 1
No attack found
Done
Table 6.4: Verification results of the UPD phase using Casper/FDR2
6.3 Performance Evaluation
This section reports the performance evaluation of the SK-based and PK-based
protocols by comparing them to the standard correspondent registration protocol,
i.e. when the return routability (RR) procedure is used to protect the registration
process (see Section 2.5). In addition, the SK-based protocol is compared to the
SSKv1 and SSKv2 protocols (see Sections 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.2). The performance
is measured in terms of correspondent registration delay (CR-Delay) measured
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in seconds and control signalling overhead measured in bits per second. The CR-
Delay is defined as the total amount of time taken for the MN to register a new
CoA with the CN. The control signalling overhead is the total amount of Mobile
IPv6 signalling traffic sent and received by all involved entities, i.e. the MN, CN,
and HA.
6.3.1 Simulation Modelling
OPNETTM Modeler version 14.5 has been used to simulate the performance of the
SK-based and PK-based protocols. In particular, the control signalling overhead
is investigated at all involved entities. The CR-Delay is also investigated when
varying levels of background traffic on the network are applied. The simulation
results obtained are then compared to those when the RR, SSKv1, and SSKv2
protocols are run.
Figure 6.1: Simulation model - stationary CN case
Two network models are constructed to measure the performance in the sta-
tionary and mobile CN cases. The first model, depicted in Figure 6.1, is composed
of: (1) a single stationary CN that is connected via a router (R1) to the Internet;
(2) a single MN that is located at a home link; (3) an HA that represents the
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home link; and (4) two access routers (AR1 and AR2) that represent foreign links.
The MN moves from the home link to the first foreign link, from the first foreign
link to the second foreign link, and then from the second foreign link to the home
link. In this way, the MN will create a new binding, update the binding, and
delete the binding with the CN, respectively.
Figure 6.2: Simulation model - mobile CN case
The second model (depicted in Figure 6.2) is identical to the first model, but
one additional access router (AR3) that represents a third foreign link is included.
In addition, the CN is also mobile and is located at that foreign link. The router
(R1) is now referred to as the CN’s home agent and represents the home link of
the mobile CN.
The HA and the ARs have been positioned in such a way that provide a
continuous wireless coverage area for the MN. The MN performs one hundred
passes (movement between HA and AR2) with three handoffs in each pass (one
binding creation, one binding update, and one binding deletion). The OPNET
Modeler’s documentation recommends thirty as an initial rule of thumb for the
number of repetitions to use. However, one hundred passes have been chosen in
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the hope of averaging out any possible fluctuating factors.
Two separate simulation studies are performed. The first one is created to
investigate the impact of the SK-based and PK-based protocols on CR-Delay,
i.e. whether the protocols have led to any performance degradation through
increasing CR-Delay. In this study, ten background traffic scenarios ranging from
0% to 90% at 10% increments are applied to investigate how different volumes
of traffic may affect the results of the CR-Delay. The second simulation study is
to investigate the control signalling overhead produced by all involved entities,
i.e. the MN, CN, and HA, when SK-based, PK-based, RR, SSKv1, and SSKv2
protocols are executed.
6.3.2 Simulation Model Validation
This section validates the simulation models. For doing so, the OPNET debug-
ger is used to prove that the SK-based protocol operates correctly. The OPNET
debugger is applied to output the processes of generating and/or verifying session
keys, cookies, tokens, and MACs values. In addition, relevant packets’ informa-
tion (i.e. source address, destination address, and packet size) has been inspected
during runtime.
The simulation model in the stationary CN case (see Figure 6.1) has been used
to validate the correctness of the SK-based protocol in the stationary CN case.
The output from the OPNET debugger during simulation runtime is illustrated
in Appendix C. Trace labels have been defined in the code to request output of
specific information while monitoring simulation output. By observing the out-
put, the messages exchanged were confirmed to be consistent with the expected
mobility signalling exchanged among the MN, the CN, and the HA.
6.3.3 Simulation Results
This section presents and analyses simulation results obtained from the simulation
study of both the CR-Delay and the control signalling overhead. It compares the
results of the SK-based, PK-based, RR, SSKv1, and SSKv2 protocols.
6.3.3.1 Correspondent Registration Delay
This section presents an analysis of the CR-Delay simulation results in both the
stationary and mobile CN cases. A selection of the simulation results are shown
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in Figures 6.3 to 6.16. These figures illustrate the average CR-Delay in the three
binding phases (i.e. creation, update, and deletion) at different network loads.
As shown, the CR-Delays increase exponentially as the network load increases.
This pattern is caused by the increase in the queuing delay experienced at each
node. In addition, it is shown that the CR-Delay in the mobile CN case is higher
than in the stationary CN case. The reason for this is due to the fact that all
mobility-related messages that are sent to/from the mobile CN should be routed
through the mobile CN’s home link. As a result, the CR-Delay in the mobile CN
case is higher by the amount of time needed to route mobility-related messages
between the mobile CN’s HoA and CoA. Of course, this amount depends on the
current location of the mobile CN, i.e. how far the mobile CN is away from its
home link.
Figures 6.3 to 6.8 show the CR-Delay in the binding creation phase for the
stationary and mobile CN cases. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate the CR-Delay of
the RR and SK-based protocols. These figures show that around 70% load in the
stationary CN case and around 50% load in the mobile CN case, the SK-based
protocol outperforms the RR protocol. This pattern could be explained as fol-
lows. At low network loads, the queuing delay experienced at each node has a less
dominant impact on the CR-Delay. Therefore, the RR protocol produces a lower
CR-Delay as it has shorter signalling messages and fewer processing operations.
However, as the network load increases, the CR-Delay will be increasingly dom-
inated by the queuing delays and the number of signalling messages exchanged
will be a determining factor. Therefore, the SK-based protocol produces lower
CR-Delay as it requires fewer number of signalling messages to create a binding.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 illustrate the CR-Delay of the SSKv1, SSKv2, and SK-
based protocols. As shown in these figures, at all loads, the SK-based protocol
produces a higher CR-Delay than the SSKv1 and SSKv2 protocols. This is be-
cause the SK-based protocol requires four messages to create a new binding;
whereas, the SSKv1 protocol and the SSKv2 protocol require one message and
three messages, respectively, to create a new binding.
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate the CR-Delay of the RR and PK-based proto-
cols. As shown, at all loads, the PK-based protocol produces a higher CR-Delay
than the RR protocol. This is because the PK-based protocol uses computation-
ally expensive signature generation and verification operations while creating a
binding; whereas, the RR protocol uses computationally light hash operations.
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Figure 6.3: Average CR-Delay for RR and SK-based protocols vs. load (binding
creation - stationary CN case)
Figure 6.4: Average CR-Delay for RR and SK-based protocols vs. load (binding
creation - mobile CN case)
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Figure 6.5: Average CR-Delay for SSKv1, SSKv2, and SK-based protocols vs.
load (binding creation - stationary CN case)
Figure 6.6: Average CR-Delay for SSKv1, SSKv2, and SK-based protocols vs.
load (binding creation - mobile CN case)
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Figure 6.7: Average CR-Delay for RR and PK-based protocols vs. load (binding
creation - stationary CN case)
Figure 6.8: Average CR-Delay for RR and PK-based protocols vs. load (binding
creation - mobile CN case)
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Figures 6.9 to 6.12 show the CR-Delay in the binding update phase for the
stationary and mobile CN cases. In the update phase, the SK-based and PK-
based protocols are identical; thus, they will be referred to as the ‘proposed
protocols’ in the following discussions. Figures 6.9 and 6.10 illustrate the CR-
Delay of the RR protocol, the SSKv2 protocol, and the proposed protocols. As
shown in these figures, at all loads, the proposed protocols produce a lower CR-
Delay than the RR and SSKv2 protocols. This is because the proposed protocols
require one message to update a binding; whereas, the RR and SSKv2 protocols
require five messages and three messages, respectively, to update a binding.
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 illustrate the CR-Delay of the SSKv1 protocol and
the proposed protocols. These figures show that the SSKv1 protocol slightly
outperforms the proposed protocols. Specifically, on average, the SSKv1 protocol
updates a binding about 6% and 7% faster than the proposed protocols in the
stationary and mobile CN cases, respectively.
Figure 6.9: Average CR-Delay for RR, SSKv2, and SK-based and PK-based
protocols vs. load (binding update - stationary CN case)
170
6.3. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Figure 6.10: Average CR-Delay for RR, SSKv2, and SK-based and PK-based
protocols vs. load (binding update - mobile CN case)
Figure 6.11: Average CR-Delay for SSKv1 protocol and SK-based and PK-based
protocols vs. load (binding update - stationary CN case)
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Figure 6.12: Average CR-Delay for SSKv1 protocol and SK-based and PK-based
protocols vs. load (binding update - mobile CN case)
Figures 6.13 to 6.16 show the CR-Delay in the binding deletion phase for the
stationary and mobile CN cases. Again, in the deletion phase, the SK-based and
PK-based protocols are identical and referred to as the ‘proposed protocols’. In
addition, the SSKv1 and SSKv2 protocols are also identical and are thus referred
to as the ‘SSK protocols’ in the following discussions. Figures 6.13 and 6.14
illustrate the CR-Delay of the RR protocol and the proposed protocols. As shown
in these figures, at all loads, the proposed protocols produce a lower CR-Delay
than the RR protocol. This is because the proposed protocols require one message
to delete a binding; whereas, the RR protocol requires three messages to delete
a binding.
Figures 6.15 and 6.16 illustrate the CR-Delay of the SSK protocols and the
proposed protocols. These figures show that the SSK protocols slightly outper-
form the proposed protocols. Specifically, on average, the SSK protocols delete a
binding about 4.9% and 5.2% faster than the proposed protocols in the stationary
and mobile CN cases, respectively.
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Figure 6.13: Average CR-Delay for RR protocol and SK-based and PK-based
protocols vs. load (binding deletion - stationary CN case)
Figure 6.14: Average CR-Delay for RR protocol and SK-based and PK-based
protocols vs. load (binding deletion - mobile CN case)
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Figure 6.15: Average CR-Delay for SSKv1 and SSKv2 protocols and SK-based
and PK-based protocols vs. load (binding deletion - stationary CN case)
Figure 6.16: Average CR-Delay for SSKv1 and SSKv2 protocols and SK-based
and PK-based protocols vs. load (binding deletion - mobile CN case)
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6.3.3.2 Control Signalling Overhead
This section presents an analysis of the control signalling overhead simulation
results in both the stationary and mobile CN cases for the RR, SSKv1, SSKv2,
SK-based, and PK-based protocols. The control signalling overhead at an entity
is the amount of Control Traffic Received (CTR) and Control Traffic Sent (CTS)
by the entity. A selection of the simulation results are shown in Figures 6.17
to 6.20. These figures illustrate the control signalling overhead produced at all
involved entities in the three binding phases (i.e. creation, update, and deletion)
when all the simulated protocols are executed at the same rate.
The following observations can be made from Figures 6.17 to 6.20.
• While creating a new binding, the control signalling overheads in the proposed
protocols, i.e. SK-based and PK-based protocols, at all involved entities are
higher than in the other simulated protocols (shown in all the figures).
• While updating a binding, the control signalling overheads in the proposed
protocols at the MN are lower than in the RR and SSKv2 protocols, but higher
than in the SSKv1 protocol (Figure 6.17).
• While updating a binding, the control signalling overheads in the proposed
protocols at the CN (and also at the CN’s HA in the mobile CN case) are
about 6%, 150%, and 19% higher than in the RR, SSKv1, and SSKv2 protocols,
respectively (Figures 6.18 and 6.20).
• While updating a binding, the control signalling overheads in the proposed
protocols at the MN’s HA are about 14% lower than in the RR protocol (Fig-
ure 6.19).
• While deleting a binding, the control signalling overheads in the proposed pro-
tocols at all involved entities are lower than in the other simulated protocols
(shown in all the figures).
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Figure 6.17: Control signalling overhead (bits/sec) at MN
Figure 6.18: Control signalling overhead (bits/sec) at CN
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Figure 6.19: Control signalling overhead (bits/sec) at HA
Figure 6.20: Control signalling overhead (bits/sec) at HACN
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6.3.3.3 Discussions
From the simulation results presented, the following observations can be made:
• Firstly, in the creation phase, the SK-based and PK-based protocols produce
a higher registration delay and control signalling overhead than all the other
simulated protocols. However, this high delay is acceptable as the creation
phase runs parallel to data transfer between the MN and the CN through the
MN’s home link.
• Secondly, in the update phase, the SK-based and PK-based protocols produce a
lower registration delay than both the RR protocol and the SSKv2 protocol, but
a slightly higher registration delay than the SSKv1 protocol. This is because
the SK-based and PK-based protocols utilize early binding updates to minimise
the registration delay. The simulation results also show that the SK-based and
PK-based protocols produce a reduction in the signalling overhead compared
to the RR protocol at the MN and the HA, but an increase in the signalling
overhead at the CN.
• Thirdly, in the deletion phase, the SK-based and PK-based protocols produce
a lower registration delay than the RR protocol, but a slightly higher regis-
tration delay than both the SSKv1 protocol and the SSKv2 protocol. The
simulation results also show that the SK-based and PK-based protocols pro-
duce a reduction in the signalling overhead compared to all the other simulated
protocols.
Overall, the author concludes that if a comparison between the proposed pro-
tocols and the most related work is performed on the basis of efficiency as well
as security, the proposed protocols render themselves superior. Specifically, the
proposed protocols offer significantly enhanced security for correspondent regis-
trations. This is at the cost of a varying increase, depending on the protocol,
in the delay and signalling overhead during the creation phase. In the update
and deletion phases, the delay and signalling overhead is considerably less than
at related work. It would therefore be commercially advantages to adopt the
proposed protocols.
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6.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented the security and performance analyses of our cor-
respondent registration protocols. The protocols are first informally analysed
against the security requirements and known security attacks specified in Sec-
tions 5.1 and 2.2.1, respectively. This informal analysis has demonstrated that
the INF-based protocol cannot authenticate the HoA and CoA due to the use of
the unauthentic public key. It also has demonstrated that both the SK-based and
PK-based protocols meet the specified security requirements and defend against
the specified known attacks. The formal verification of the SK-based and PK-
based protocols has further confirmed our intuitive analysis that the security
requirements and known attacks are indeed satisfied and defended against, re-
spectively, by our protocols.
Simulation models of the SK-based and PK-based protocols have been con-
structed using the OPNET Modeler. The model of the SK-based protocols has
been validated using the OPNET Modeler. The analysis of simulation results
has demonstrated that the SK-based and PK-based protocols, compared to the
RR protocol, produce lower registration delay and a reduction in the signalling
overhead during update and deletion phases. This is at the cost of a varying in-
crease, depending on the protocol variant, in the registration delay and signalling
overhead during the creation phase.
The next chapter concludes this thesis, and gives recommendations to further
work.
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Conclusions and Future Work
The focus of this thesis was on improving the security and efficiency of home and
correspondent registrations, i.e. the location management feature, of the MIPv6
protocol. This chapter summarises the work presented in this thesis, gives the
conclusions drawn from the research findings, and recommends future work.
7.1 Thesis Summary
The work presented in this thesis can be arranged into four parts: research back-
ground, enhanced home registration protocol, family of correspondent registration
protocols, and the evaluation of both protocols.
• Research Background
The thesis has introduced home and correspondent registrations in the MIPv6
protocol. Chapter 2 gave an overview of the MIPv6 protocol, its main compo-
nents, and the two possible modes of communications allowed between an MN
and a CN. This chapter also detailed the security attacks that could be launched
via abuse of the location management feature of the protocol. In addition, it
outlined the security services and performance requirements needed for securing
home and correspondent registrations. The basic home registration protocol and
the return routability procedure, which are currently used to protect home and
correspondent registrations respectively, were also described. Chapter 3 surveyed
other related works in protecting correspondent registrations.
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• The Enhanced Home Registration protocol
Chapter 4 described our novel enhanced home registration (EHR) protocol. This
chapter first presented an overview of the EHR protocol and detailed the design
of its three novel building blocks: the symmetric CGA-based technique, the con-
current CoA reachability test, and the segmenting IPv6 address space method.
The chapter next presented the description of the EHR protocol. It then infor-
mally analysed the security of the EHR protocol. Finally, Chapter 4 simulated
and presented the performance comparison of the EHR protocol with the basic
home registration protocol.
• The Family of Correspondent Registration protocols
Chapters 5 and 6 presented our novel correspondent registration protocols. Specif-
ically, Chapter 5 first specified the design objectives for the protocols. It then
gave an overview of the protocols and their three phases: the creation phase, the
update phase, and the deletion phase. Finally, it presented detailed descriptions
of the protocols. Chapter 6 gave the security analysis and performance evaluation
of the protocols presented in Chapter 5. It first informally analysed the proto-
cols against the requirements and the well-known attacks specified earlier. The
formal verifications of the protocols using the Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
method and the Casper/FDR2 model checker were also given. Finally, the chap-
ter simulated and presented the performance comparison of the protocols with
the most related work.
• Evaluation
The following methods of evaluation have been used to evaluate our designs:
1. The performance (in terms of registration delay and signalling overhead) of
the EHR protocol has been measured and compared with the basic home
registration protocol.
2. The security of the proposed correspondent registration protocols has been
informally analysed against the requirements and well-known attacks.
3. The security of the proposed correspondent registration protocols has been
formally verified using the PCL method and the Casper/FRD2 model checker.
4. The performances (in terms of registration delay and signalling overhead)
of the proposed correspondent registration protocols have been measured
and compared with the most related work.
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7.2 Contributions
The thesis has made the following contributions and discoveries:
• The symmetrical CGA-based technique is a novel lightweight CGA-based tech-
nique that makes use of a secret key shared between the participants in generat-
ing and verifying an IPv6 address. This technique reduces the computational
and communication costs of the participants compared to traditional CGA-
based techniques. Therefore, it is suitable for use by MNs to configure new
CoAs and by HAs to verify the authenticity of those CoAs. In addition, it
forces a malicious MN to attempt about (261) tries to falsely claim a third
party’s address as its CoA, thus reducing the likelihood of stealing third par-
ties’ addresses.
• The concurrent CoA reachability test is a novel reachability test that enables
HAs to register and use MNs’ new CoAs while concurrently verifying MNs’
reachability at those CoAs. This test runs parallel to data transfer to and from
the CoAs, thus having no effect on the registration delay.
• The segmenting IPv6 address space method is a novel method that uses two
bits of the IPv6 64-bits interface identifier field to differentiate between redi-
rectable and non-redirectable IPv6 addresses. This method reduces the number
of targets that are vulnerable to DoS attacks launched via abuse of the loca-
tion management feature of current, as well as future, mobility protocols; it
prevents malicious MNs from impersonating either stationary nodes or other
MNs located at their home links.
• The enhanced home registration (EHR) protocol extends the basic home reg-
istration protocol to support the location authentication of MNs to their HAs.
The EHR protocol adds the novel symmetrical CGA-based technique, the novel
concurrent CoA reachability test, and the novel segmenting IPv6 address space
method mentioned above to the basic home registration protocol. Therefore, it
reduces the likelihood of a malicious MN being successful in launching DoS at-
tacks against third parties. This is done with a marginal impact on registration
delay, but a significant increase in the signalling overhead.
• The SK-based, PK-based, and INF-based protocols are a family of novel corre-
spondent registration protocols that rely on the assistance of MNs’ home links
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in authenticating MNs’ HoAs and CoAs to CNs. These protocols oﬄoad the
operational load from an MN to its home link and are designed in creation,
update, and deletion phases to reduce iterating courses of the entire protocol.
The creation phase runs parallel to data transfer between the MN and the
CN through the MN’s home link; thus, most of the authentication and keys
establishment take place in it. In addition, the established keys are used to
secure the update and deletion phases. Therefore, the SK-based and PK-based
protocols improve the security strength and registration delay; they satisfy all
the specified security requirements and reduce registration delay in the update
and deletion phases. This is at the cost of an increase in the registration delay
and signalling overhead during the creation phase.
• To demonstrate the efficiency and efficacy of the EHR, SK-based, and PK-based
protocols, the performance of the protocols has been evaluated and compared
to that of related work using the OPNET simulation package. In addition,
the security of the protocols has been informally analysed against the security
requirements and well-known attacks. Furthermore, the security of the SK-
based and PK-based protocols has been verified using formal methods.
7.3 Future Work
The author has the following recommendations for future work:
• All of the proposed protocols, i.e. both the EHR protocol and the correspondent
registration protocols, have allowed an HA and a CN to initially set the granted
binding lifetime between an MN’s HoA and CoA to a MIN BINDING LIFETIME
value. This lifetime value is to limit the amount of data that the HA/CN can
send to the MN’s CoA while gaining confidence that the MN is indeed con-
nected to that CoA. The optimal value for this lifetime value is an area for
further research.
• The EHR protocol has prevented an MN from bypassing the concurrent CoA
reachability test by limiting the number of BUs that the MN can send from
an unreachable CoA to a MAX ATTEMPT value. The optimal value for this
number of attempts is a direction for further research.
• The proposed correspondent registration protocols have increased the maxi-
mum permitted binding lifetime to reduce the number of redundant binding
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refreshes, thus reducing signalling overheads. The optimal value for this per-
mitted lifetime is a point of further research.
• The symmetrical CGA-based technique has only used the compression algo-
rithm included in the CryptoSys toolkit to try to overcome the hash-length
shortage problem, i.e. at most, 62 bits of the address can be used for the hash.
However, this compression algorithm cannot compress a hash value. The au-
thor needs to try further compression algorithms to investigate whether the
idea of lossless compression proposed by Hwang in [58] is suited to overcome
the hash-length shortage problem.
• The segmenting IPv6 address space method has required changing the way
every IPv6 node chooses an IPv6 address. The resulting changes in network
infrastructure and endpoint devices are points of further research
• The PK-based protocol has only been compared to the RR protocol. The
protocol can be compared to other public key based protocols.
• The thesis has simulated all of the proposed protocols in an IEEE 802.11 wire-
less environment. The protocols can be simulated in other wireless technologies,
e.g. UMTS, to evaluate the performance costs.
In conclusion, the aims of this research, to determine the security and per-
formance needs of home and correspondent registrations, to investigate existing
solutions in the context, and to design an enhanced home registration protocol as
well as a family of correspondent registration security protocols with high levels
of security and efficiency, have been achieved but there remain other possible
avenues of future work.
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Appendix A
Cryptographic Building Blocks
This appendix presents an overview of the basic cryptographic techniques. These
techniques include random numbers, one-way hash functions, secret-key and
public-key cryptosystems, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and Diffie-Hellman
(DH) key exchange. It makes use of the following cryptographic jargon. Plain-
text or cleartext denotes a message in its original form. Message encryption is
a process of transforming a plaintext message into a coded message, and the re-
sulting message is known as ciphertext. Message decryption is a reverse process
of transforming a ciphertext into its original (plaintext) form. Encryption and
decryption are performed through the use of a cryptographic algorithm, called a
cipher, and a cryptographic key.
A.1 Basic Security Services
Security is one of the most important requirements for the exchange of users’
private data over an insecure public network (e.g. Internet). A lack of security
could result in an intruder being able to impersonate a user, eavesdrop on data,
or change data. A security service is a processing or communication service
that gives a specific kind of protection to private data. Basic security services
include authentication, authorization, confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay, and
non-repudiation.
• Authentication
Authentication is a process of verifying the identity of an entity and making sure
that data originates from that entity. There are two types of authentication:
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unilateral authentication and mutual authentication. The function of unilateral
authentication is to assure the recipient that the data is from the source that
it claims to be. Mutual authentication enables the communicating entities to
verify the identity of each other. Authentication is important in preventing im-
personation attacks and hence ensuring authenticity of the data. Authentication
is achieved through several cryptographic techniques, such as secret-key encryp-
tions, message authentication codes, or digital signatures [80].
• Authorization
Authorization is the process of specifying whether a user has the authority to
conduct a particular action. Authorization is related to the existence of a security
policy, which is a set of rules that specify what types of activities, resources, or
services an authenticated user is permitted to perform [81].
• Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the prevention of the unauthorised disclosure of data, i.e. data
cannot be viewed by an unauthorised entity. Confidentiality is provided by en-
cryption, and it is important in protecting against eavesdropping attacks [81].
• Integrity
The integrity service is the detection of any unauthorised alteration of transmit-
ted data, i.e. data is not alterable without detection. Alteration types include
insertion, deletion, or change of transmitted data. When data authenticity and
integrity are preserved, the data is called reliable. Entities can be relatively
certain that they are viewing data created by a legitimate source and that no
unauthorised alterations have been made. Integrity is achieved through several
cryptographic techniques, such as checksums, message authentication codes, or
digital signatures [81, 82].
• Anti-Replay
Anti-replay service is the detection of any replay of the transmitted data, i.e.
the recipient can detect and reject old or duplicated data, which protects against
replay attacks. Anti-replay is provided through several ways, such as using a
one-time token, a random number, a sequence number, or a timestamp.
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• Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation is the prevention of a sender or receiver from denying transmitted
data. Non-repudiation provides protection against false denials that particular
data has not been sent or received by one of the participants involved in a com-
munication. There are two types of non-repudiation: non-repudiation of origin
and non-repudiation of receipt [82]. The former provides the recipient of the data
with evidence of the origin. This evidence will protect against any subsequent
attempt by the sender to falsely deny sending the data. The latter proves to the
sender that the data was received by the specified recipient.
To provide the basic security requirements discussed above, the following sec-
tions present the essential cryptographic techniques that have been used in the
design of the proposed home and correspondent registration protocols.
A.2 Random Numbers
A random number can be informally defined as a number that is “unpredictable
to an attacker” [83]. Computers make use of pseudorandom number generators
(PRNGs) to generate random numbers for cryptographic applications. A PRNG
is a deterministic algorithm for generating a sequence of numbers that approxi-
mates the properties of random numbers.
Random numbers are used in network security protocols to provide freshness
for protocol messages and to prevent replay attacks [82]. In addition, they are
used for a number of computer security purposes, such as generating public-key
pairs and producing secret keys [84].
A.3 One-Way Hash Functions
A hash function, also called a message digest function, is a one-way function that
is relatively easy to compute but significantly hard to reverse. A hash function
takes a variable-length message M as input and produces a fixed-length output,
referred to as a hash value H(M). The hash value H(M) is a function of all the
bits of the message M. Therefore, any change to M will result in a change to
H(M). Two widely used hash functions are Message-Digest Algorithms, such as
MD5 [85], and Secure Hash Algorithms, such as SHA-1 [86] and SHA-512 [66].
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Hash functions are used in network security protocols to provide data integrity
and data authenticity services. These services guarantee the message receiver
that the message has not been tampered with in transit and that the message
was originated from the claimed sender. One way of achieving this is to combine
the use of a hash function with a secret key, which is known only to the sender and
the receiver, to compute a message authentication code. Hash functions are also
used in digital-signature generation. When digitally signing a message, instead
of applying cryptographic processing to the whole message, it is applied to the
message’s hash value. This is much more efficient as hash values have a fixed and
relatively small length.
A.4 Secret-Key (Symmetric) Cryptosystems
In a secret-key cryptosystem [82], also referred to as symmetric, the sender and
the receiver use the same secret key. Secret-key cryptosystems include secret-key
encryptions and message authentication codes.
A.4.1 Secret-Key Encryptions
In a secret-key encryption (also known as symmetric cipher), the sender uses a
secret key to encrypt a message into ciphertext and the receiver uses the same
secret key to decrypt the ciphertext into the original message. This process is
illustrated in Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Secret-key encryption/decryption scheme
Secret-key encryptions can be classified into stream and block ciphers [82],
according to the way in which the plaintext is processed. A stream cipher pro-
cesses the plaintext in bit-wise or byte-wise manner. A block cipher breaks up
the plaintext into groups of bits (called blocks) of a fixed length and processes
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one block at a time [87]. The latter is the more secure and more commonly used.
Most widely used secret-key block ciphers are the Triple Data Encryption Stan-
dard (3DES [88]), the International Data Encryption Standard (IDEA [89]), and
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES [64]).
Secret-key encryptions are widely used in network security protocols to provide
message confidentiality and to assure message authenticity. This is due to the
fact that the only entities capable of enciphering and deciphering the message
are those that know the key. Therefore, the sender keeps the message unreadable
by anyone other than the intended receiver, and the receiver is assured that the
message has originated from that sender.
A.4.2 Message Authentication Codes
The second type of secret-key cryptosystems is the Message Authentication Code
(MAC), also referred to as the keyed one-way hash function. The MAC combines
the use of a hash function with a shared secret key and can be used to provide
integrity and authenticity of a message. A sender applies a hash function over
a message M and a secret key K to produce a MAC value H(K, M). The sender
then sends both M and H(K, M) to the receiver. Once these are received, the
receiver can use the same secret key to re-compute a MAC value and compare it
with the received MAC value. This operation is illustrated in Figure A.2.
Figure A.2: The use of a MAC for message integrity and authenticity checking
Secret-key cryptosystems, i.e. secret-key encryptions and message authentica-
tion codes, are efficient and commonly used for message confidentiality, message
integrity, and message authenticity. However, they need an effective and secure
key management system for generating and distributing secret keys. They also
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require a large number of keys; for a secret-key cryptosystem with n users, since
each user has to possess n-1 keys, the required total number of keys can grow
to n*(n-1)/2. Finally, secret-key cryptosystems cannot provide non-repudiation
of origin or non-repudiation of receipt security services, as a message sender and
receiver can later deny sending and receiving the message. These limitations have
led to the advent of public-key cryptosystems [90] .
A.5 Public-Key (Asymmetric) Cryptosystems
A public-key cryptosystem, also referred to as asymmetric, uses a pair of keys;
a public key, which can be known to anyone, and a private key known only
to its owner. The public key and the private key are mathematically related
so that data encrypted with either key can only be decrypted using the other.
However, the private key cannot feasibly be derived from the public key. A
public-key cryptosystem depends on one or more trusted third parties, known
as certification authorities, to securely bind a public key to its rightful owner.
Public-key cryptosystems include public-key encryptions and digital signatures.
A.5.1 Public-Key Encryptions
Public-key encryptions (also known as asymmetric ciphers) use public keys for
encryption and private keys for decryption. As only the owner of a private key
can decrypt a message, public-key encryptions can be used to provide message
confidentiality. Figure A.3 shows the process of public-key encryption.
Figure A.3: Public-key encryption/decryption scheme
Public-key encryptions can provide message confidentiality, but they are not
normally used for bulk-message encryption as they are much slower in compar-
ison to secret-key encryptions (up to 100 times in software implementation and
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10,000 times in hardware implementation [91]). Therefore, public-key encryption
is typically combined with secret-key encryption to get the advantages of both
encryptions. At the beginning of a communication session, the sender and the
receiver use public-key encryption to establish a secret key. They then use the
secret key to provide integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality to all subsequent
messages using MAC and secret-key encryption. Well-known Internet security
protocols, such as SSL [92] and IPSec [25], use this hybrid approach.
Figure A.4: Digital signature generation and verification processes
A.5.2 Digital Signatures
A digital signature of a message can be defined as a cryptographic transformation
of the message using a secret known only to the signer (signer’s private key). A
digital signature scheme consists of two main components: namely, a signature
generation algorithm and a signature verification algorithm. The signature gener-
ation algorithm takes the signing entity’s private key and the message that needs
to be signed as input, and then produces output as a digital signature for that
message. The signature verification algorithm takes the message, the signature
and the signer’s public key as input, and outputs an indication as to whether or
not the signature on the message is valid. For example, if a sender wished to
send a digitally signed message to a receiver, the sender would first apply a hash
function to the message to produce a shorter message digest. The digest would
then be encrypted with the sender’s private key to produce a digital signature on
the message. The signature would then be appended to the original message and
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sent together as a digitally signed message to the receiver. Once the signed mes-
sage was received, the receiver would verify the signature by first decrypting the
signature with the sender’s public key to obtain a message digest. The receiver
would then apply the same hash function to the received message to generate a
fresh message digest. If the two digest values matched, then the signature would
be positively verified. Figure A.4 shows the signature generation and verification
processes.
Digital signatures can be used to provide data integrity, data authenticity, and
non-repudiation of origin services [87]. Since the sender uses his/her own private
key to generate the signature, a digital signature guarantees that the message
must have come from the claimed sender. Thus, the sender cannot later deny
that he/she generated and signed the message. The signature also assures that
any changes made to data cannot go undetected.
A.6 Digital Certificates and PKI
An important security issue associated with the use of public-key cryptosystems
is how to assure other entities that a public key is authentic, i.e. indeed belongs
to a particular entity. A well-known way to provide such assurance is through
the use of public-key certificates provided by Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI).
A public-key certificate is a structured data record issued and signed by a
trusted entity, called the Certification Authority (CA). The certificate contains a
number of data entries, including the public key that is being certified, the identity
of the public-key owner, the validity period of the certificate, the identity of the
issuer (the CA), and the CA’s signature on the certificate. The CA maintains a
list of all revoked certificates, known as the Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
In this way, an entity can verify the authenticity of a public key by checking both
the CA’s signature contained in the certificate associated with the public key and
the CA’s most recent CRL.
PKI is a hierarchical structure of CAs that perform the issuance and man-
agement of public-key certificates for the purpose of the wide-scale deployment
of public-key cryptosystems. The root CA issues public-key certificates to CAs
at a level immediately below, these in turn issue certificates to CAs at the next
level down, and so on, until the leaf nodes where the certificates are issued to
organizations and individuals.
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A.7 Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange [82] is a cryptographic protocol that en-
ables two entities without a previous security association to establish a shared
secret key over an insecure public network. The shared key can then be used to
authenticate and/or encrypt subsequent communications using a secret-key cryp-
tosystem. A description of the protocol is shown in Figure A.5 and is summarised
as follows:
Figure A.5: A Diffie-Hellman key exchange
• Alice and Bob agree on p and g, where p is a large prime number and g is a
primitive root (mod p) of the prime number p.
• Alice chooses a random private number ‘a’, i.e. a < p, and computes and sends
a public value ‘A’ to Bob, i.e. A = ga mod p.
• Bob chooses a random private number ‘b’, i.e. b < p, and computes and sends
a public value ‘B’ to Alice, i.e. B = gb mod p.
• Alice computes the key K = (B)a mod p = (gb mod p)a mod p = gba mod p.
• Bob computes the key K = (A)b mod p = (ga mod p)b mod p = gab mod p.
Both Alice and Bob are now in possession of the shared secret key K, because
gab and gba are equal mod p. In addition, perfect forward secrecy is achieved,
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as the secret numbers ‘a’ and ‘b’ are discarded at the end of the session. The
established shared secret key could be used to protect subsequent data exchanged
between Alice and Bob.
The DH key exchange is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. In this
attack, an attacker establishes two distinct DH key exchanges, masquerading as
Alice to Bob and vice versa. When Alice transmits her public value ‘A’, the
attacker intercepts it and sends his/her own public value to Bob. The attacker
intercepts Bob’s public value ‘B’ and sends his/her own public value to Alice.
The attacker then decrypts any messages sent out by Alice or Bob (and reads
and possibly modifies them), and re-encrypts and transmits the messages to the
other entity. One possible solution to this vulnerability is to use PKI and digital
signatures for the authentication of the exchanged public keys.
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Existing Correspondent
Registration Protocols
This appendix presents a more detailed description of the existing correspondent
registration protocols mentioned in Chapter 3.
B.1 EBU Protocol
• The MN initiates a proactive home address test, which is technically the same
as a standard home address test, by sending a HoTI message to the CN. The
CN responds by returning a HoT message containing a secret home keygen
token (Token1). The MN needs to run the test at most every 3.5 minutes as
this is the lifetime of a home keygen token [5]. Alternatively, the MN may
be able to run the test just before the current link breaks if its link layer can
trigger the indication.
• After moving to a foreign link, the MN sends an Early Binding Update (EBU)
message to the CN for CoA registration. The EBU is authenticated using a
binding management key (KBM) that is generated based on the home keygen
token received during the proactive home address test, i.e. KBM = SHA1
(Token1). The MN also initiates a concurrent care-of address test, which is
technically the same as a standard care-of address test, by sending a CoTI
message to the CN as soon as it has sent the EBU message.
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• Upon receiving the EBU message, the CN verifies the MN’s reachability at the
HoA using KBM , and infers the MN’s new CoA. Therefore, the CN creates/up-
dates a Binding Cache entry, stores the binding between the MN’s HoA and
CoA at the entry and, optionally, returns an Early Binding Acknowledgement
(EBA) message for confirmation. The CN also sends subsequent packets des-
tined for the MN to its new CoA. However, as the CN is not yet able to verify
the MN’s reachability at the CoA, the CN sets the entry in an unconfirmed
state and limits the amount of data sent to the CoA by using a Credit-Based
Authorisation technique [39, 40]. The CN also responds to the concurrent care-
of address test by returning a CoT message containing a secret care-of keygen
token (Token2).
• When the MN receives the CoT message, it sends a BU message to the CN.
The BU is authenticated using a key (KBM) that is generated based on both
the home and care-of keygen tokens, i.e. KBM = SHA1 (Token1 || Token2).
• Upon receiving the BU message, the CN verifies the authenticity of the message,
and then changes the status of the CoA to be confirmed. In addition, the CN
optionally returns a BA message to the MN for confirmation.
B.2 PBK Protocol
Initialisation:
• The MN generates a temporary public/private key pair, which is known as a
Purpose-Built Key (PBK) pair.
• The MN generates a Purpose-Built ID (PBID) by performing a cryptographic
one-way hash of the public key of the PBK pair.
• When the MN initiates a new connection with a CN, it sends the PBID as
well as the public key of its PBK pair along with the initial packets in the
connection.
• When the CN receives the initial packets, it verifies that the received public
key hashes to the received PBID. The CN then stores the PBID, the public
key and the source address of the packets, i.e. the MN’s HoA.
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Correspondent registrations:
• The MN initiates a correspondent registration by sending a request message
to the CN. The MN includes the PBID in the message and signs it with the
private key of the PBK pair.
• When the CN receives the request message, it verifies the digital signature using
the stored public key associated with the PBID. If the verification succeeds,
the CN will generate and send a random number as a challenge to the MN’s
CoA.
• Upon receiving the challenge, the MN encrypts the random number and the
binding information with the private key of the PBK pair to create a response.
The MN then sends the response and the PBID to the CN.
• Upon receiving the response, the CN decrypts and verifies it using the stored
public key. If the verification succeeds, the CN will accept the binding infor-
mation and the current correspondent registration will conclude.
B.3 UDHBU Protocol
Initial correspondent registration:
• The MN initiates the protocol by sending Message1 to the CN; Message1 =
{Src=CoA, Des=CN, HoA, NI , gm}, where NI is a fresh random nonce and
gm is a DH public value from a well-known DH group. The nonce NI is to
protect the MN against replay attacks and to enable the MN to reuse gm while
ensuring that the resulting session key will be different.
• When the CN receives Message1, it checks the DH group chosen by the MN;
if it is not acceptable, the CN will reply indicating the accepted DH groups.
Otherwise, the CN will reply by sending Message2 to the MN’s HoA; Message2
= {Src=CN, Des=HoA, NI , NR, gc, key-identifier, authenticator}, where NR
is a fresh random nonce; gc is a DH public value from the same DH group
chosen by the MN; key-identifier is an identifier for the public value gc; and
the authenticator is calculated using a keyed hashing MAC from a secret KCN
known only to the CN, i.e. authenticator = HMAC (KCN , (CN || HoA || CoA
|| NI || NR || gm || gc)).
206
APPENDIX B. EXISTING PROTOCOLS
• When the MN receives Message2, it verifies that the given nonce, i.e. NI ,
matches the nonce sent by the MN to this CN in Message1. The MN next
computes a DH session key (KS) based on the two nonces, its DH private
value, and the CN’s DH public value. The MN then sends Message3 to the
CN, which includes a BU that is authenticated using the key KS; Message3 =
{Src=CoA, Des=CN, NI , NR, gm, key-identifier, authenticator, Authenticated
BU (KS)}.
• When the CN receives Message3, it first checks on the validity of the nonce
NR. It next validates the received authenticator; the CN calculates a fresh
authenticator and compares it to the received one. If the validations succeed,
the CN will compute KS and verify the authenticity of the BU. If the BU
authentication succeeds, the CN will create a Binding Cache entry and store
the binding between the MN’s HoA and CoA as well as the value of KS at the
entry. It also optionally sends Message4 to the MN, where Message4 is a BA
message that is authenticated using the key KS.
Subsequent correspondent registrations:
• In subsequent correspondent registrations, the MN and the CN use the shared
session key, i.e. KS, directly in authenticating BUs and BAs.
B.4 CGA-OMIPv6 Protocol
Initial correspondent registration:
• An MN and a CN run a modified RR procedure, which establishes a shared
secret (KBM) between the two nodes. The modified RR procedure combines the
HoTI and the CoTI messages in one message called the HoTI&CoTI message.
Apart from this, the modified and the original RR procedures are identical.
• Immediately after a successful running of the modified RR procedure, the MN
sends a normal BU message, but includes the MN’s public key and signature
as well as the CGA auxiliary parameters that are used to generate the HoA
cryptographically (see Section 3.1). The BU message is authenticated using
the KBM established from the modified RR procedure.
• Upon receiving the BU message, the CN verifies the authenticity of the message
using KBM . It next runs the CGA-based address verification algorithm (see
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Figures 3.2 in Section 3.1) to verify the MN’s HoA. The CN then checks on the
validity of the signature. If the address and signature verifications succeed, the
CN generates a fresh session key (KSESSION) and encrypts it with the MN’s
public key. The CN also creates a Binding Cache entry and stores the binding
between the MN’s HoA and CoA as well as the value of KSESSION at the entry.
Finally, the CN sends a BA message to the MN. The BA message includes the
encrypted session key and is authenticated using the KBM established from the
modified RR procedure.
• Upon receiving the BA message, the MN uses KBM to verify the authenticity
of the message. The MN then decrypts the session key and records it for
subsequent correspondent registrations.
Subsequent correspondent registrations:
• The MN initiates a subsequent correspondent registration by performing a care-
of address test; the MN and the CN exchange a CoTI and a CoT message. The
CoT message sent by the CN to the MN includes a secret care-of keygen token
(Token2).
• The MN and the CN then exchange a BU and a BA message, which they
authenticate using a one-time session key (KBMPERM). The two nodes generate
KBMPERM by hashing the shared session key with the care-of keygen token,
i.e. KBMPERM = HMAC SHA1 (KSESSION , Token2).
B.5 ERO-MIPv6 Protocol
Initial correspondent registration:
• The MN initiates the initial correspondent registration by running a proactive
home address test with the CN as in the EBU protocol, which results in sharing
a home keygen token (Token1).
• After moving to a foreign link, the MN sends an EBU&CoTI message to the CN.
The EBU&CoTI message is a merging of the EBU and the CoTI messages from
the EBU protocol but includes the CGA auxiliary parameters and the MN’s
public key and signature as in the CGA-OMIPv6 protocol. The EBU&CoTI
message is authenticated using a key (KBM) that is generated based on the
208
APPENDIX B. EXISTING PROTOCOLS
home keygen token received during the proactive home address test as in the
EBU protocol (i.e. KBM = SHA1(Token1)).
• Upon receiving the EBU&CoTI message, the CN generates KBM and validates
the message. The CN next runs the CGA-based address verification algorithm.
It then verifies the signature, generates a fresh session key (KSESSION), and
encrypts the session key with the MN’s public key, as in the CGA-OMIPv6
protocol. It also utilises the Credit-Based Authorisation technique to limit the
amount of data sent to the MN’s unconfirmed CoA, as in the EBU protocol.
Finally, the CN sends an EBA&CoT message to the MN. The EBA&CoT mes-
sage is a merging of the EBA and the CoT messages from the EBU protocol but
also includes the encrypted session key as in the CGA-OMIPv6 protocol. The
EBA&CoT message is authenticated using the KBM as in the EBU protocol.
• Upon receiving the EBA&CoT message, the MN knows the session key and the
care-of keygen token. The MN and the CN next exchange normal BU and BA
messages. The BU and BA messages are authenticated with a key (KBM−new)
that is generated based on the shared session key and the fresh care-of token.
Subsequent correspondent registrations:
• Subsequent correspondent registrations are identical to the initial correspon-
dent registration, but the home address ownership and reachability proofs are
omitted. Specifically, there is no proactive home address test, i.e. the MN and
the CN do not exchange HoTI and HoT messages. In addition, the EBU&CoTI
message does not contain the CGA auxiliary parameters, the MN’s public key,
or the MN’s signature. Furthermore, the EBA&CoT message does not contain
the encrypted session key.
B.6 TBU Protocol
Initial correspondent registration:
• The MN initiates a correspondent registration by sending a BU message (Messa-
ge1) to the HA, i.e. Message1 = {Src=CoA, Des=HA, HoA, CoA, CN, NMN ,
TSMN , LTBReq}, where NMN is a fresh nonce; TSMN is the MN’s timestamp;
and LTBReq is a binding lifetime request. Message1 is reversed tunnelled from
the MN to the HA through the IPSec ESP secure tunnel.
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• Upon receiving Message1, the HA first validates timestamp TSMN . It then
generates a nonce (NHA) and sends Message2 to the CN on behalf of the MN.
Message2 is a request for ticket creation and correspondent registration execu-
tion between the MN and CN. Message2 = {Src=HoA, Des=CN, CoA, NMN ,
NHA, TSHA, LTBReq}, where TSHA is the HA’s timestamp. Message2 is also
sent to the CN via the IPSec ESP secure tunnel.
• Upon receiving Message2, the CN first validates timestamp TSHA. It next
generates a nonce (NCN) and creates a ticket key KMN−CN = HMAC (KHA−CN ,
(NMN || NCN || NHA)), where KHA−CN is the IPSec secret key shared between
HA and CN. The CN also creates a ticket TcKMN−CN = ENCKCN [HoA || NCN
|| TSCN || LTTcK || KMN−CN ], where KCN is a secret random value only known
by the CN; TSCN is the CN’s timestamp; and LTTcK is the ticket’s lifetime.
The CN also creates a Binding Cache entry for HoA and CoA. Finally, the
CN sends Message3 to the MN’s HoA, i.e. Message3 = {Src=CN, Des=HoA,
NHA, NCN , TSCN , LTBGrant, TcKMN−CN}, where LTBGrant is a granted binding
lifetime set by CN.
• The HA intercepts Message3 and checks on the validity of nonce NHA and times-
tamp TSCN . The HA next creates KMN−CN like CN, and sends Message4 to the
MN through the IPSec ESP secure tunnel. Message4 = {Src=HA, Des=CoA,
HoA, CN, NMN , TSHA, LTBGrant, TcKMN−CN , KMN−CN}.
• When the MN receives Message4, it checks on the validity of nonce NMN , and
then it securely stores values of TcKMN−CN and KMN−CN in its Binding Update
List entry for that CN. At this point, the initial correspondent registration
concludes and a secret key as well as a ticket are distributed between the MN
and the CN.
Subsequent correspondent registrations:
• In subsequent correspondent registrations, the MN sends a BU message directly
to the CN to register its new CoA, i.e. BU = {Src=CoA, Des=CN, HoA, NMN ,
TSMN , LTBReq, TcKMN−CN , MACKMN−CN (BU)}, where NMN is a fresh nonce,
TSMN is the MN’s timestamp; and MACKMN−CN (BU) is a keyed hash value
for the BU message using the ticket key KMN−CN .
• Upon receiving the BU message, the CN checks on the validity of timestamp
TSMN . It next verifies the validity of the ticket TcKMN−CN by decrypting and
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checking the MN’s HoA as well as the ticket lifetime LTTcK included in the
ticket. The CN then verifies the MAC using the ticket key KMN−CN . Finally,
the CN sends a BA message to the MN for confirmation, i.e. BA = {Src=CN,
Des=CoA, HoA, NMN , TSCN , LTBGrant, MACKMN−CN (BA)}.
• Upon receiving the BA message, the MN checks the validity of nonce NMN ,
and then verifies the MAC using the ticket key KMN−CN .
B.7 CBU Protocol
• The MN initiates a correspondent registration by sending a route optimization
request (REQ) message to the HA, i.e. REQ = {Src=CoA, Des=HA, HoA,
CoA, CN, N0}, where N0 is a nonce value used to match the reply message.
The REQ message is ‘reversed tunnelled’ from the MN to the HA through the
IPSec ESP secure tunnel.
• Upon receiving the REQ message, the HA generates a cookie (C0) and sends
COOKIE0 message to the CN on behalf of the MN, i.e. COOKIE0 = {Src=HoA,
Des=CN, C0}.
• Upon receiving the COOKIE0 message, the CN generates a nonce N1 and a
cookie C1, and sends COOKIE1 message to the MN’s HoA, i.e. COOKIE1 =
{Src=CN, Des=HoA, C0, C1, N1}.
• The HA intercepts the COOKIE1 message and checks on the validity of C0.
The HA next generates a nonce N2 and a DH private value ‘x’, and computes
its DH public value gx. The HA then sends EXCH0 message to the CN on
behalf of the MN. The EXCH0 = {Src=HoA, Des=CN, C0, C1, N1, N2, gx,
SIGH [H (HoA || CN || gx || N1 || N2)], CertH}, where SIGH [] denotes the
home link’s signature using the private key SKH , and CertH is the public key
certificate of the home link.
• When the CN receives the EXCH0 message, it validates the cookies, the home
link’s public key certificate, and the signature. If all the validations are posi-
tive, the CN is confident that the MN’s HoA is authorised by its home link and
the DH public value gx is freshly generated by the MN’s home link. Therefore,
the CN generates a DH private value ‘y’ and computes its DH public value
gy. The CN next computes a DH key KDH = (g
x)y and a session key KBM
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= HMAC (KDH , (N1 || N2)). The CN also creates a Binding Cache entry for
the HoA and stores the value of KBM for authenticating subsequent correspon-
dent registrations from the MN. Finally, the HA sends EXCH1 message to the
MN’s HoA, i.e. EXCH1 = {Src=CN, Des=HoA, C0, C1, gy, MACKBM (gy ||
EXCH0)}.
• Again, the HA intercepts the EXCH1 message, validates the cookies, and calcu-
lates the DH key KDH as well as the session key KBM . The HA next validates
MACKBM (g
y || EXCH0). If all the validations are positive, the HA sends a
REP message to the MN through the IPSec ESP secure tunnel, i.e. REP =
{Src=HA, Des=CoA, HoA, CN, N0, KBM}.
• Upon receiving the REP message, the MN verifies that N0 is the same as the
one it sent out in the REQ message. If the verification succeeds, the MN
proceeds by exchanging normal BU and BA messages with the CN, where the
messages are protected using the key KBM .
• In subsequent correspondent registrations, the MN and the CN use the shared
session key, i.e. KBM , directly in authenticating BUs and BAs.
B.8 HCBU Protocol
The protocol is divided into three steps. The first step consists of three messages
and is initiated by the MN when it realises an imminent handover. The MN
generates a fresh nonce Nm and sends Message1 to the HA, i.e. Message1 =
{Src=CoA, Des=HA, HoA, CoA, CN, Nm}. The HA (on behalf of the MN) and
the CN then exchange Message2 and Message3 to prepare for the coming binding
update. Message2 passes the fresh nonce Nm, MN’s HoA, and a DH public value
gx to the CN, i.e. Message2 = {Src=HoA, Des=CN, Nm, gx}. In reply, Message3
passes CN’s fresh nonce Nc and DH public value g
y to the HA. Message3 also
contains a cookie CookieCN that is created using CN’s secret key KCN . Message3
= {Src=CN, Des=HoA, Nm, Nc, gx, gy, CookieCN}, where CookieCN = HMAC
(KCN , Message3). At this point, the CN does not create a state for the protocol,
which protects the CN against resource exhaustion DoS attacks. However, the
HA needs to record the values of Nm, Nc, g
x, gy, and CookieCN .
The second step consists of three messages and is initiated by the MN when
it roams to a foreign link and is configured a new CoA. The MN first obtains the
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foreign link’s signature on the binding of (HoA, CoA), i.e. SIGH ’ [H (HoA || CoA
|| Validity)]. The MN then sends Message4 to the HA for proving its ownership
of CoA, i.e. Message4 = {Src=CoA, Des=HA, HoA, CoA, Validity, CN, SIGH ’
[H (HoA || CoA || Validity)], CertH ’}, where CertH ’ is the public key certificate
of the foreign link. Upon receiving Message4, the HA first checks the validity of
the certificate and verifies the signature contained in the message, which assures
the correctness of the MN’s CoA. Next, the HA computes a DH key KDH =
(gx)y, and a session key KBM = HMAC (KDH , (Nm || Nc)). The HA then sends
Message5 to the MN for delivering the session key, i.e. Message5 = {Src=HA,
Des=CoA, HoA, CN, Nm, KBM}. At the same time, the HA also sends Message6
to the CN for proving the MN’s ownership of both the HoA and CoA. Message6
= {Src=HoA, Des=CN, CoA, Nm, Nc, gx, gy, CookieCN , Validity, SIGH [H (HoA
|| CoA || Validity || CN || KDH || Nm || Nc)], CertH}. When the CN receives
Message6, it first validates the cookie CookieCN . It next checks the validity of
the certificate. It then computes KDH and verifies the signature contained in
the message. If all validations succeed, the CN is confident that both the MN’s
HoA and CoA are indeed correct. Finally, the CN computes KBM and creates a
Binding Cache entry for HoA, CoA, and KBM . However, the CN initialises this
entry in an inactive state, indicating that a final confirmation from the CoA is
required.
The third step consists of two messages, i.e. normal BU and BA messages, and
is initiated immediately by the MN when it receives Message5 from the HA. The
MN exchanges normal BU and BA messages with the CN, where the messages
are protected using the KBM . As a result, the CN changes the state of the entry
to active and sends subsequent traffic directly to the CoA.
In subsequent correspondent registrations, the MN obtains the foreign link’s
signature on the binding of (HoA, CoA). The MN then sends a BU message that
contains the foreign link’s signature and public key certificate to the CN. The BU
message is also protected using KBM .
B.9 ETBU Protocol
Initial correspondent registration:
• The MN generates a fresh nonce (NMN), a fresh session key (KMN−CN), and a
ticket TcKMN−CN = ENCKMN [CN || TSMN || LTTcK || KMN−CN ], where KMN
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is a secret random value only known by MN; TSMN is MN’s timestamp repre-
senting the issue time of the ticket; and LTTcK is the ticket’s lifetime. The MN
next sends a BU request message (Message1) to its home agent, i.e. Message1
= {Src=CoA, Des=HA, HoA, CoA, CN, NMN , SeqMN , LTBReq, TcKMN−CN ,
KMN−CN}, where SeqMN is an initial sequence number; and LTBReq is a bind-
ing lifetime request. Message1 is reversed tunnelled from the MN to the HA
through the IPSec ESP secure tunnel.
• Upon receiving Message1, the HAMN generates a nonce (NHAMN ) and sends a
BU request forwarding message (Message2) to the CN on behalf of the MN.
Message2 = {Src=HoA, Des=CN, NHAMN , SIGHAMN [NHAMN || LTBReq ||
TcKMN−CN || TSHAMN || SeqMN ], ENCPKHACN [NHAMN || HAMN || CoA ||
KMN−CN ]}, where TSHAMN is HAMN ’s timestamp and ENCPKHACN denotes
encryption using the CN’s home link public key.
• The CN’s home agent (HACN) intercepts Message2 and checks on the validity of
the signature and then decrypts the message using its private key. If the valida-
tion succeeds, HACN then sends a BU request verification message (Message3)
to the CN through the IPSec ESP secure tunnel. Message3 = {Src=HoA,
Des=CN, NHACN , CoA, SeqMN , TcKMN−CN , KMN−CN}, where NHACN is a
fresh nonce.
• Upon receiving Message3, the CN creates a Binding Cache entry for the HoA
and CoA, and stores the value of SeqMN in it. It also securely stores the
values of TcKMN−CN and KMN−CN . The CN next generates a fresh session key
(KCN−MN) and a ticket (TcKCN−MN) as the MN, but uses its own secret value
(KCN). The CN then sends a BA respond message (Message4) to the HACN
through the IPSec ESP secure tunnel. Message4 = {Src=CN, Des=HACN ,
HoA, SeqMN , NCN , TSCN , LTBGrant, TcKCN−MN , KCN−MN}.
• Upon receiving Message4, the HACN sends Message5 to the MN on behalf
of the CN. Message5 = {Src=CN, Des=HoA, NHAMN , SIGHACN [NHAMN ||
LTBGrant || TcKCN−MN || TSHACN || SeqMN ], ENCPKHAMN [NHAMN || HACN ||
KCN−MN ]}, where TSHACN is the CN’s home link timestamp and ENCPKHAMN
denotes encryption using the MN’s home link public key.
• After intercepting Message5, the HAMN checks on the validity of the nonce
NHAMN . It next decrypts the message using its private key and then checks
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on the validity of the signature. If the validation succeeds, HAMN will send
Message6 to the MN through the IPSec ESP secure tunnel. Message6 =
{Src=HA, Des=CoA, HoA, CN, NMN , SeqMN , LTBGrant, TcKCN−MN , KCN−MN}.
• When the MN receives Message6, it checks on the validity of nonce NMN and
sequence number SeqMN . It then securely stores values of TcKCN−MN and
KCN−MN in its Binding Update List for that CN. At this point, the initial
correspondent registration concludes and two secret keys as well as two tickets
are distributed between the MN and the CN.
Subsequent correspondent registrations:
• When the MN roams to a new foreign link, it first generates a fresh nonce NMN .
The MN then sends a BU message to the CN, i.e. BU = {Src=CoA, Des=CN,
HoA, NMN , SeqMN , LTBReq, TcKCN−MN , PKMN , MACKCN−MN (BU)}, where
PKMN is the MN’s self-generated public key that is used in generating both
the HoA and the CoA; and MACKCN−MN (BU) is a keyed hash value for the
BU message using the ticket key KCN−MN . If the CN is currently located in
its home link, it will receive the BU message directly. Otherwise, the HACN
will intercept and forward the messages to the CN’s current CoA via a secure
tunnel. If the CN simultaneously moves to a new CoA, the message is further
intercepted by an HA existing in the CN’s previous link and is forwarded to
the CN’s new CoA.
• Upon receiving the BU message, the CN verifies the validity of the MN’s
HoA and CoA by running the CGA-based address verification algorithm us-
ing PKMN (see Figures 3.2 in Section 3.1). The CN next decrypts the ticket
TcKCN−MN using its secret KCN , and then verifies the validation periods and
the HoA included in the ticket. Finally, the CN uses the ticket key KCN−MN
contained in the ticket to verify the MACKCN−MN (BU). If all verifications
succeed, the CN updates its Binding Cache entry and sends a BA message
to the MN, i.e. BA = {Src=CN, Des=CoA, HoA, NMN , SeqMN , LTBGrant,
MACKCN−MN (BA)}.
• Upon receiving the BA message, the MN first checks the validity of nonce NMN
and sequence number SeqMN , and then verifies the MACKCN−MN (BA) using
the ticket key KCN−MN .
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Appendix C
OPNET Modeler and CryptoSys
Toolkit
C.1 OPNET Modeler
Simulations modelling presented in this thesis use the OPNETTM simulation pack-
age [13]. OPNET Modeler is an event driven simulator and provides a powerful
graphical tool to display simulation statistics. It uses hierarchically linked do-
mains to denote a network design, namely the process domain, the node domain,
and the network domain. Figure C.1 demonstrates the model hierarchy from an
example model [93].
At the lowest level, protocols and applications are defined as process models.
A process model is represented as a state transition diagram (STD). Each state
in the model has an Enter and Exit execution block where C/C++ coded proce-
dures are entered. OPNET Modeler uses various pre-written kernel procedures
to simplify simulation modelling by implementing key functions such as sending
and receiving messages. Transitions between states have associated condition
macros. The flow of control in the process is determined by interrupt events such
as packet arrivals or timer expirations. There are two types of state used; the
forced state and the un-forced state. The process will remain in the unforced
state until the next interrupt event occurs after which it will move to the next
state determined by the state-flow diagram. The process will move immediately
from a forced state once the executive blocks have been processed.
The next level in OPNET Modeler’s simulation model hierarchy is node mod-
elling. A node model is built from a number of process models that are connected
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together using message flows. Network nodes, such as workstations and routers,
are defined as node models. Node models are used at the next level to create
network models. A network model consists of a number of network nodes that
are connected using network links. Sub-networks can also be used to represent
an entire network topology.
Figure C.1: OPNET modelling hierarchy [93]
OPNET Modeler has a large library of pre-implemented protocols, applica-
tions, nodes, and statistics. The basic Mobile IP protocols (MIPv4 and MIPv6)
have been implemented as part of the standard models library. This is one of the
main incentives for choosing OPNET as a simulator tool because the author is not
required to implement the basic functionalities of MIPv6 prior to the integration
of the proposed protocols.
C.2 Mobile IPv6 in OPNET Modeler
The implementation of the Mobile IPv6 protocol in the OPNET Modeler version
14.5 is based upon two process models: mipv6 mgr and mipv6 mn. The former
performs the operations for home agents and correspondent nodes. The latter
performs the operations for mobile nodes. Also, the former is responsible for
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creating the latter; the mipv6 mgr process model is the parent process model
that creates the mipv6 mn process model.
The mipv6 mgr process model is depicted in Figure C.2. It consists of two
states: ‘init’ state and ‘idle’ state. The ‘init’ state initializes the mipv6 mgr
process and reads the Mobile IPv6-related attributes such as ‘node type’ and
‘route optimization status’. A different set of attributes is expected for every
different node type. This state is also responsible for creating and invoking the
child process model ‘mipv6 mn in case this node type is a mobile node. The
‘idle’ state is responsible for handling any incoming mobility message. This state
evaluates the mobility header in the incoming message to determine the message
type. Upon determining the message type, the state either processes it or sends
it to the mipv6 mn process. An HA and/or a CN will process mobility messages
in the current mipv6 mgr process.
Figure C.2: mipv6 mgr process model
The mipv6 mn process model is depicted in Figure C.3. It consists of six
states: ‘init’ state, ‘home’ state, ‘ha bind’ state, ‘away’ state, ‘route test’ state,
and ‘cn bind’ state. The ‘init’ state initializes the mipv6 mn process and its
state variables. In addition, it reads the node’s home address, sets the node’s
care-of address to invalid (i.e. no care-of address is set yet), and registers the
node’s local and global statistics.
The home state sets some flags to indicate that the node (MN) is currently
located at its home link. In addition, it evaluates the current invocation of the
mipv6 mn process by executing the mipv6 mn invocation process function
(which will be explained later in greater detail).
The ‘ha bind’ state is responsible for sending a BU message to an HA. This
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state first checks the MN’s current location, i.e. whether the MN is at the home
network or at a foreign network. It then sends a BU message that requests the
HA to either remove its Binding Cache entry or update it with the MN’s current
CoA. Finally, this state executes the mipv6 mn invocation process function
to evaluate all of the invocations of the current mipv6 mn process.
The ‘away’ state sets some flags to indicate that the MN is away from its home
network. The state also executes the mipv6 mn invocation process function
to evaluate all of the invocations of the current mipv6 mn process.
The ‘route test’ state is responsible for performing a route optimization pro-
cedure with CNs. This state first checks if route optimization is enabled in this
MN. If enabled, it will send both of the routability test initialization messages,
i.e. HoTI and CoTI messages, to all the CNs already in the MN’s Binding Update
List.
The ‘cn bind’ state is responsible for sending a BU message to a CN. This state
checks the MN’s current location, and then sends a BU message that requests the
CN to either remove its Binding Cache entry or update it with the MN’s current
CoA.
The mipv6 mn invocation process function evaluates all of the invoca-
tions of the current mipv6 mn process as follows. It first checks the invocation
mode; if the invocation mode is direct, which means the current mipv6 mn
process (MN) has received a mobility message, the function will determine the
type of received mobility message, i.e. BA, HoT, or CoT. This function then
processes the message as follows:
• BA: Search for an entry in the Binding Update List that corresponds to the
source address of the BA message. If no entry is found, ignore the BA message.
Otherwise, check the status and process the BA message as follows:
1. If the status is accepted, then (1) cancel the timer associated with this
entry to stop the retransmitting of BU messages; and (2) update/remove
the current entry from the Binding Update List according to whether this
message is a response to a registration or deregistration process.
2. If the status is rejected and the message is coming from an HA, then retry
later.
3. If the status is rejected and the message is coming from a CN, do not try
to bind again with this CN.
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• HoT or CoT: check if the source of this BA message already has an entry in
the Binding Update List. If no entry is found, ignore the message. Otherwise,
mark the correspondent routability test as completed and wait for the second
test. When both tests are completed, cancel the event associated to route test
retransmission and send a BU message to the source of this message.
Figure C.3: mipv6 mn process model
When the invocation mode is direct, which means an interrupt has hap-
pened, the mipv6 mn invocation process function first determines the in-
terrupt type, i.e. layer3 handoff interrupt, start binding interrupt, bind-
ing update retx timer interrupt, or route test rtex timer interrupt. The
function then processes the interrupt as follows:
• layer3 handoff : This interrupt means that the MN received a router adver-
tisement message from a new router. The interrupt indicates that the MN
has roamed to a different domain. This interrupt is processed by executing
layer3 handoff process function. This function first checks whether the new
router is same as the current router. If they are the same, then it is a false
alarm, hence ignore it. Otherwise, a new router is detected; then it checks
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whether the MN returned to the home network or roamed to a foreign net-
work. In the former case, start the deregistering procedure. In the latter
case, obtain a CoA that corresponds to the new network prefix and start the
registering procedure.
• start binding: This interrupt means that the MN needs to start a binding
procedure with a CN. The function obtains the address of the CN through the
interrupt and starts the route optimization procedure with that CN.
• binding update retx timer: This interrupt means that the binding update
retransmission timer is expired; hence, the MN needs to retransmit a BU mes-
sage. Therefore, the function obtains the address of the HA/CN through the
interrupt and retransmits the BU message.
• route test rtex timer: This interrupt means that the routability test re-
transmission timer is expired; hence, the MN needs to retransmit a HoTI
and/or CoTI message. Therefore, the function obtains the address of the CN
through the interrupt and retransmits the corresponding routability test ini-
tialization message.
C.3 CryptoSys Cryptography Toolkit
CryptoSys is a cryptographic toolkit that is developed by D.I. Management Ser-
vices Pty Limited [94]. It provides a large library of cryptography tools for
developers using VB6/VBA, C/C++, C#, VB.NET and VBScript/COM/ASP.
It runs on all Win32 operating system: 95/98/NT4/2K/XP/2003/Vista/W7. A
Linux and Win64 versions are also available.
CryptoSys includes two major products: CryptoSys API and CryptoSys PKI.
The CryptoSys API provides symmetrical encryption. It provides: (1) four of the
major block cipher algorithms: AES [64], DES [95], Triple DES [88] and Blow-
fish [96]; (2) a stream cipher algorithm compatible with RC4[97]; key wrap with
AES and Triple DES; (3) secure message digest hash algorithms SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, MD2 and MD5; (4) the HMAC and CMAC
message authentication algorithms; (5) data compression and decompression al-
gorithms; (6) a secure random number generator; and (7) password-based key
derivation function (PBKDF).
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The CryptoSys PKI provides asymmetrical public key encryption and digital
signatures. It provides: (1) RSA public and private keys generation; (2) X.509
certificates creation; (3) RSA public key encryption and signing; (4) encryption
with symmetrical block ciphers Triple-DES and AES-128/192/256; (5) secure
message digest hash algorithms SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512,
MD2 and MD5; (6) HMAC message authentication algorithms; and (7) a secure
random number generator.
The author chooses CryptoSys because of its features as it has a large library of
cryptography tools, runs on Win32 operating system, uses C/C++ programming
language (compatible with OPNET), and is so easy to use.
C.4 OPNET Simulation Model Validation - EHR
Model Debugging
HA’s Address = [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
MN’s HoA = [2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mobile IPv6 Mobility Detection: Moving away; MN performs layer-3 handoff process.
New router address = [3015:0:0:AA:0:0:0:1]
MN configures a new CoA using the symmetric CGA-based generation algorithm:
1- MN uses RNG NonceDataHex to generate 128-bits fresh Modifier
Modifier = 211DB539DCFDF210
2- Subnet Prefix of the foreign link = 3015:0:0:AA
3- Data1 = (Modifier || Supnet Prefix) = 211DB539DCFDF210301500AA
4- MN uses SHA1 Hmac to generate 160-bits Digest1
Digest1 = f2723619a4def3d13ab922f9bbcb1fec376c97fe
5- First 64-bits of Digest1 = f2723619a4def3d1
6- MN sets M/S=1, H/C=0, U/L=0, and I/G=0 to perform interface identifier (ID)
ID = f8723619a4def3d1
7- New CoA = [3015:0:0:AA:F872:3619:A4DE:F3D1]
MN sends a BU message to the HA located at address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
Value of Modifier included in the BU message is 211DB539DCFDF210
Total Size of the BU message in bits is < 848 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
HA at address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1] received a BU message from an MN
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MN’s HoA = [2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2]
MN’s CoA = [3015:0:0:AA:F872:3619:A4DE:F3D1]
Value of Modifier received = 211DB539DCFDF210
HA verifies the CoA using the symmetric CGA-based verification algorithm:
1- Subnet Prefix of the received CoA = 3015:0:0:AA
2- Data1 = (Modifier || Supnet Prefix) = 211DB539DCFDF210301500AA
3- HA uses SHA1 Hmac to generate 160-bits Digest1
Digest1 = f2723619a4def3d13ab922f9bbcb1fec376c97fe
4- First 64-bits of Digest1 = f2723619a4def3d1
5- HA sets M/S=1, H/C=0 U/L=0, and I/G=0 to perform interface identifier (ID)
ID = f8723619a4def3d1
6- HA calculates the ID part of MN’s CoA as [F872:3619:A4DE:F3D1]
The claimed CoA is valid, It passed the symmetric CGA-based verification algorithm.
HA uses SHA1 Hmac to generate 64-bits fresh CoT
1- Data2 = (MN’s HoA || MN’s CoA) = 2005009C00002301500AAF8723619A4DEF3D1
2- Digest2 = 915b8e1799890c0cdb92b64aac253c46d9809cdb
3- Generated CoT = First 64-bits of Digest2 = 915b8e1799890c0c
HA sets binding status as ‘Accepted for limited period’
HA sets binding lifetime to MIN BU LIIFETIME
HA sends a BACoT message to MN at Address [3015:0:0:AA:F872:3619:A4DE:F3D1]
Value of CoT included in the BACoT is 915b8e1799890c0c
Value of index (I) included in the BACoT is 0
Total Size of the BACoT message in bits is < 672 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN at address [3015:0:0:AA:F872:3619:A4DE:F3D1] received a BACoT message from an HA
HA address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
Status of the received BACoT messag is ‘Accepted for limited period’
Value of CoT received = 915b8e1799890c0c
Value of index (I) received = 0
MN sends a BUCoT message to HA at address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
Value of CoT included in the BUCoT is 915b8e1799890c0c
Value of index (I) included in the BUCoT is 0
Total Size of the BUCoT message in bits is < 800 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
HA at address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1] received a BUCoT message from an MN
MN’s HoA = [2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2]
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MN’s CoA = [3015:0:0:AA:F872:3619:A4DE:F3D1]
Value of CoT received = 915b8e1799890c0c
Value of index (I) received = 0
HA uses SHA1 Hmac to regenerate the CoT
Data2 = (MN’s HoA || MN’s CoA) = 2005009C00002301500AAF8723619A4DEF3D1
Digest2 = 915b8e1799890c0cdb92b64aac253c46d9809cdb
Regenerated CoT = First 64-bits of Digest2 = 915b8e1799890c0c
Regenerated CoT = Received CoT
HA sets binding status as ‘Accepted’
HA sets binding lifetime to BU LIIFETIME
HA sends a BA message to MN at Address [3015:0:0:AA:F872:3619:A4DE:F3D1]
Total Size of the BA message in bits is < 576 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN at address [3015:0:0:AA:F872:3619:A4DE:F3D1] received a BA message from an HA
HA address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
Status of the received BA message is ‘Accepted’
Table C.1: Model debugging - EHR protocol
C.5 OPNET Simulation Model Validation - SK-
based Model Debugging
HA’s Address = [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
MN’s HoA = [2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2]
CN’s Address = [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mobile IPv6 Mobility Detection: MN performs layer-3 handoff process.
New router address = [3015:0:0:AA:0:0:0:1]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN runs the enhanced home registration protocol (EHR) with HA as specified in Table C.1.
MN’s current CoA = [3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN at address [3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD] received traffic from CN located at address
[5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] via HA tunnel.
1- MN uses RNG NonceDataHex to generate 64 bit fresh cookie; cookie = 98148493.
2- MN at address [3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD] sends a CoTI mobility message to CN lo-
cated at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2].
Value of cookie included in the message = < 98148493 >
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Total Size of the message in bits = < 448 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] received a CoTI mobility message from MN located at address
[3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD]
Value of cookie received in the message = < 98148493 >
1- CN uses SHA1 HMAC to generate 64 bit token; token = f8e9fcc1.
2- CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] sends a CoT mobility message to MN located at address
[3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD]
Value of cookie included in the message = < 98148493 >
Value of token included in the message = < f8e9fcc1 >
Value of token index included in the message = < 0 >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 512 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN at address [3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD] received a CoT mobility message from CN
located at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2]
Value of cookie received in the message = < 98148493 >
Value of token received in the message = < f8e9fcc1 >
Value of token index received in the message = < 0 >
1- MN checks received cookie. The received and stored cookies are matched.
2- MN at address [3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD] sends a BReq mobility message to HA
located at address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD >
Value of CN’s Address included in the message = < 5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2 >
Value of token included in the message = < f8e9fcc1 >
Value of token index included in the message = < 0 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 0 >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 928 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
HA at address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1] received a BReq mobility message from MN located at address
[3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD].
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD >
Value of CN’s Address included in the message = < 5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2 >
Value of token included in the message = < f8e9fcc1 >
Value of token index included in the message = < 0 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 0 >
1- HA checks received HoA. There is a Binding Cache entry for that address, i.e. the HA is serving
as a home agent for that MN’s HoA.
2- HA checks received CoA. The MN claimed CoA matches with its CoA registered at the HA.
3- HA uses RNG NonceDataHex to generate 64 bit nonce NHA1; NHA1 = 256FCD39.
4- HA uses RNG NonceDataHex to generate 64 bit nonce NHA2; NHA2 = 10CC448A.
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5- HA uses SHA2 HMAC to generate 256 bit KBC1 and KBC2 keys
KBC1 = 0B1268C5430A7A8145E17E5C21C092D9
KBC2 = 4498942CF8BDBCBF721259E2EAC1B9BF
6- HA at address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1] sends a BRep mobility message to MN located at address
[3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of CN’s Address included in the message = < 5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 0 >
Value of KBC1 included in the message = < 0B1268C5430A7A8145E17E5C21C092D9 >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 944 >
7- HA at address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1] sends an EBC mobility message to CN located at address
[5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD >
Value of NHA1 included in the message = < 256FCD39 >
Value of NHA2 included in the message = < 10CC448A >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 0 >
Value of token included in the message = < f8e9fcc1 >
Value of token index included in the message = < 0 >
Value of MACKBC2 (EBC) included in the message = < 5AFC9A310F9A >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 848 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN at address [3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD] received a BRep mobility message from HA
located at address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of CN’s Address included in the message = < 5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 0 >
Value of KBC1 included in the message = < 0B1268C5430A7A8145E17E5C21C092D9 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] received an EBC mobility message from HA located at address
[2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD >
Value of NHA1 included in the message = < 256FCD39 >
Value of NHA2 included in the message = < 10CC448A >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 0 >
Value of token included in the message = < f8e9fcc1 >
Value of token index included in the message = < 0 >
Value of MACKBC2 (EBC) included in the message = < 5AFC9A310F9A >
1- CN checks received token. The received and regenerated tokens are matched.
2- CN uses SHA2 HMAC to generate 256 bit KBC1 and KBC2 keys
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KBC1 = 0B1268C5430A7A8145E17E5C21C092D9
KBC2 = 4498942CF8BDBCBF721259E2EAC1B9BF
3- CN checks received MACKBC2 (EBC). The received and calculated MACs are matched.
4- CN uses RNG NonceDataHex to generate 256 bit fresh session key (KMN−CN ).
KMN−CN = 1423F477EB588C9777D69F48046E0BB4
5- CN encrypts key KMN−CN using AES256 HexMode CBC symmetric encryption with KBC1.
ENCKBC1 [KMN−CN ] = < 6BDF4439DF4E4C250B31D03AC3AEAD1B >
6- CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] sends an EBA mobility message to MN located at address
[3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 0 >
Value of ENCKBC1 [KMN−CN ] included = < 6BDF4439DF4E4C250B31D03AC3AEAD1B >
Value of MACKMN−CN (EBA) included in the message = < 842A53F8DF4A >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 912 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN at address [3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD] received an EBA mobility message from CN
located at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 0 >
Value of ENCKBC1 [KMN−CN ] included = < 6BDF4439DF4E4C250B31D03AC3AEAD1B >
Value of MACKMN−CN (EBA) included in the message = < 842A53F8DF4A >
1- MN decrypts value of ENCKBC1 [KMN−CN ] received using AES256 HexMode CBC symmetric
decryption with KBC1. KMN−CN = < 1423F477EB588C9777D69F48046E0BB4 >
2- MN checks received MACKMN−CN (EBA). The received and calculated MACs are matched.
3- MN at address [3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD] sends a BCC mobility message to CN lo-
cated at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 1 >
Value of MACKMN−CN (BCC) included in the message = < 30A72B6C9331 >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 810 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] received a BCC mobility message from MN located at address
[3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 1 >
Value of MACKMN−CN (BCC) included in the message = < 30A72B6C9331 >
1- CN checks received MACKMN−CN (BCC). The received and calculated MACs are matched
2- CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] sends a BA mobility message to MN located at address
[3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
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Value of sequence number included in the message = < 1 >
Value of MACKMN−CN (BA) included in the message = < 0D5D29E76552 >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 576 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN at address [3015:0:0:AA:C818:96A7:BC59:1ABD] received a BA mobility message from CN lo-
cated at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 1 >
Value of MACKMN−CN (BA) included in the message = < 0D5D29E76552 >
1- MN checks received MACKMN−CN (BA). The received and calculated MACs are matched.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mobile IPv6 Mobility Detection: MN performs layer-3 handoff process.
New router address = [4025:0:0:12:0:0:0:1]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN runs the enhanced home registration protocol (EHR) with HA as specified in Table C.1.
MN’s current CoA = [4025:0:0:12:E852:5EAF:F52D:5C00]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1- MN uses SHA1 HMAC to generate KBM key; KBM = EB3F874922BBBF9B5AB8
2- MN calculates Authenticator using AES256 HexMode CBC symmetric encryption with
KMN−HA. Authenticator =
< CEFA1CC8B8F5C55A2E991C982AFF39A91953B2BEDB9E757F985F32C568AAB514 >
3- MN at address [4025:0:0:12:E852:5EAF:F52D:5C00] sends a BU mobility message to CN located
at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 4025:0:0:12:E852:5EAF:F52D:5C00 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 2 >
Value of Authenticator included in the message =
< CEFA1CC8B8F5C55A2E991C982AFF39A91953B2BEDB9E757F985F32C568AAB514 >
Value of MACKBM (BU) included in the message = < 8FD8FF720AC8 >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 1072 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] received a BU mobility message from MN located at address
[4025:0:0:12:E852:5EAF:F52D:5C00]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 4025:0:0:12:E852:5EAF:F52D:5C00 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 2 >
Value of Authenticator included in the message =
< CEFA1CC8B8F5C55A2E991C982AFF39A91953B2BEDB9E757F985F32C568AAB514 >
Value of MACKBM (BU) included in the message = < 8FD8FF720AC8 >
1- CN uses SHA1 HMAC to generate KBM key; KBM = EB3F874922BBBF9B5AB8
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2- CN checks received MACKBM (BU). The received and calculated MACs are matched
3- CN uses RNG NonceDataHex to generate 64 bit nonce NCN ; NCN = 121B70BD
4- CN uses SHA1 HMAC to generate KBC key; KBC = F4E0992F4CD9482FD082
5- CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] sends a BCReq mobility message to HA located at address
[2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 4025:0:0:12:E852:5EAF:F52D:5C00 >
Value of Authenticator included in the message =
< CEFA1CC8B8F5C55A2E991C982AFF39A91953B2BEDB9E757F985F32C568AAB514 >
Value of NCN included in the message = < 121B70BD >
Value of MACKBC (BCReq) included in the message = < 2329B8159BB2 >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 960 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
HA at address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1] received a BCReq mobility message from CN located at address
[5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2].
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 4025:0:0:12:E852:5EAF:F52D:5C00 >
Value of Authenticator included in the message =
< CEFA1CC8B8F5C55A2E991C982AFF39A91953B2BEDB9E757F985F32C568AAB514 >
Value of NCN included in the message = < 121B70BD >
Value of MACKBC (BCReq) included in the message = < 2329B8159BB2 >
1- HA checks received HoA. There is a Binding Cache entry for that address, i.e. the HA is serving
as a home agent for that MN’s HoA.
2- HA checks received CoA. The MN claimed CoA matches with its CoA registered at the HA.
3- HA uses SHA1 HMAC to generate KBC key; KBC = F4E0992F4CD9482FD082
4- HA checks received MACKBC (BCReq). The received and calculated MACs are matched
5- HA decrypts value of Authenticator received using AES256 HexMode CBC symmetric decryption
with KMN−HA.
Decrypted value = 2005009C0000240250012E8525EAFF52D5C00503500800020808080808080808
6- HA at address [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1] sends a BCRep mobility message to CN located at address
[5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2].
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 4025:0:0:12:E852:5EAF:F52D:5C00 >
Value of NCN included in the message = < 121B70BD >
Value of MACKBC (BCRep) included in the message = < C22BBE8A4072 >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 688 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] received a BRep mobility message from HA located at address
[2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 4025:0:0:12:E852:5EAF:F52D:5C00 >
Value of NCN included in the message = < 121B70BD >
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Value of MACKBC (BCRep) included in the message = < C22BBE8A4072 >
1- CN checks received MACKBC (BCRep). The received and calculated MACs are matched
2- CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] sends a BA mobility message to MN located at address
[4025:0:0:12:E852:5EAF:F52D:5C00]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 2 >
Value of MACKBM (BA) included in the message = < BED4F31F2D64 >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 640 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN at address [4025:0:0:12:E852:5EAF:F52D:5C00] received a BA mobility message from CN located
at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 2 >
Value of MACKBM (BA) included in the message = < BED4F31F2D64 >
1- MN checks received MACKBM (BA). The received and calculated MACs are matched
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mobile IPv6 Mobility Detection: MN performs layer-3 handoff process.
New router address = [2005:0:0:9:0:0:0:1]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN runs the enhanced home registration protocol (EHR) with HA as specified in Table C.1.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1- MN uses SHA1 HMAC to generate KBM key; KBM = < FBFF6D9E461A48E1D3DE >
2- MN at address [2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2] sends a BU mobility message to CN located at address
[5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 3 >
Value of MACKBM (BU) included in the message = < 57004BE9D252 >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 800 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] received a BU mobility message from MN located at address
[2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of MN’s CoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 3 >
Value of MACKBM (BU) included in the message = < 57004BE9D252 >
1- CN uses SHA1 HMAC to generate KBM key; KBM = < FBFF6D9E461A48E1D3DE >
2- CN checks received MACKBM (BU). The received and calculated MACs are matched
3- CN at address [5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2] sends a BA mobility message to MN located at address
[2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2]
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Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 3 >
Value of MACKBM (BA) included in the message = < C7187F29D67B >
Total Size of the message in bits = < 480 >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MN at address [2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2] received a BA mobility message from CN located at address
[5035:0:0:8:0:0:0:2]
Value of MN’s HoA included in the message = < 2005:0:0:9:C00:0:0:2 >
Value of sequence number included in the message = < 3 >
Value of MACKBM (BA) included in the message = < C7187F29D67B >
1- MN checks received MACKBM (BA). The received and calculated MACs are matched
Table C.2: Model debugging - SK-based protocol
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Appendix D
Proposed Correspondent
Registration Protocols
This appendix presents a more detailed description of the proposed correspondent
registration protocols mentioned in Chapter 5.
D.1 Detailed CRE-SK Phase Description
Step S1-SK
The MN initiates the creation phase by creating a Binding Update List entry
for the CN and setting the entry in a Route Pending state. The MN then sends
message M1-SK to the CN (as shown in Figure D.1) requesting a care-of keygen
token. The MN includes a 64-bit random number (Cookie) in the message. The
MN stores the Cookie at the list entry for the CN and compares it later with
the response from that CN; the Cookie is used to protect the MN against replay
attacks.
If the MN does not receive a matching response within a retransmission inter-
val of one second, the MN will resend the message with a new Cookie value. The
MN doubles the retransmission interval upon each retransmission in the same
way, as specified in the base specification of the MIPv6 protocol ([5], see also
Section 2.5).
Step S2-SK
Upon receiving message M1-SK, the CN uses its own secret (KCN) to generate a
care-of keygen token (Token2) as in the RR procedure (see Section 2.5). The CN
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Figure D.1: Step S1-SK and message M1-SK (CoTI)
then sends the Cookie, J, and Token2 to the MN’s CoA in message M2-SK (as
shown in Figure D.2), where J is an index that identifies the care-of nonce (NJ)
used in generating Token2. Token2 will be returned to the CN later to prevent
replay attacks. The CN generates a new nonce NJ at regular intervals, which
allows the CN to check the freshness of any received token; if the token enclosed
in a message is generated using a fresh nonce, then the message is fresh.
Figure D.2: Step S2-SK and message M2-SK (CoT)
Step S3-SK
When the MN receives message M2-SK, it uses the CN’s address as an index
to search its Binding Update List. If a list entry is found with a Route Pending
status, the MN will perform Verification MN1-SK to confirm that the received
Cookie is identical to the Cookie that was sent in message M1-SK.
Verification MN1-SK: The MN verifies that Cookie’ equals Cookie, where
Cookie’ is enclosed in message M2-SK and Cookie is stored at the matched
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list entry in the MN. This verification is to detect replay attacks.
If no list entry is found, if the matched list entry is not in a Route Pending sta-
tus, or if Verification MN1-SK fails, the MN will discard message M2-SK
without any further action. Otherwise, the MN will change the status of the
list entry to Creation Pending indicating that the return of a session key and an
acknowledgement are expected. Then, the MN will send CoA, LTBRem, CN, Seq,
LTBReq, J, and Token2 to the HA in message M3-SK (as shown in Figure D.3)
requesting binding creation with a specific CN. LTBRem is the current remaining
lifetime for the binding of HoA and CoA at both the MN and the HA. LTBRem is
used as a timestamp to protect the HA against replay attacks. The value of CN
enclosed in the message is to inform the HA of the CN’s address. Seq and LTBReq
are the initial sequence number and binding lifetime request, respectively. It is
recommended that the MN requests the maximum permitted binding lifetime to
reduce the number of redundant binding refreshes. Message M3-SK is sent via
an IPSec ESP secure tunnel; it is encrypted using the secret key KMN−HA shared
between the MN and the HA.
Figure D.3: Step S3-SK and message M3-SK (BReq)
Step S4-SK
Upon receiving message M3-SK, the HA uses the MN’s HoA as an index to
search its Binding Cache. If a cache entry is found, the HA will decrypt the mes-
sage using key KMN−HA, and then perform Verification HA1-SK (as shown in
Figure D.4) to confirm the freshness of the message.
Verification HA1-SK: The HA checks if (LTBRem - tvalid)≤ LTBRem’≤ (LTBRem
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+ tvalid), where LTBRem’ is enclosed in message M3-SK; LTBRem is the remaining
binding lifetime stored locally at HA in Binding Cache entry for the HoA when
message M3-SK is received; and tvalid is the validity period agreed upon priorly
between the MN and HA (Assumption A3). This verification is to detect replay
attacks.
Figure D.4: Verification HA1-SK
If Verification HA1-SK fails (or if no cache entry is found), the HA will dis-
card the message without any further action. Otherwise, the HA will perform
Verification HA2-SK to confirm the correctness of the claimed care-of address.
Verification HA2-SK: The HA checks if CoA’ equals CoA, where CoA’ is the
MN’s care-of address enclosed in message M3-SK and CoA is the MN’s care-of
address stored locally at HA in the Binding Cache entry for the HoA enclosed in
the message.
A positive outcome of Verification HA2-SK assures the HA that the MN is
not cheating the CN with a fake CoA. If the verification fails, the HA will send
a binding error message to the MN indicating that the claimed CoA is not yet
registered at the HA, and thus, the HA cannot help registering it at the CN. If
both Verifications HA1-SK and HA2-SK are successful, the HA will perform
Verification HA3-SK to confirm that the binding lifetime requested by the MN
(LTBReq) is not greater than the remaining lifetime (LTBRem) for the binding of
HoA and CoA at the HA.
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Verification HA3-SK: The HA checks if LTBReq ≤ LTBRem, where LTBReq is
the binding lifetime request enclosed in message M3-SK and LTBRem is the re-
maining binding lifetime stored locally at HA in the Binding Cache entry for the
HoA when message M3-SK is received. This verification is to ensure that the
MN is not requesting a binding lifetime greater than the remaining binding life-
time at the HA. If the verification fails, the HA will use value of LTBRem instead
of LTBReq in message M5-SK sent to the CN.
After Verification HA3-SK, the HA generates two keys (KBC1 and KBC2) based
on the secret key shared with the CN (KHA−CN) and two fresh nonces (NHA1 and
NHA2); KBC1 = HMAC SHA1 (KHA−CN , (HoA || CoA || CN || NHA1) and KBC2
= HMAC SHA1 (KHA−CN , (HoA || CoA || CN || NHA2). The HA then sends
the CN, Seq, and KBC1 to the MN in message M4-SK via an IPSec ESP secure
tunnel (as shown in Figure D.5). At the same time, the HA sends the CoA, idHA,
NHA1, NHA2, Seq, LTBReq, J, Token2, and MACKBC2 (EBC) to the CN in message
M5-SK (as shown in Figure D.6), where:
• idHA is the home link’s public identity, for example the URL of the home link’s
website or the 64-bit subnet prefix of the home link’s address.
• MACKBC2 (EBC) is a keyed hash value used to ensure the integrity and au-
thenticity of message M5-SK; MACKBC2 (EBC) = First (96, HMAC SHA1
(KBC2, (HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || Seq || LTBReq))).
Figure D.5: Step S4-SK, message M4-SK (BRep), and Step S5-SK
Step S5-SK
When the MN receives message M4-SK, it decrypts the message using key
KMN−HA, and then uses the CN’s address as an index to search its Binding
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Figure D.6: Step S4-SK and message M5-SK (EBC)
Update List. If a list entry is found with a Creation Pending status, the MN will
perform Verification MN2-SK to confirm the freshness of the message.
Verification MN2-SK: The MN verifies that Seq’ equals Seq where Seq’ is the
sequence number enclosed in the message and Seq is the sequence number stored
at the matched list entry in the MN. This verification is to detect replay attacks.
If no list entry is found, if the matched list entry is not in a Creation Pending
status, or if Verification MN2-SK fails, the MN will discard message M4-SK
without any further action. Otherwise, the MN will store key KBC1 enclosed in
the message at the matched list entry.
Step S6-SK
When the CN receives message M5-SK, it performs Verification CN1-SK (as
shown in Figure D.7) to confirm the freshness of the message and reachability of
the MN at the CoA.
Verification CN1-SK: The CN verifies that Token2 equals First (64, HMAC SHA1
(KCN , (CoA || NJ || 1))), where Token2 and CoA are enclosed in message M5-
SK, and the value of NJ is retrieved based on value of J enclosed in the message.
This verification is to detect replay attacks.
If Verification CN1-SK fails, the CN will discard message M5-SK without
any further action. Otherwise, the CN will generate KBC1 and KBC2 based on
its address, the secret key shared with the home link (KHA−CN), and the items
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Figure D.7: Verification CN1-SK
enclosed in the message (HoA, CoA, NHA1, and NHA2). The CN then performs
Verification CN2-SK (as shown in Figure D.8) to confirm the integrity and
authenticity of message M5-SK.
Verification CN2-SK: The CN verifies that MACKBC2 (EBC) equals First (96,
HMAC SHA1 (KBC2, (HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || Seq || LTBReq))),
where MACKBC2 (EBC), HoA, CoA, idHA, NHA1, NHA2, Seq, and LTBReq are
enclosed in message M5-SK.
A positive outcome of Verification CN2-SK assures the CN that message M5-
SK is coming from the home link of the MN and has not been altered in transit.
Otherwise, i.e. if Verification CN2-SK fails, the CN will discard the message.
After successful verifications, the CN first generates a fresh session key KMN−CN .
The CN then creates a Binding Cache entry, and stores the binding between the
MN’s HoA and CoA as well as the values of Seq, LTBReq, and KMN−CN at the
entry. In addition, the CN sets the granted binding lifetime (LTBGrant) between
the MN’s HoA and CoA to a MIN BINDING LIFETIME value to handle the
case of the MN roaming to a new CoA while the HA and the CN are running
the protocol. The CN also sends subsequent packets destined for the MN to its
new CoA for as long as the lifetime is granted for the binding. Finally, the CN
sends Seq, LTBGrant, ENCKBC1 [KMN−CN ], and MACKMN−CN (EBA) to the MN
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Figure D.8: Verification CN2-SK
in message M6-SK (as shown in Figure D.9) for acknowledging the binding of
the CoA, where:
• ENCKBC1 [KMN−CN ] is the encryption of key KMN−CN using key KBC1.
• MACKMN−CN (EBA) is a keyed hash value used to ensure the integrity and au-
thenticity of message M6-SK; MACKMN−CN (EBA) = First (96, HMAC SHA1
(KMN−CN , (HoA || CoA || CN || Seq || LTBGrant))).
Figure D.9: Step S6-SK and message M6-SK (EBA)
Step S7-SK
When the MN receives message M6-SK, it uses the CN’s address as an index to
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search its Binding Update List. If a list entry is found, the MN will repeat Ver-
ification MN2-SK (see Step S5-SK) to confirm the freshness of the message.
After Verification MN2-SK, the MN will decrypt the coded session key en-
closed in message M6-SK using KBC1; DECKBC1 [ENCKBC1 [KMN−CN ]] = {KMN−CN}.
The MN then performs Verification MN3-SK (as shown in Figure D.10) to con-
firm the integrity and authenticity of the message.
Verification MN3-SK: The MN verifies that MACKMN−CN (EBA) equals First
(96, HMAC SHA1 (KMN−CN , (HoA || CoA || CN || Seq || LTBGrant))), where
MACKMN−CN (EBA), HoA, CoA, CN, Seq, and LTBGrant are enclosed in message
M6-SK.
Figure D.10: Verification MN3-SK
If Verification MN2-SK or MN3-SK fails (or if no list entry is found), the
MN will discard message M6-SK without any further action. Otherwise, the
MN will update the value of KBC1 with the value of KMN−CN and will store the
value of LTBGrant at the matched list entry. As LTBGrant indicates a small binding
lifetime, the MN sends the HoA, CoA, Seqnew, LTBReq, Ack, and MACKMN−CN
(BCC) to the CN in message M7-SK (as shown in Figure D.11), requesting a
greater binding lifetime, confirming the receipt of KMN−CN , and showing the
existence at the CoA, where:
• Ack is an acknowledge bit that may be set to request the return of a binding
acknowledgement message.
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• Seqnew is a new sequence number that is greater than the Seq sent by the MN
in message M3-SK.
• MACKMN−CN (BCC) is a keyed hash value used to ensure the integrity and au-
thenticity of message M7-SK; MACKMN−CN (BCC) = First (96, HMAC SHA1
(KMN−CN , (HoA || CoA || Seqnew || LTBReq || Ack))).
The MN also changes the status of the list entry. Specifically, if the MN sets
the Ack bit, then it will change the status to a Binding Pending indicating that
it is waiting for an acknowledgement; otherwise, it will change the status to a
Binding Complete indicating the binding creation is complete.
Figure D.11: Step S7-SK and message M7-SK (BCC)
Step S8-SK
Upon receiving message M7-SK, the CN uses the HoA enclosed in the message
to find a matched cache entry. The CN then performs Verification CN3-SK
to confirm the freshness of the message.
Verification CN3-SK: The CN verifies that Seqnew is greater than Seq, where
Seqnew is the sequence number enclosed in the message and Seq is the sequence
number stored at the matched cache entry in the CN (received in message M5-
SK). This verification is to detect replay attacks.
After a successful verification, the CN next performs Verification CN4-SK (as
shown in Figure D.12) to confirm the integrity and authenticity of the message.
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Verification CN4-SK: The CN verifies that MACKMN−CN (BCC) equals First
(96, HMAC SHA1 (KMN−CN , (HoA || CoA || Seqnew || LTBReq || Ack))), where
MACKMN−CN (BCC), HoA, CoA, Seqnew, LTBReq, and Ack are enclosed in mes-
sage M7-SK.
Figure D.12: Verification CN4-SK
If Verification CN3-SK or CN4-SK fails, the CN will discard the message
without any further action. Otherwise, the CN will perform Verification CN5-
SK to confirm that the binding lifetime requested by the MN (LTBReq) is not
greater than the binding lifetime request received in message M5-SK.
Verification CN5-SK: The CN checks if LTBReq’ ≤ LTBReq, where LTBReq’ is
the binding lifetime request enclosed in message M7-SK and LTBReq is the bind-
ing lifetime request stored at the CN from message M5-SK. If the verification
fails, the CN will use the value of LTBReq instead of LTBReq’ while setting the
value of granted binding lifetime (LTBGrant).
After Verification CN5-SK, the CN updates the matched cache entry by stor-
ing the value of Seqnew enclosed in the message and by setting the granted binding
lifetime (LTBGrant) to a value that is less than or equal to LTBReq’ (or LTBReq).
Finally, the CN checks the Ack bit enclosed in message M7-SK. If the MN
has requested an acknowledgement, the CN will send Seqnew, LTBGrant, and
MACKMN−CN (BA) to the MN in message M8-SK (as shown in Figure D.13)
to acknowledge the binding of the CoA, where:
• MACKMN−CN (BA) is a keyed hash value used to ensure the integrity and
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authenticity of message M8-SK; MACKMN−CN (BA) = First (96, HMAC SHA1
(KMN−CN , (HoA || CoA || CN || Seqnew || LTBGrant))).
Figure D.13: Step S8-SK, message M8-SK (BA), and Step S9-SK
Step S9-SK
Upon receiving message M8-SK, the MN uses the CN’s address to find a matched
list entry, and then confirms the freshness of the message by checking the value
of Seqnew enclosed in it, as in Verification MN2-SK. After a successful verifi-
cation, the MN performs Verification MN4-SK (as shown in Figure D.14) to
confirm the authenticity of the message.
Verification MN4-SK: The MN verifies that MACKMN−CN (BA) equals First
(96, HMAC SHA1 (KMN−CN , (HoA || CoA || CN || Seqnew || LTBGrant))), where
MACKMN−CN (BA), HoA, CoA, CN, Seqnew, and LTBGrant are enclosed in mes-
sage M8-SK.
If no matched list entry is found for that CN, or if Verification MN2-SK or
MN4-SK fails, the MN will discard the message without any further action.
Otherwise, the MN will update the status of the list entry to Binding Complete
indicating that the binding has been acknowledged. In addition, the MN adjusts
the remaining binding lifetime depending on the given granted binding lifetime.
The creation phase for the SK-based protocol in the stationary CN case is now
complete.
If the MN continues to receive data from the CN via its home link, the MN will
restart the creation phase by running Step S1-SK and sending message M1-SK
to the CN. If the creation retries fail, the MN will stop the SK-based protocol
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Figure D.14: Verification MN4-SK
and record in its Binding Update List entry that future binding creations should
not be tried with this CN. However, such a list entry is removed after a period
of time in order to allow for retrying route optimization as specified in the base
specification of the MIPv6 protocol [5].
D.2 Detailed CRE-PK Phase Description
Steps S1-PK, S2-PK, and S3-PK
Steps S1-PK, S2-PK, and S3-PK are identical, respectively, to Steps S1-SK,
S2-SK, and S3-SK mentioned in Section D (see Figures D.1 and D.2), but the
MN sends the value of KBM instead of Token2 to the HA in message M3-PK (as
shown in Figure D.15). Specifically, when the MN receives message M2-PK, it
hashes Token2 to generate a binding management key KBM , i.e. KBM = SHA1
(Token2). The MN then includes KBM instead of Token2 in message M3-PK
sent to the HA.
Step S4-PK
The first part of Step S4-PK is identical to the first part of Step S4-SK. Specif-
ically, upon receiving message M3-PK, the HA uses the MN’s HoA as an index
to search its Binding Cache. If a cache entry is found, the HA will decrypt the
message using key KMN−HA, and then perform Verifications HA1-PK, HA2-
PK, and HA3-PK, which are identical to Verifications HA1-SK, HA2-SK,
and HA3-SK, respectively. Verification HA1-PK is to confirm the freshness
of message M3-PK. Verification HA2-PK is to confirm the correctness of the
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Figure D.15: Step S3-PK and message M3-PK (BReq)
claimed care-of address. Verification HA3-PK is to confirm that the binding
lifetime requested by the MN (LTBReq) is not greater than the remaining lifetime
(LTBRem) for the binding of HoA and CoA at the HA.
After successful verifications, the HA sends the CoA, NHA, Seq, LTBReq, J,
MACKBM (EBC), SIGH , and CertH to the CN in message M4-PK (as shown in
Figure D.16) where:
• NHA is a fresh nonce to protect the HA against replay attacks.
• MACKBM (EBC) is a keyed hash value used to ensure the freshness of message
M4-PK and the reachability of the MN at the CoA; MACKBM (EBC) = First
(96, HMAC SHA1 (KBM , (HoA || CoA || NHA || Seq || LTBReq))) and KBM is
the key received from the MN in message M3-PK.
• SIGH is the HA’s digital signature, where SIGH = ENCSKH [SHA1 (HoA ||
CoA || NHA || Seq || LTBReq)] and SKH is the home link’s private key.
• CertH is the public key certificate of the home link.
The HA also temporarily stores the value of NHA (generated by itself) and the
value of KBM (enclosed in message M3-PK) to verify the freshness and authen-
ticity of the response from that CN.
Step S5-PK
When the CN receives message M4-PK, it performs Verification CN1-PK (as
shown in Figure D.17) to confirm the freshness of the message and reachability
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Figure D.16: Step S4-PK and message M4-PK (EBC)
of the MN at the CoA.
Verification CN1-PK: The CN uses the value of J enclosed in message M4-
PK to generate Token2, and then hashes Token2 to generate KBM . The CN next
verifies that MACKBM (EBC) equals First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBM , (HoA || CoA
|| NHA || Seq || LTBReq))), where MACKBM (EBC), HoA, CoA, NHA, Seq, and
LTBReq are enclosed in message M4-PK.
Figure D.17: Verification CN1-PK
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A positive outcome of Verification CN1-PK assures the CN that message M4-
PK is fresh, as the key KBM is generated using unexpired token Token2. It also
assures the CN that message M4-PK is coming from a node that is reachable
at the CoA, which provides some assurance of the MN’s honesty before perform-
ing heavy computations. This verification is to protect the CN against replay
attacks and resource exhaustion DoS attacks. After a successful verification, the
CN next performs Verification CN2-PK to confirm the integrity and authen-
ticity of message M4-PK.
Verification CN2-PK: The CN verifies the HA’s signature (SIGH) as shown in
Figure D.18. The CN first decrypts SIGH using PKH ; DECPKH [SIGH ] = SHA1
(HoA || CoA || NHA || Seq || LTBReq). The CN then checks if the decrypted value
equals the one freshly computed from the received items.
Figure D.18: Verification CN2-PK
A positive outcome of Verification CN2-PK assures the CN that message
M4-PK is indeed from the home link of the MN and has not been altered in
transit. If Verification CN1-PK or CN2-PK is negative, the CN will discard
message M4-PK without any further action. Otherwise, the CN will generate
fresh session keys (KMN−CN and KHA−CN), create a Binding Cache entry, and
store the binding between the MN’s HoA and CoA, as well as the values of
Seq, LTBReq, KMN−CN , and KHA−CN at the entry. In addition, the CN sets
the granted binding lifetime (LTBGrant) between the MN’s HoA and CoA to a
MIN BINDING LIFETIME value to handle the case of the MN roaming to a
new CoA while the HA and the CN are running the protocol. The CN also sends
subsequent packets destined for the MN to its new CoA for as long as the lifetime
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is granted for the binding. Finally, the CN sends NHA, Seq, LTBGrant, ENCPKH
[KMN−CN || KHA−CN ], and MACKBM (EBA) to the MN’s HoA in message M5-
PK (as shown in Figure D.19), where:
• ENCPKH [KMN−CN || KHA−CN ] is the encryption of KMN−CN and KHA−CN
using public key PKH .
• MACKBM (EBA) is a keyed hash value used to ensure the integrity and authen-
ticity of message M5-PK; MACKBM (EBA) = First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBM ,
(NHA || Seq || LTBGrant || ENCPKH [KMN−CN || KHA−CN ]))).
Figure D.19: Step S5-PK and message M5-PK (EBA)
Step S6-PK
The HA intercepts message M5-PK and performs Verification HA4-PK to
confirm the freshness, integrity, and authenticity of the message.
Verification HA4-PK: The HA checks if NHA’ equals NHA, where NHA’ is the
nonce enclosed in message M5-PK and NHA is the nonce sent by the HA in
message M4-PK. This check is to protect the HA against replay attacks. After a
successful verification, the HA uses KBM to verify the integrity and authenticity
of the received message (as shown in Figure D.20). Specifically, the HA verifies
MACKBM (EBA) equals First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBM , (NHA || Seq || LTBGrant ||
ENCPKH [KMN−CN || KHA−CN ]))), where MACKBM (EBA), NHA, Seq, LTBGrant,
and ENCPKH [KMN−CN || KHA−CN ] are enclosed in message M5-PK. If Ver-
ification HA4-PK fails, the HA will discard the message without any further
action.
248
APPENDIX D. PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
Figure D.20: Verification HA4-PK
A positive outcome of Verification HA4-PK assures the HA that message M5-
PK is from a node that knows the key KBM and is reachable at the CN’s address,
which provides some assurance of the CN’s honesty before performing a heavy
public-key operation. After a successful verification, the HA next decrypts the
coded session keys enclosed in message M5-PK using the home link’s private key
SKH ; DECSKH [ENCPKH [KMN−CN || KHA−CN ]] = {KMN−CN || KHA−CN}. The
HA then sends CN, Seq, LTBGrant, and KMN−CN to the MN in message M6-PK
via an IPSec ESP secure tunnel (as shown in Figure D.21). The HA also stores
the value of KHA−CN and discards the values of NHA and KBM that it has stored
while running the protocol with the CN.
Figure D.21: Step S6-PK and message M6-PK (BRep)
Step S7-PK
When the MN receives message M6-PK, it decrypts the message using key
KMN−HA, and then uses the CN’s address as an index to search its Binding
Update List. If a list entry is found with a Creation Pending status, the MN will
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perform Verification MN2-PK to confirm the freshness of the message. Other-
wise, i.e. if no entry is found (or if the matched entry is not in a Creation Pending
status), the MN will discard the received message without any further action.
Verification MN2-PK: The MN verifies that Seq’ equals Seq, where Seq’ is the
sequence number enclosed in the message and Seq is the sequence number stored
at the matched list entry in the MN. This verification is to detect replay attacks.
If Verification MN2-PK fails, the MN will discard the message without any
further action.
After Verification MN2-PK, the MN stores the values of KMN−CN and LTBGrant
enclosed in the message at the matched list entry. As LTBGrant indicates a small
binding lifetime, the MN sends message M7-PK to the CN requesting a greater
binding lifetime, confirming the receipt of KMN−CN , and showing the existence at
the CoA. Message M7-PK is identical to message M7-SK shown in Figure D.11.
Steps S8-PK and S9-PK
Steps S8-PK and S9-PK are identical, respectively, to Steps S8-SK and S9-
SK mentioned in Section D (see Figures D.12, D.13, and D.14).
D.3 Detailed CRE-INF Phase Description
Steps S1-INF
Step S1-INF is identical to Step S1-SK and Step S1-PK, but the MN’s HoA
is enclosed in message M1-INF sent from the MN to the CN as shown in Fig-
ure D.22. The MN sends message M1-INF to request home keygen and care-of
keygen tokens, and thus, the MN includes its HoA in the message.
Step S2-INF
Upon receiving message M1-INF, the CN performs Verification CN1-INF to
confirm that the HoA and CoA enclosed in the message belong to different net-
works.
Verification CN1-INF: The CN checks that the subnet prefix part of the HoA
is not equal to the subnet prefix part of the CoA.
250
APPENDIX D. PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
Figure D.22: Step S1-INF and message M1-INF (HoTI&CoTI)
Figure D.23: Step S2-INF and message M2-INF (HoT)
A positive outcome of Verification CN1-INF assures the CN that the two mes-
sages it will send as a response will not be routed to the same network, and thus,
the CN is not involved in an amplification attack against a particular network.
If Verification CN1-INF fails, the CN will discard the message without any
further action. Otherwise, the CN will reply to the MN’s request as in the RR
procedure (see Section 2.5). Specifically, the CN generates a home keygen token
(Token1) and a care-of keygen token (Token2). The CN then sends the Cookie, I,
and Token1 to the MN’s HoA in message M2-INF. The HA intercepts message
M2-INF and forwards it to the MN’s registered CoA via an IPSec ESP secure
tunnel (as shown in Figure D.23). At the same time, the CN sends the Cookie,
J, and Token2 to the MN’s CoA in message M3-INF (as shown in Figure D.24).
I and J are indices that identify home nonce (NI) and care-of nonce (NJ) used in
generating Token1 and Token2, respectively.
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Figure D.24: Step S2-INF and message M3-INF (CoT)
Step S3-INF
When the MN receives message M2-INF or message M3-INF, it uses the CN’s
address as an index to search its Binding Update List. If a list entry is found
with a Route Pending status, the MN will perform Verification MN1-INF
to confirm that the received cookie (Cookie) equals the cookie that was sent in
message M1-INF. Verification MN1-INF is identical to Verification MN1-
SK mentioned in Section D.
If no list entry is found, if the matched list entry is not in a Route Pending
status, or if Verification MN1-INF fails, the MN will discard the received
message without any further action. Otherwise, the MN will record the given
keygen token and nonce index in the list entry and wait for the second mes-
sage. When the MN receives both of message M2-INF and message M3-INF,
it hashes the two tokens together to form a binding management key KBM ; KBM =
SHA1 (Token1 || Token2). The MN then sends CoA, LTBRem, CN, Seq, LTBReq,
I, J, KBM , Modifier, and Collision-Count to the HA in message M4-INF (as
shown in Figure D.25) requesting binding creation with a specific CN. Modi-
fier and Collision-Count are the values of the modifier and the collision-count,
respectively, which are used in generating the MN’s CGA-based HoA. Message
M4-INF is sent via an IPSec ESP secure tunnel; it is encrypted using the secret
key KMN−HA shared between the MN and the HA. Finally, the MN changes the
status of the list entry to Creation Pending indicating that the return of a session
key and an acknowledgement are expected.
Step S4-INF
Step S4-INF is identical to Step S4-PK, but the HA concatenates the values of
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Figure D.25: Step S3-INF and message M4-INF (BReq)
Modifier, Subnet Prefix, and Collision-Count to form the CGA parameters used
in generating the MN’s HoA. Specifically, upon receipt of message M4-INF, the
HA performs Verifications HA1-INF, HA2-INF, and HA3-INF, which are
identical to Verifications HA1-SK, HA2-SK, and HA3-SK, respectively. If
Verification HA1-INF or HA2-INF fails, the HA will discard message M4-
INF without any further action. If Verifications HA3-INF fails, the HA will
use the value of LTBRem instead of LTBReq in message M5-INF sent to the CN.
Figure D.26: Step S4-INF and message M5-INF (EBC)
After Verification HA3-INF, the HA concatenates from left the values of Mod-
ifier, Subnet Prefix, and Collision-Count to form the CGA parameters used in
generating the MN’s HoA, where Modifier and Collision-Count are enclosed in
message M4-INF, and Subnet Prefix is the home link subnet prefix. The HA
then sends message M5-INF (shown in Figure D.26) to the CN to request bind-
ing creation on behalf of the MN. Message M5-INF is identical to message
M4-PK shown in Figure D.16, but the CGA parameters and the home link’s
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self-generated public key are included in the message. The HA also temporar-
ily stores the value of KBM enclosed in message M4-INF and the value of NHA
to verify the authenticity and freshness of the response from that CN, respectively.
Step S5-INF
When the CN receives message M5-INF, it first performs Verification CN2-
INF (as shown in Figure D.27) to confirm the freshness of the message and
reachability of the MN at both the HoA and the CoA.
Verification CN2-INF: The CN uses the values of I and J enclosed in mes-
sage M5-INF to generate Token1 and Token2, respectively, and then hashes the
two tokens to generate KBM as in the RR procedure (see Section 2.5). The CN
next verifies that MACKBM (EBC) equals First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBM , (CoA
|| NHA || Seq || LTBReq))), where MACKBM (EBC), CoA, NHA, Seq, and LTBReq
are enclosed in message M5-INF.
Figure D.27: Verification CN2-INF
A positive outcome of Verification CN2-INF assures the CN that message
M5-INF is fresh, as the key KBM is generated using unexpired tokens. It also
assures the CN that message M5-INF is coming from a node that is reachable at
both the HoA and the CoA, which provides some assurance of the MN’s honesty
before performing heavy computations. This verification is to protect the CN
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against replay attacks and resource exhaustion DoS attacks. After a successful
verification, the CN next performs Verification CN3-INF.
Verification CN3-INF: The CN runs the CGA-based address verification al-
gorithm (see Figures 3.2 in Section 3.1) to confirm the authenticity of HoA.
If the outcome of Verification CN3-INF is positive, the CN is assured that the
HoA and PKH enclosed in message M5-INF are bound. The CN then performs
Verification CN4-INF to confirm the authenticity of message M5-INF.
Verification CN4-INF: The CN verifies the correctness of HA’s signature in
message M5-INF. Verification CN4-INF is identical to Verification CN2-
PK shown in Figure D.18.
A positive outcome of Verification CN4-INF assures the CN that message
M5-INF is indeed from a node that knows the private key corresponding to the
public key used in generating the HoA.
If Verification CN2-INF, CN3-INF, or CN4-INF is negative, the CN will
discard message M5-INF without any further action. Otherwise, the CN will
perform as in Step S5-PK. Specifically, the CN will generate KMN−CN and
KHA−CN , create a Binding Cache entry, and store the binding between the MN’s
HoA and CoA, as well as the values of Seq, LTBReq, KMN−CN and KHA−CN at the
entry. In addition, the CN sets the granted binding lifetime LTBGrant between
the MN’s HoA and CoA to a MIN BINDING LIFETIME value. Finally, the CN
sends message M6-INF to the HA. Message M6-INF is identical to message
M5-PK shown in Figure D.19.
Steps S6-INF, S7-INF, S8-INF, and S9-INF
Steps S6-INF, S7-INF, S8-INF, and S9-INF are identical, respectively, to
Steps S6-PK, S7-PK, S8-PK, and S9-PK mentioned in Section D.
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D.4 Detailed UPD Phase Description
Step S1-UPD
The MN generates a fresh key KBM = HMAC SHA1 (KMN−CN , (HoA || CoA
|| CN || Seqnew)), where KMN−CN is the shared session key established between
the MN and the CN in the creation phase, and Seqnew is a new sequence number
that is greater than the previous sequence number sent to that CN. The MN then
sends HoA, CoA, Seqnew, LTBReq, Ack, Authenticator, and MACKBM (BU) to the
CN in message M1-UPD (as shown in Figure D.28), where:
• Ack is an acknowledge bit that may be set to request the return of a binding
acknowledgement message.
• Authenticator is a coded value used to protect the MN’s HA against replay
attacks. Authenticator = ENCKMN−HA [HoA || CoA || CN || LTBRem], where
KMN−HA is the secret key shared between the MN and the HA (Assumption
A2), and LTBRem is the current remaining lifetime for the binding of HoA and
CoA at both the MN’s Binding Update List entry for the HA and the HA’s
Binding Cache entry for the MN. Authenticator will be forwarded by the CN
to the HA in message M3-UPD to convenience the HA that the message is
fresh.
• MACKBM (BU) is a keyed hash value used to ensure the integrity and authen-
ticity of message M1-UPD; MACKBM (BU) = First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBM ,
(HoA || CoA || Seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || Authenticator))).
Figure D.28: Step S1-UPD and message M1-UPD (BU)
The MN also changes the status of the list entry. Specifically, if the MN sets
the Ack bit, then it will change the status to a Binding Pending indicating that
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it is waiting for an acknowledgement; otherwise, it will change the status to a
Binding Complete indicating the binding update is complete.
If the MN sends message M1-UPD to the CN in which the Ack bit is set and
does not receive a matching response within a retransmission interval of one sec-
ond, the MN will resend the message with a new sequence number that is greater
than the value of the sequence number used for the previous transmission of this
message. The MN doubles the retransmission interval upon each retransmission
in the same way, as specified in the base specification of the MIPv6 protocol ([5],
see also Section 2.5).
Step S2-UPD
Upon receiving message M1-UPD, the CN uses HoA enclosed in the message to
find a matched cache entry. The CN then performs Verification CN1-UPD to
confirm the freshness of the message.
Verification CN1-UPD: The CN verifies that Seqnew is greater than Seq, where
Seqnew is the sequence number enclosed in the message and Seq is the sequence
number stored at the matched cache entry in the CN. This verification is to detect
replay attacks.
After a successful verification, the CN generates key KBM based on key KMN−CN
shared with the MN and on items enclosed in the message. The CN then performs
Verification CN2-UPD (as shown in Figure D.29) to confirm the integrity and
authenticity of the message.
Verification CN2-UPD: The CN verifies that MACKBM (BU) equals First (96,
HMAC SHA1 (KBM , (HoA || CoA || Seqnew || LTBReq || Ack || Authenticator))),
where MACKBM (BU), HoA, CoA, Seqnew, LTBReq, Ack, and Authenticator are
enclosed in message M1-UPD.
If Verification CN1-UPD or CN2-UPD fails (or if no cache entry is found),
the CN will discard the message without any further action. Otherwise, the CN
will register and use the new CoA while concurrently requesting home network’s
confirmation of that CoA. Specifically, the CN updates the matched cache entry
with the values of CoA, Seqnew, and Ack enclosed in message M1-UPD. The CN
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Figure D.29: Verification CN2-UPD
also sets the entry in an unconfirmed state and limits the amount of data sent to
the CoA by setting the granted binding lifetime to a MIN BINDING LIFETIME
value. In addition, the CN sends subsequent packets destined for the MN to
the unconfirmed CoA for as long as the lifetime is granted for the binding. The
CN then generates a fresh key KBC = HMAC SHA1 (KHA−CN , (HoA || CoA
|| CN || NCN)), where KHA−CN is the shared session key established between
the MN’s home network and the CN in the creation phase, and NCN is a fresh
nonce. Finally, the CN sends CoA, LTBReq, Authenticator, NCN , and MACKBC
(BCReq) to the MN’s HoA in message M2-UPD (as shown in Figure D.30) to
request home network’s confirmation of the MN’s claimed CoA, where MACKBC
(BCReq) is a keyed hash value used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of
message M2-UPD; MACKBC (BCReq) = First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBC , (HoA
|| CoA || LTBReq || Authenticator || NCN))).
Figure D.30: Step S2-UPD and message M2-UPD (BCReq)
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The CN limits the number of M1-UPD messages that could be received from
unconfirmed CoAs. Normally, the MN’s HA intercepts packets on the home link
destined for the MN’s HoA. Therefore, when the CN sends message M2-UPD
to the MN’s HoA, it is expecting that the message will be intercepted by the HA.
However, the MN could return to its home link and cheat the CN with a fake CoA
in message M1-UPD. In this case, the MN would receive and ignore message
M2-UPD sent by the CN and would continue to send message M1-UPD. By
limiting the number of M1-UPD messages received from unconfirmed CoAs, the
CN can prevent the MN from bypassing the confirmation request by continuously
sending M1-UPD message without involving the request.
Step S3-UPD
The HA intercepts message M2-UPD and generates KBC based on KHA−CN
shared with the CN and on items enclosed in the message. The HA then performs
Verification HA1-UPD (as shown in Figure D.31) to confirm the integrity and
authenticity of the message.
Verification HA1-UPD: The HA verifies that MACKBC (BCReq)’ equals First
(96, HMAC SHA1 (KBC , (HoA’ || CoA’ || LTBReq’ || Authenticator’ || NCN ’))),
where MACKBC (BCReq)’, HoA’, CoA’, LTBReq’, Authenticator’, and NCN ’ are
enclosed in message M2-UPD.
Figure D.31: Verification HA1-UPD
A positive outcome of Verification HA1-UPD assures the HA that message
M2-UPD is coming from the CN and has not been altered in transit. After
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a successful verification, the HA performs Verification HA2-UPD to confirm
that the Authenticator enclosed in the message is freshly generated by the MN;
Verification HA2-UPD is to confirm the freshness of message M2-UPD.
Verification HA2-UPD: The HA decrypts the Authenticator enclosed in mes-
sage M2- UPD using key KMN−HA shared with the MN; DECKMN−HA [Au-
thenticator] = {HoA” || CoA” || CN” || LTBRem”}. The HA then checks if the
decrypted values equal the values enclosed in the message. That is to confirm
that HoA” equals HoA’, CoA” equals CoA’, and CN” equals CN’, where HoA”,
CoA”, and CN” are the decrypted items, and HoA’, CoA’, and CN’ are the
items enclosed in the message. The HA also checks whether or not LTBRem” is
fresh. That is, if (LTBRem - tvalid) ≤ LTBRem” ≤ (LTBRem + tvalid) then it is
fresh, where LTBRem is the remaining binding lifetime stored locally at HA in
Binding Cache entry for the HoA when message M2-UPD is received; and tvalid
is the validity period agreed upon priorly between MN and HA (Assumption A3).
A positive outcome of Verification HA2-UPD assures the HA that the Au-
thenticator is generated using a fresh timestamp (LTBRem”) for that particular
CN, and therefore message M2-UPD is fresh. After a successful verification,
the HA performs Verification HA3-UPD to confirm that CoA’ enclosed in the
message matches the MN’s current location.
Verification HA3-UPD: The HA checks if CoA’ equals CoA, where CoA’ is
the MN’s care of address enclosed in message M2-UPD and CoA is the MN’s
care-of address stored locally at HA in the Binding Cache entry for the HoA
enclosed in the message.
A positive outcome of Verification HA3-UPD assures the HA that: (1) the
CN already knows the current location of the MN; and (2) the MN is not cheating
the CN with a fake CoA. After a successful verification, the HA performs Veri-
fication HA4-UPD to confirm that the binding lifetime requested by the MN
(LTBReq’) is not greater than the remaining lifetime (LTBRem) for the binding of
HoA and CoA at the HA.
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Verification HA4-UPD: The HA checks if LTBReq’ ≤ LTBRem, where LTBReq’
is the binding lifetime request enclosed in message M2-UPD and LTBRem is the
remaining binding lifetime stored locally at HA in Binding Cache entry for the
HoA when message M2-UPD is received. This verification is to confirm that the
binding lifetime requested by the MN is not greater than the remaining lifetime
for the binding of HoA and CoA at the HA. If the verification fails, the HA will
use the value of LTBRem instead of LTBReq’ in message M3-UPD sent to the CN.
If Verification HA1-UPD, HA2-UPD, or HA3-UPD fails, the HA will dis-
card message M2-UPD without any further action. Otherwise, the HA will send
CoA, LTBReq, NCN , and MACKBC (BCRep) to the CN in message M3-UPD (as
shown in Figure D.32) for confirming the claimed CoA, where MACKBC (BCRep)
is a keyed hash value used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of message
M3-UPD; MACKBC (BCRep) = First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBC , (HoA || CoA ||
LTBReq || NCN))).
Figure D.32: Step S3-UPD and message M3-UPD (BCRep)
Step S4-UPD
Upon receiving message M3-UPD, the CN uses the HoA enclosed in the message
to find a matched cache entry. The CN then performs Verification CN3-UPD
to confirm the freshness, integrity, and authenticity of the message.
Verification CN3-UPD: The CN checks if NCN ’ equals NCN , where NCN ’ is
the nonce enclosed in message M3-UPD and NCN is the nonce sent by the CN in
message M2-UPD. This check is to protect the CN against replay attacks. After
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a successful verification, the CN uses KBC to verify the integrity and authenticity
of the received message (as shown in Figure D.33). Specifically, the CN verifies
that MACKBC (BCRep) = First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBC , (HoA || CoA || LTBReq
|| NCN))), where MACKBC (BCRep), HoA, CoA, LTBReq, and NCN are enclosed
in message M3-UPD. If Verification CN3-UPD fails, the CN will discard the
message without any further action.
Figure D.33: Verification CN3-UPD
After a successful verification, the CN updates the matched cache entry by
changing its status to be confirmed and by setting the granted binding lifetime
(LTBGrant) to a value that is less than or equal to LTBReq enclosed in message
M3-UPD. Finally, the CN checks the Ack bit of the matched cache entry. If
the MN has requested an acknowledgement, the CN will send Seqnew, LTBGrant,
and MACKBM (BA) to the MN in message M4-UPD (as shown in Figure D.34)
for acknowledging the binding of the CoA, where MACKBM (BA) is a keyed
hash value used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of message M4-UPD;
MACKBM (BA) = First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBM , (HoA || CoA || CN || Seqnew
|| LTBGrant))).
Step S5-UPD
Upon receiving message M4-UPD, the MN uses the CN’s address to find a
matched list entry, and then performs Verification MN1-UPD to confirm the
freshness, integrity and authenticity of the message.
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Figure D.34: Step S4-UPD, message M4-UPD (BA), and Step S5-UPD
Verification MN1-UPD: The MN verifies that Seqnew’ equals Seqnew, where
Seqnew’ is the sequence number enclosed in message M4-UPD and Seqnew is the
sequence number stored at the matched list entry in the MN. This verification is to
detect replay attacks. After a successful verification, the MN uses KBM to verify
the integrity and authenticity of the received message (as shown in Figure D.35).
Specifically, the MN verifies that MACKBM (BA) equals First (96, HMAC SHA1
(KBM , (HoA || CoA || CN || Seqnew || LTBGrant))), where MACKBM (BA), HoA,
CoA, CN, Seqnew, and LTBGrant are enclosed in message M4-UPD.
Figure D.35: Verification MN1-UPD
If no matched list entry is found for that CN, or if Verification MN1-UPD
fails, the MN will discard the message without any further action. Otherwise, the
MN will update the status of the list entry to Binding Complete indicating that
the binding has been acknowledged. In addition, the MN adjusts the remaining
binding lifetime depending on the given granted binding lifetime. The update
phase for the protocols in the stationary CN case is now complete.
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D.5 Detailed DEL Phase Description
Step S1-DEL
Step S1-DEL is identical to Step S1-UPD, but the Authenticator is not en-
closed in message M1-DEL sent from the MN to the CN. In addition, the MN
sets the CoA equal to its HoA and the binding lifetime request (LTBReq) to ‘zero’
as shown in Figure D.36.
Figure D.36: Step S1-DEL and message M1-DEL (BU)
Step S2-DEL
The first part of Step S2-DEL is identical to the first part of Step S2-UPD.
Specifically, the CN uses the MN’s HoA as an index to search its Binding Cache.
If a cache entry is found, the CN will perform Verifications CN1-DEL and
CN2-DEL, which are identical to Verifications CN1-UPD and CN2-UPD,
respectively. Verification CN1-DEL is to confirm the freshness of message
M1-DEL; and Verification CN2-DEL is to confirm the authenticity of the
message.
If Verification CN1-DEL or CN2-DEL fails (or if no cache entry is found),
the CN will discard the message without any further action. Otherwise, the CN
will delete the Binding Cache entry for the MN and, if requested, will send Seqnew
and MACKBM (BA) to the MN in message M2-DEL (as shown in Figure D.37)
for acknowledging the deletion of the binding, where MACKBM (BA) is a keyed
hash value used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of message M2-DEL;
MACKBM (BA) = First (96, HMAC SHA1 (KBM , (HoA || CN || Seqnew))).
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Figure D.37: Step S2-DEL, message M2-DEL (BA), and Step S3-DEL
Step S3-DEL
Step S3-DEL is identical to Step S5-UPD, but after Verification MN1-
DEL, which is identical to Verification MN1-UPD, the MN will delete the
Binding Update List entry for the CN. The deletion phase for the protocols in
the stationary CN case is now complete.
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Appendix E
Protocol Composition Logic
(PCL)
E.1 Programming Language
names N ::= Xˆ name.
threads P ::= X thread.
keys K ::= k basic key.
k inverse key.
nonce n ::= n nonce.
numbers i ::= i number.
i1 ::= succ(i2) i1 > i2.
terms t ::= x variable term.
name(N) name.
thread(P) thread.
key(K) key.
nonce(n) nonce.
number(i) number.
t1,...,i2 tuple of terms.
ENCk{t} encrypted term.
HASHk{t} keyed hash term.
HASH{t} hashed term.
SIGk{t} signed term.
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actions a ::= send t send a term t.
receive x receive into var x.
new x generate a new term.
isLess i1,i2 check that i1 < i2.
hash m hash m.
hash m,k hash m using k.
enc m,k encrypt m using k.
dec m,k decrypt m using k.
sign m,k sign m using k.
verify m,k verify the signature.
match t1/t2 match a term.
E.2 Syntax of the Logic
Action formulas:
a::= Send(X,m) principal Xˆ has sent message m.
Receive(X,m) principal Xˆ has received message m.
New(X,t) principal Xˆ has generated new term t.
SymEnc(X,t,k) principal Xˆ has computed encrypted term t using symmetric key k.
PkEnc(X,t,k) principal Xˆ has computed encrypted term t using public key k.
SymDec(X,t,k) principal Xˆ has computed decrypted term t using symmetric key k.
PkDec(X,t,k) principal Xˆ has computed decrypted term t using its private key k.
Sign(X,t,k) principal Xˆ has signed term t using its private key k.
Verify(X,t,k) principal Xˆ has verified signed term t using public key k.
Hash(X,t,k) principal Xˆ has computed hashed term t using key k.
Hash(X,t) principal Xˆ has computed hashed term t.
IsLess(i1,i2) number i1 is less than number i2.
Formulas:
φ::= a any action formula.
a1 < a2 both actions have happened and action a2 has happened after action
a1.
φ1 ∧ φ2 both formula φ1 and formula φ2 hold
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¬ φ formula φ is false
∃x.φ formula φ exists in thread X
3 φ formula φ holds in some state in the past.
	 φ formula φ holds in the previous state.
Has(X,t) principal Xˆ possesses term t. This is because it has generated
t, has received t in the clear, or has received t under encryption
where the decryption key is known.
Start(X) principal Xˆ starts a new thread X; Xˆ did not execute any actions
in the past in this thread.
Contains(t1,t2) term t1 contains term t2 as a sub-term.
Fresh(X,t) term t generated by principal Xˆ is fresh in the sense that no
one else has seen any term containing t as a sub-term.
Gen(X,t) X is the originating thread of the term t.
FirstSend(X,t,m) principal Xˆ has sent the term t for the first time when Xˆ has
sent the message m.
Computes(X,t) principal Xˆ possesses enough information to compute term t.
Honest(Xˆ) principal Xˆ assumes a particular role of the protocol and does
exactly the actions prescribed by that role.
SafeMsg(m,s,k) every occurrence of secret s in message m is protected by key k.
SendsSafeMsg(X,s,k) ≡ ∀m.(Send(X,m) ⊃ SafeMsg(m,s,k)), all messages sent by
thread X are ‘Safe’.
SafeNet(s,k) ≡ ∀X.SendsSafeMsg(X,s,k), all messages sent by all threads are
‘Safe’.
KeyHonest(K) ≡ ∀X.∀k.∈K.(Has(X,k)⊃Honest(Xˆ)), a thread generating a se-
cret belong to honest principals.
OrigHonest(s) ≡ ∀X.(New(X,s)⊃Honest(Xˆ)), all threads with access to a rel-
evant key belong to honest principals.
KOHonest(s,K) ≡ KeyHonest(K) ∧ OrigHonest(s), the conjunction of the two
predicates.
Modal formulas:
Ψ::= θ [a]X φ this means starting from a state where formula θ is true, after
actions ‘a’ are executed by the principal Xˆ, the formula φ is
true in the resulting state.
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E.3 Proof System
Axioms for protocol actions:
AA1 φ [a]X 3 a if Xˆ has executed an action in some role, then
the corresponding predicate asserting that the
action has occurred in the past is true.
AA2 Start(X) [a]X ¬ a(X) at the start of a thread any action predicate
applied to the thread is false.
AA3 ¬Send(X,t) [b]X ¬Send(X,t), if
σSend(X,t) 6= σb for all substi-
tutions σ
the predicate asserting thread X has not sent
the term t remains false after any action that
does not send a term that unified with t.
AA4 φ [a1,...,ak ]X a1 < ... < ak after thread X does actions a1, ..., ak in se-
quence, the action predicates corresponding to
the actions are ordered in the same sequence.
AN1 New(X,t) ∧ New(Y,t) ⊃ Xˆ=Yˆ a particular nonce is generated by a unique
thread.
AN2 φ [new t]X Has(Y,t) ⊃ Yˆ=Xˆ if thread X generates a new nonce t, and does
no further actions, then no one else knows t.
AN3 φ[new t]X Fresh(X,t) if a thread generates a new value, then this
value is fresh.
AN4 Fresh(X,t) ⊃ Gen(X,t) if a fresh value t is known to a thread X, then
X is the originating thread of t.
AR1 Receive(X,p(t1)) [match p(t1) as
p(t2)]X Receive(X,p(t2))
it is used to model obtaining information about
structure of terms as they received.
AR2 a(x) [verify x,t,k]X a(SIGk{t}) it is used to model appropriate substitution of
signature verification inside the action predi-
cate a.
AR3 a(x) [m’ := dec x,t,k]X
a(ENCk{t})
it is used to model appropriate substitution of
decryption inside the action predicate a
Preservation axioms:
P1 Persist(X,t) [a]X Persist(X,t) for
Persist ∈ {Has, FirstSend, a<b,
a}
certain predicates continues to hold after fur-
ther actions.
P2 Fresh(X,t) [a]X Fresh(X,t) where
t 6⊆ a
freshness of a term holds across actions that do
not send out some term containing it.
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Possession axioms:
ORIG 3New(X,t) ⊃ Has(X,t) principal Xˆ possesses term t if Xˆ freshly gen-
erated it.
REC 3Receive(X,t) ⊃ Has(X,t) principal Xˆ possesses term t if Xˆ received it in
some message.
TUP Has(X,t1) ∧ Has(X,t1) ⊃
Has(X,(t1,t2))
principal Xˆ can construct a tuple if the parts
are known.
PROJ Has(X,(t1,t2)) ⊃ Has(X,t1) ∧
Has(X,t1)
principal Xˆ can decompose a tuple into its com-
ponents.
Temporal ordering axioms:
FS1 Fresh(X,t) [send m]X
FirstSend(X,t,m)
where t ⊆ m
if Xˆ generated a fresh term t and sent it out
in message m, then this is the first such send
event.
FS2 FirstSend(X,t,m) ∧ a(Y,t’) ⊃
Send(X,t) < a(Y,t’) where X 6=
Y and t ⊆ t’
if Yˆ did some action with a term t’, which con-
tains a term t that first sent inside a message m
by Xˆ as a sub-term, then that send must have
occurred before Yˆ ’s action.
Hash axioms:
HASH1 Computes(X,HASHk{t})⊃
Has(X,k) ∧ Has(X,t)
if a principal has hashed term t using key k, then
the principal possesses both t and k.
HASH2 Computes(X,HASHk{t})⊃
Has(X,HASHk{t})
if a principal can hash term t using key k, then
the principal possesses the hashed term.
HASH3 Receive(X,HASHk{t})⊃
∃Z,m.Computes(Z,HASHk{t})
∧Send(Z,m)∧
Contains(m,HASHk{t})
if Xˆ has received a hashed term, then there must
be another principal Zˆ that hashed and sent the
term in the past.
HASH4 Has(X,HASHk{t})⊃
Computes(X,HASHk{t})∨
∃Z,m.Computes(Z,HASHk{t})
∧Send(Z,m)∧
Contains(m,HASHk{t})
if Xˆ possesses a hashed term, then either Xˆ
hashed the term or another principal Zˆ hashed
and sent the term in the past.
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Encryption and signature axioms:
Where: Enc ∈ {SymEnc,PKEnc} and Dec ∈ {SymDec,PKDec}
SEC Honest(Xˆ) ∧ PkDec(Y,ENCk{t},k) ⊃ Yˆ=Xˆ a principal needs to possess the
private key in order to decrypt
a term encrypted with the corre-
sponding public key.
VER Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Verify(Y,SIGk{t},k) ∧ Xˆ 6= Yˆ ⊃
∃X.Send(X,m) ∧ Contains(m,SIGk{t})
a principal can not deny signing
a term (unforgeability of signa-
tures).
ENC0 [t’ := enc t,k;]X Enc(X,t,k) if a principal has encrypted term
t using key k in some role, then
the corresponding predicate as-
serting that the encryption has
occurred is true
ENC1 Has(X,t)∧Has(X,k)⊃ Computes(X,ENCk{t})
⊃ Has(X,ENCk{t})
principal Xˆ can encrypt a term t
using a key k if the term and the
key are known.
ENC2 pi(X,t,k) [a]X pi(X,t,k), for pi ∈ {Enc,¬Enc},
where either a 6= enc or a = (enc q,k’) such
that (q,k’) 6= (m,k)
the predicate asserting thread X
has (not) encrypted term t using
key k remains true after any ac-
tion that does not encrypt a term
using a key that unified with t
and k respectively.
ENC3 Computes(X,ENCk{t}) ⊃ Has(X,ENCk{t}) ⊃
Has(X,k) ∧ Has(X,t)
if a principal has encrypted term
t using key k, then the principal
possesses both t and k.
ENC4 SymDec(X,ENCk{t},k) ⊃ ∃Y.Send(Y,m) ∧
Contains(m,ENCk{t})
If Xˆ can decrypt a term that
is encrypted using a secret key
shared with Yˆ , then it must be Yˆ
that encrypted and sent the term
in the past.
PENC PKDec(X,ENCk{t},k) ⊃ ∃Z.Send(Z,m) ∧
Contains(m,ENCk{t})
if Xˆ can decrypt a term using
its private key, then there must
be another principal Zˆ that en-
crypted and sent the term in the
past.
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Secrecy axioms:
SAF1 SafeMsg(m0.m1,s,k) ≡ SafeMsg(m0,s,k) ∧ SafeMsg(m1,s,k)
SAF2 SafeMsg(ENCk{m},s,k) ≡ SafeMsg(m,s,k) ∨ k ∈ K
SAF3 SafeMsg(ENCk{m},s,k) ≡ SafeMsg(m,s,k) ∨ k ∈ K
SAF4 SafeMsg(HASH{m},s,k)
SAF5 SafeMsg(HASHk{m},s,k)
SAF6 SafeMsg(SIGk{m},s,k)
SH0 Safe(m’,HASHk{m}) , m’ is an atomic term different from m
SH1 Safe(m’.m”,HASHk{m}) ≡ Safe(m’,HASHk{m}) ∧ Safe(m”,HASHk{m})
SH2 Safe(SIGk′{m’},HASHk{m}) ≡ Safe(m’,HASHk{m})
SH3 Safe(ENCk′{m’},HASHk{m}) ≡ Safe(m’,HASHk{m})
SH4 Safe(HASHk′{m’},HASHk{m}) ≡ k6=k’ ∨ m’ 6=m
SH5 Safe(ENCk′{m’},HASHk{m}) ≡ Safe(m’,HASHk{m})
HPOS SafeNet(HASHk{m}) ∧ Has(X,HASHk{m}) ⊃ Has(X,k)
Induction rule:
NET ∀p ∈ Q.∀P ∈ BS(p).
SafeNet(s,k) [P]X Honest(Xˆ) ∧ φ ⊃ SendsSafeMsg(X,s,k)
Q ` KOHonest(s,k) ∧ φ ⊃ SafeNet(s,k)
NET0 SafeNet(s,k) []X SendsSafeMsg(X,s,k)
NET1 SafeNet(s,k) [receive m]X SafeMsg(m,s,k)
NET2 SendsSafeMsg(X,s,k) [a]X SendsSafeMsg(X,s,k), where a is not a send.
NET3 SendsSafeMsg(X,s,k) [send m]X SafeMsg(m,s,k) ⊃ SendsSafeMsg(X,s,k)
POS SafeNet(s,k) ∧ Has(X,m) ∧ ¬SafeMsg(m,s,k)⊃ ∃k ∈ K.Has(X,k) ∨ New(X,s)
POSL ψ ∧ SafeNet(s,k) [P]X SendsSafeMsg(X,s,k) ∧ Has(Y,m) ∧ ¬SafeMsg(m,s,k)
ψ ∧ SafeNet(s,k) [P]X ∃k ∈ K.Has(Y,k) ∨ New(Y,s)
, where P is any basic sequence of actions
Honesty rule:
HON Start(X) []X φ ∀ p ∈ Q.∀ P ∈ BS(p).φ [P]X φ
Honest(Xˆ) ⊃ φ
, where P is any basic sequence of actions
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Formal Verification using PCL
F.1 CRE-SK Phase.
This section presents a formal correctness proof of the CRE-SK phase using the
PCL method. It first models the CRE-SK phase using a simple “protocol pro-
gramming language”. It then formulates the security properties that the phase
ought to satisfy from the CN’s point of view. Finally, it proves the correctness of
the phase.
Modelling the CRE-SK phase
SK : MobileNode = (MN, HˆA, CˆN , LTBRem, LTBReq , HoA, CoA, CNA, Ack, KMN−HA)
[ new Cookie; msg1 := CoA, Cookie; send MˆN , CˆN , msg1;
receive CˆN , MˆN , msg2; match msg2/Cookie, J, Token2; match Cookie/Cookie;
new seq; ENC3 := enc HoA || CoA || LTBRem || CNA || seq || LTBReq || J || Token2, KMN−HA;
msg3 := ENC3; send MˆN , HˆA, msg3;
receive HˆA, MˆN , msg4; match msg4/ENC4; DEC4 := dec ENC4, KMN−HA;
match DEC4/CNA, Seq, KBC1; match seq/seq;
receive CˆN , MˆN , msg6; match msg6/seq, LTBGrant, ENC6, macEBA; match seq/seq;
KMN−CN := dec ENC6, KBC1;
match macEBA/hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seq || LTBGrant, KMN−CN );
new seqnew such that seqnew := succ(seq);
macBCC := hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KMN−CN );
msg7 := HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBCC ; send MˆN , CˆN , msg7;
receive CˆN , MˆN , msg8; match msg8/seqnew, LTBGrant, macBA; match seqnew/seqnew;
match macBA/hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew || LTBGrant, KMN−CN );
]MN
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SK : HomeAgent = (HA, idHA, LTBRem, HoA, CoA, KMN−HA, KHA−CN )
[ receive MˆN , HˆA, msg3; match msg3/ENC3; DEC3 := dec ENC3, KMN−HA;
match DEC3/HoA, CoA, LTBRem, CNA, seq, LTBReq , J, Token2;
match HoA/HoA; match CoA/CoA; match LTBRem/LTBRem; isLess(LTBReq , LTBRem);
new NHA1; KBC1 := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NHA1, KHA−CN );
new NHA2; KBC2 := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NHA2, KHA−CN );
ENC4 := enc CNA || seq || KBC1, KMN−HA; msg4 := ENC4; send HˆA, MˆN , msg4;
macEBC := hash(HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq , KBC2);
msg5 := HoA, CoA, idHA, NHA1, NHA2, seq, LTBReq , J, Token2, macEBC ; send HˆA, CˆN , msg5;
]HA
SK : CorrespondentNode = (CN, CNA, LTBGrant, KCN , idHA, KHA−CN )
[ receive MˆN , CˆN , msg1; match msg1/CoA, Cookie;
new J; new NJ ; Token2 := hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN );
msg2 := Cookie, J, Token2; send CˆN , MˆN , msg2;
receive HˆA, CˆN , msg5; match msg5/HoA, CoA, idHA, NHA1, NHA2, seq, LTBReq , J, Token2, macEBC ;
match Token2/hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN );
KBC1 := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NHA1, KHA−CN );
KBC2 := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NHA2, KHA−CN );
match macEBC/hash(HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq , KBC2);
new KMN−CN ; ENC6 := enc KMN−CN , KBC1;
macEBA := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seq || LTBGrant, KMN−CN );
msg6 := seq, LTBGrant, ENC6, macEBA; send CˆN , MˆN , msg6;
receive MˆN , CˆN , msg7; match msg7/HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBCC ;
match HoA/HoA; match CoA/CoA; isLess(seq, seqnew);
match macBCC/hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KMN−CN );
macBA := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew || LTBGrant, KMN−CN );
msg8 := seqnew, LTBGrant, macBA; send CˆN ,MˆN , msg8;
]CN
Table F.1: CRE-SK phase written in PCL language
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Security Properties
(1) Session Authentication for the CN
φSK,CN−auth ::= Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ⊃
∃(MˆN ∧ HˆA).ActionsInOrder(
Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1), Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2),
Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2), Send(MN, MˆN , HˆA, msg3),
Receive(HA, MˆN , HˆA, msg3), Send(HA, HˆA, MˆN , msg4),
Send(HA, HˆA, CˆN , msg5),
(Receive(MN, HˆA, MˆN , msg4) ∧ Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg5)),
Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg6), Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg6),
Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7), Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7),
Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg8))
(2) Key Secrecy for the CN
φSK,CN−sec ::= Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KMN−CN )) ⊃
Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = MˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
CN Security Guarantee (Session Authentication and Key Secrecy )
ΓSK1 ∧ ΓSK2 ∧ θSK1 ∧ θSK2 `[SK : CorrespondentNode]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA)
∧ CˆN 6= MˆN 6= HˆA ⊃ φSK,CN−auth ∧ φSK,CN−sec
θSK1 := (Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KMN−HA)) ⊃ Zˆ = MˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
θSK2 := (Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KHA−CN )) ⊃ Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
ΓSK1 := Computes(Zˆ, HASH(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || CNA || NHA1, KHA−CN )) ⊃
¬(Send(Zˆ, m) ∧ Contains(m, HASH(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || CNA || NHA1, KHA−CN )))
ΓSK2 := Computes(Zˆ, HASH(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || CNA || NHA2, KHA−CN )) ⊃
¬(Send(Zˆ, m) ∧ Contains(m, HASH(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || CNA || NHA2, KHA−CN )))
Table F.2: CRE-SK phase preconditions and invariants
275
APPENDIX F. FORMAL VERIFICATION USING PCL
Proof of Session Authentication for the CN
AA1, AR1,
AA4
[SK : CorrespondentNode]CN Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN ,
msg2) < Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg5) < Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg6) < Receive(CN, MˆN ,
CˆN , msg7) < Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg8)
(1)
AN3 [new NJ ; Token2 := hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN );]CN Fresh(CN, Token2)
(2)
(2), FS1, P1 [new J; new NJ ; Token2 := hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN ); msg2 := Cookie, J, Token2; send
CˆN , MˆN , msg2;]CN FirstSend(CN, Token2, msg2)
(3)
(1), (3), FS2 [new J; new NJ ; Token2 := hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN ); msg2 := Cookie, J, Token2; send
CˆN , MˆN , msg2;]CN Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2) ∧ MˆN 6= CˆN ⊃ Send(CN, CˆN ,
MˆN , msg2) < Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2)
(4)
AR1,
HASH3,
ΓSK2
θSK2 [receive HˆA, CˆN , msg5; match msg5/HoA, CoA, idHA, NHA1, NHA2, seq, LTBReq ,
J, Token2, macEBC ; match Token2/hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN ); KBC1 := hash(HoA
|| CoA || CNA || NHA1, KHA−CN ); KBC2 := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NHA2,
KHA−CN ); match macEBC/hash(HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq ,
KBC2);]CN Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , HoA, CoA, idHA, NHA1, NHA2, seq, LTBReq , J,
Token2, HASHkBC2{HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq} ⊃
(∃X.Has(X, HASHkBC2{HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq}) ∧
Send(X, HASHkBC2{HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq})) ∧ (Send(X,
HASHkBC2{HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq}) < Receive(CN, HˆA,
CˆN , msg5))
(5)
(5), HASH4 Has(X, HASHkBC2{HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq}) ⊃ Computes(X,
HASHkBC2{HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq}) ∨ ∃Y,m.Computes(Y,
HASHkBC2{HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq}) ∧ Send(Y, m) ∧
Contains(m, HASHkBC2{HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq})
(6)
(6), HASH1 Computes(Z, HASHkBC2{HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq}) ⊃ Has(Zˆ,
KBC2) ∧ Has(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq)
(7)
(7), ΓSK2 θSK2 [receive HˆA, CˆN , msg5; match msg5/HoA, CoA, idHA, NHA1, NHA2, seq, LTBReq ,
J, Token2, macEBC ; match Token2/hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN ); KBC1 := hash(HoA ||
CoA || CNA || NHA1, KHA−CN ); KBC2 := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NHA2, KHA−CN );
match macEBC/hash(HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq , KBC2);]CN
Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KBC2) ⊃ Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
(8)
(5), (8) θSK2 [receive HˆA, CˆN , msg5; match msg5/HoA, CoA, idHA, NHA1, NHA2, seq, LTBReq ,
J, Token2, macEBC ; match Token2/hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN ); KBC1 := hash(HoA ||
CoA || CNA || NHA1, KHA−CN ); KBC2 := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || NHA2, KHA−CN );
match macEBC/hash(HoA || CoA || idHA || NHA1 || NHA2 || seq || LTBReq , KBC2);]CN
Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ⊃ Send(HA, HˆA, CˆN , msg5) < Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg5)
(9)
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AN3, ΓSK1 [new KMN−CN ; ENC6 := enc KMN−CN , KBC1;]CN Fresh(CN, ENC6)
(10)
(10), FS1, P1 [new KMN−CN ; ENC6 := enc KMN−CN , KBC1; macEBA := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA ||
seq || LTBGrant, KMN−CN ); msg6 := seq, LTBGrant, ENC6, macEBA; send CˆN , MˆN ,
msg6;]CN FirstSend(CN, ENC6, msg6)
(11)
(1), (11), FS2 [new KMN−CN ; ENC6 := enc KMN−CN , KBC1; macEBA := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA ||
seq || LTBGrant, KMN−CN ); msg6 := seq, LTBGrant, ENC6, macEBA; send CˆN , MˆN ,
msg6;]CN Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg6) ∧ MˆN 6= CˆN ⊃ Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg6)
< Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg6)
(12)
AR1,
HASH3,
ΓSK1
θSK1 ∧ θSK2 [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg7; match msg7/HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq ,
Ack, macBCC ; match HoA/HoA; match CoA/CoA; isLess(seq, seqnew); match
macBCC/hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KMN−CN );]CN Receive(CN,
MˆN , CˆN , HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew ||
LTBReq || Ack} ⊃
(∃X.Has(X, HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ∧ Send(X,
HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack})) ∧ (Send(X, HASHkMN−CN {HoA
|| CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) < Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7))
(13)
(13), HASH4 Has(X, HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ⊃ Computes(X,
HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ∨ ∃Y,m.Computes(Y,
HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ∧ Send(Y, m) ∧ Contains(m,
HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack})
(14)
(14), HASH1 Computes(Z, HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ⊃ Has(Zˆ,
KMN−CN ) ∧ Has(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack)
(15)
(15),
φSK,CN−sec
θSK1 ∧ θSK2 [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg7; match msg7/HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq ,
Ack, macBCC ; match HoA/HoA; match CoA/CoA; isLess(seq, seqnew); match
macBCC/hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KMN−CN );]CN Honest(CˆN)
∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KMN−CN ) ⊃ Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = MˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
(16)
(13), (16) θSK1 ∧ θSK2 [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg7; match msg7/HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq ,
Ack, macBCC ; match HoA/HoA; match CoA/CoA; isLess(seq, seqnew); match
macBCC/hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KMN−CN );]CN Honest(CˆN)
∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ⊃ Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7) < Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN ,
msg7)
(17)
(1), HON Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ⊃ Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN ,
msg2) < Send(MN, MˆN , HˆA, msg3) < Receive(HA, MˆN , HˆA, msg3) < Send(HA, HˆA,
MˆN , msg4) < Send(HA, HˆA, CˆN , msg5) < (Receive(MN, HˆA, MˆN , msg4) ∧ Receive(CN,
HˆA, CˆN , msg5)) < Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg6) < Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7)
(18)
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(1), (4), (9),
(12), (17),
(18)
θSK1 ∧ θSK2 [CorrespondentNode]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧
Honest(HˆA) ⊃ Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2) <
Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2) < Send(MN, MˆN , HˆA, msg3) <
Receive(HA, MˆN , HˆA, msg3) < Send(HA, HˆA, MˆN , msg4) <
Send(HA, HˆA, CˆN , msg5) <
(Receive(MN, HˆA, MˆN , msg4) ∧ Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg5)) <
Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg6) < Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg6) <
Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7) < Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7) <
Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg8)) ⊃ φSK,CN−auth
(19)
F.2 CRE-PK Phase.
This section presents a formal correctness proof of the CRE-PK phase using
the PCL method. It first models the CRE-PK phase using a simple “protocol
programming language”. It then formulates the security properties that the phase
ought to satisfy from the CN’s point of view. Finally, it proves the correctness of
the phase.
Modelling the CRE-PK phase
PK : MobileNode = (MN, HˆA, CˆN , LTBRem, LTBReq , HoA, CoA, CNA, Ack, KMN−HA)
[ new Cookie; msg1 := CoA, Cookie; send MˆN ,CˆN , msg1;
receive CˆN , MˆN , msg2; match msg2/Cookie, J, Token2; match Cookie/Cookie;
KBM := hash(Token2); new seq;
ENC3 := enc HoA || CoA || LTBRem || CNA || seq || LTBReq || J || KBM , KMN−HA;
msg3 := ENC3; send MˆN , HˆA, msg3;
receive HˆA, MˆN , msg6; match msg6/ENC6; DEC6 := dec ENC6, KMN−HA;
match DEC6/CNA, seq, LTBGrant, KMN−CN ; match seq/seq;
new seqnew such that seqnew := succ(seq);
macBCC := hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KMN−CN );
msg7 := HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBCC ; send MˆN , CˆN , msg7;
receive CˆN , MˆN , msg8; match msg8/seqnew, LTBGrant, macBA; match seqnew/seqnew;
match macBA/hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew || LTBGrant, KMN−CN );
]MN
PK : HomeAgent = (HA, LTBRem, HoA, CoA, KMN−HA, skH , CertH)
[ receive MˆN , HˆA, msg3; match msg3/ENC3; DEC3 := dec ENC3, KMN−HA;
match DEC3/HoA, CoA, LTBRem, CNA, seq, LTBReq , J, KBM ;
match HoA/HoA; match CoA/CoA; match LTBRem/LTBRem; isLess(LTBReq , LTBRem);
new NHA; macEBC := hash(CoA || NHA || seq || LTBReq , KBM );
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SIGskH := sign(hash(CoA || NHA || seq || LTBReq , skH);
msg4 := HoA, CoA, NHA, seq, LTBReq , J, macEBC , SIGskH , CertH ; send HˆA, CˆN , msg4;
receive CˆN , HˆA, msg5; match msg5/NHA, seq, LTBGrant, ENC5,macEBA;
match NHA/NHA; match macEBA/hash(NHA || seq || LTBGrant || ENC5, KBM );
keys := dec ENC5, skH ; match keys as KMN−CN || KHA−CN ;
ENC6 := enc CNA || seq || LTBGrant || KMN−CN , KMN−HA;
msg6 := ENC6; send HˆA, MˆN , msg6;
]HA
PK : CorrespondentNode = (CN, CNA, LTBGrant, KCN )
[ receive MˆN , CˆN , msg1; match msg1/CoA, Cookie;
new J; new NJ ; Token2 := hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN );
msg2 := Cookie, J, Token2; send CˆN , MˆN , msg2;
receive HˆA, CˆN , msg4; match msg4/HoA, CoA, NHA, seq, LTBReq , J, macEBC , SIGskH , CertH ;
Token2 := hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN ); KBM := hash(Token2);
match macEBC/hash(CoA || NHA || seq || LTBReq , KBM );
verify SIGskH , pkH ; new KMN−CN ; new KHA−CN ;
ENC5 := enc KMN−CN || KHA−CN , pkH ;
macEBA := hash(NHA || seq || LTBGrant || ENC5, KBM );
msg5 := NHA, seq, LTBGrant, ENC5, macEBA; send CˆN , HˆA, msg5;
receive MˆN , CˆN , msg7; match msg7/HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBCC ;
match HoA/HoA; match CoA/CoA; isLess(seq, seqnew);
match macBCC/hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KMN−CN );
macBA := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew || LTBGrant, KMN−CN );
msg8 := seqnew, LTBGrant, macBA; send CˆN ,MˆN , msg8;
]CN
Table F.3: CRE-PK phase written in PCL language
Security Properties
(1) Session Authentication for the CN
φSK,CN−auth ::= Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ⊃
∃(MˆN ∧ HˆA).ActionsInOrder(
Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1), Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2),
Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2), Send(MN, MˆN , HˆA, msg3),
Receive(HA, MˆN , HˆA, msg3), Send(HA, HˆA, CˆN , msg4),
Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg4), Send(CN, CˆN , HˆA, msg5),
Receive(HA, CˆN , HˆA, msg5), Send(HA, HˆA, MˆN , msg6),
Receive(MN, HˆA, MˆN , msg6), Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7),
Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7), Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg8))
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(2) Key Secrecy for the CN
φPK,CN−sec1 ::= Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KMN−CN ) ⊃
Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = MˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
φPK,CN−sec2 ::= Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KHA−CN ) ⊃
Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
CN Security Guarantee (Session Authentication and Key Secrecy )
θPK `[PK : CorrespondentNode]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA)
∧ CˆN 6= MˆN 6= HˆA ⊃ φPK,CN−auth ∧ φPK,CN−sec1 ∧ φPK,CN−sec2
θPK := Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KMN−HA) ⊃ Zˆ = MˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
Table F.4: CRE-PK phase preconditions
Proof of Session Authentication for the CN
AA1, AR1,
AA4
[PK : CorrespondentNode]CN Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN ,
msg2) < Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg4) < Send(CN, CˆN , HˆA, msg5) < Receive(CN, MˆN ,
CˆN , msg7) < Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg8)
(1)
AN3 [new NJ ; Token2 := hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN );]CN Fresh(CN, Token2)
(2)
(2), FS1, P1 [new J; new NJ ; Token2 := hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN ); msg2 := Cookie, J, Token2; send
CˆN , MˆN , msg2;]CN FirstSend(CN, Token2, msg2)
(3)
(1), (3), FS2 [new J; new NJ ; Token2 := hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN ); msg2 := Cookie, J, Token2; send
CˆN , MˆN , msg2;]CN Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2) ∧ MˆN 6= CˆN ⊃ Send(CN, CˆN ,
MˆN , msg2) < Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2)
(4)
AR1, AR2,
VER
[receive HˆA, CˆN , msg4; match msg4/HoA, CoA, NHA, seq, LTBReq , J, macEBC ,
SIGskH , CertH ; Token2 := hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN ); KBM := hash(Token2); match
macEBC/hash(CoA || NHA || seq || LTBReq , KBM ); verify SIGskH , pkH ;]CN Re-
ceive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , HoA, CoA, NHA, seq, LTBReq , J, HASHkBM {CoA || NHA || seq
|| LTBReq}, SIGskH {CoA || NHA || seq || LTBReq} ⊃
(∃X.Send(X, SIGskH {CoA || NHA || seq || LTBReq}) ∧ Send(X, SIGskH {CoA || NHA ||
seq || LTBReq}) < Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg4))
(5)
(5) [receive HˆA, CˆN , msg4; match msg4/HoA, CoA, NHA, seq, LTBReq , J, macEBC ,
SIGskH , CertH ; Token2 := hash(CoA || NJ || 1, KCN ); KBM := hash(Token2);
match macEBC/hash(CoA || NHA || seq || LTBReq , KBM ); verify SIGskH , pkH ;]CN
Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ⊃ Send(HA, HˆA, CˆN , msg4) < Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg4)
(6)
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AN3 [new KMN−CN ; new KHA−CN ; ENC5 := enc KMN−CN || KHA−CN , pkH ;]CN
Fresh(CN, ENC5)
(7)
(7), FS1, P1 [new KMN−CN ; new KHA−CN ; ENC5 := enc KMN−CN || KHA−CN , pkH ; macEBA
:= hash(NHA || seq || LTBGrant || ENC5, KBM ); msg5 := NHA, seq, LTBGrant, ENC5,
macEBA; send CˆN , HˆA, msg5;]CN FirstSend(CN, ENC5, msg5)
(8)
(1), (8), FS2 [new KMN−CN ; new KHA−CN ; ENC5 := enc KMN−CN || KHA−CN , pkH ; macEBA
:= hash(NHA || seq || LTBGrant || ENC5, KBM ); msg5 := NHA, seq, LTBGrant, ENC5,
macEBA; send CˆN , HˆA, msg5;]CN Receive(HA, CˆN , HˆA, msg5) ∧ HˆA 6= CˆN ⊃
Send(CN, CˆN , HˆA, msg5) < Receive(HA, CˆN , HˆA, msg5)
(9)
AR1,
HASH3
θPK [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg7; match msg7/HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBCC ;
match HoA/HoA; match CoA/CoA; isLess(seq, seqnew); match macBCC/hash(HoA || CoA
|| seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KMN−CN );]CN Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , HoA, CoA, seqnew,
LTBReq , Ack, HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack} ⊃
(∃X.Has(X, HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ∧ Send(X,
HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack})) ∧ (Send(X, HASHkMN−CN {HoA
|| CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) < Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7))
(10)
(10), HASH4 Has(X, HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ⊃ Computes(X,
HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ∨ ∃Y,m.Computes(Y,
HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ∧ Send(Y, m) ∧ Contains(m,
HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack})
(11)
(11), HASH1 Computes(Z, HASHkMN−CN {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ⊃ Has(Zˆ,
KMN−CN ) ∧ Has(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack)
(12)
(12),
φPK,CN−sec1
θPK [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg7; match msg7/HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBCC ;
match HoA/HoA; match CoA/CoA; isLess(seq, seqnew); match macBCC/hash(HoA || CoA
|| seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KMN−CN );]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Honest(MˆN)
∧ Has(Zˆ, KMN−CN ) ⊃ Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = MˆN ∨ Zˆ = HˆA
(13)
(10), (13) θPK [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg7; match msg7/HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBCC ;
match HoA/HoA; match CoA/CoA; isLess(seq, seqnew); match macBCC/hash(HoA || CoA
|| seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KMN−CN );]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ∧ Honest(MˆN)
⊃ Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7) < Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7)
(14)
(1), HON Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA) ⊃ Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN ,
msg2) < Send(MN, MˆN , HˆA, msg3) < Receive(HA, MˆN , HˆA, msg3) < Send(HA, HˆA,
CˆN , msg4) < Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg4)) < Receive(HA, CˆN , HˆA, msg5) < Send(HA,
HˆA, MˆN , msg6) < Receive(MN, HˆA, MˆN , msg6) < Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7)
(15)
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(1), (4), (6),
(9), (14),
(15)
θPK [CorrespondentNode]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Honest(HˆA)
⊃ Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2) <
Receive(MN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2) < Send(MN, MˆN , HˆA, msg3) <
Receive(HA, MˆN , HˆA, msg3) < Send(HA, HˆA, CˆN , msg4) <
Receive(CN, HˆA, CˆN , msg4) < Send(CN, CˆN , HˆA, msg5) <
Receive(HA, CˆN , HˆA, msg5) < Send(HA, HˆA, MˆN , msg6) <
Receive(MN, HˆA, MˆN , msg6) < Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7) <
Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg7) < Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg8) ⊃ φPK,CN−auth
(16)
F.3 DEL Phase.
This section presents a formal correctness proof of the DEL phase using the PCL
method. It first models the DEL phase using a simple “protocol programming
language”. It then formulates the security properties that the phase ought to
satisfy from the CN’s point of view. Finally, it proves the correctness of the
phase.
Modelling the DEL phase
DEL : MobileNode = (MN, CˆN , LTBReq , HoA, CoA, CNA, Ack, seq, KMN−CN )
[ new seqnew such that seqnew := succ(seq); CoA := HoA; LTBReq := 0;
KBM := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN );
macBU := hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KBM );
msg1 := HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBU ; send MˆN , CˆN , msg1;
receive CˆN , MˆN , msg2; match msg2 / seqnew, macBA; match seqnew / seqnew;
match macBA / hash(HoA || CNA || seqnew, KBM );
]MN
DEL : CorrespondentNode = (CN, CNA, KMN−CN )
[ receive MˆN , CˆN , msg1;
match msg1 / HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBU ;
isLess(seq, seqnew); match CoA/HoA; match LTBReq/0;
KBM := hash(HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN );
match macBU / hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack, KBM );
macBA := hash(HoA || CNA || seqnew, KBM );
msg2 := seqnew, macBA; send CˆN , MˆN , msg2;
]CN
Table F.5: DEL phase written in PCL language
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Security Properties
(1) Session Authentication for the CN
φDEL,CN−auth ::= Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ⊃
∃ MˆN .ActionsInOrder(
Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1),
Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1),
Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2))
(2) Key Secrecy for the CN
φDEL,CN−sec ::= Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KBM ) ⊃ Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = MˆN
CN Security Guarantee (Session Authentication and Key Secrecy )
ΓDEL ∧ θDEL1 `[DEL : CorrespondentNode]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ CˆN 6= MˆN
⊃ φDEL,CN−auth ∧ φDEL,CN−sec
θDEL := (Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KMN−CN )) ⊃ Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = MˆN
ΓDEL := Computes(Zˆ, HASH(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN )) ⊃
¬(Send(Zˆ, m) ∧ Contains(m, HASH(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN )))
Table F.6: DEL phase preconditions and invariants
Proof of Session Authentication for the CN
AA1, AR1,
AA4
[DEL : CorrespondentNode]CN Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN ,
msg2)
(1)
AR1,
HASH3,
ΓDEL
θDEL [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg1; match msg1 / HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBU ;
isLess(seq, seqnew); match CoA/HoA; match LTBReq/0; KBM := hash(HoA || CoA ||
CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN ); match macBU / hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack,
KBM );]CN Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, HASHkBM {HoA
|| CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack} ⊃
(∃X.Has(X, HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ∧ Send(X,
HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack})) ∧ (Send(X, HASHkBM {HoA || CoA
|| seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) < Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1))
(2)
(2), HASH4 Has(X, HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ⊃ Computes(X,
HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ∨ ∃Y,m.Computes(Y,
HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ∧ Send(Y, m) ∧ Contains(m,
HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack})
(3)
(3), HASH1 Computes(Z, HASHkBM {HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack}) ⊃ Has(Zˆ, KBM ) ∧
Has(Zˆ, HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack)
(4)
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(4),
φDEL,CN−sec
θDEL [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg1; match msg1 / HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBU ;
isLess(seq, seqnew); match CoA/HoA; match LTBReq/0; KBM := hash(HoA || CoA ||
CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN ); match macBU / hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack,
KBM );]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ∧ Has(Zˆ, KBM ) ⊃ Zˆ = CˆN ∨ Zˆ = MˆN
(5)
(2), (5) θDEL [receive MˆN , CˆN , msg1; match msg1 / HoA, CoA, seqnew, LTBReq , Ack, macBU ;
isLess(seq, seqnew); match CoA/HoA; match LTBReq/0; KBM := hash(HoA || CoA ||
CNA || seqnew, KMN−CN ); match macBU / hash(HoA || CoA || seqnew || LTBReq || Ack,
KBM );]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ⊃ Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Receive(CN,
MˆN , CˆN , msg1)
(6)
(1), (6) θDEL [CorrespondentNode]CN Honest(CˆN) ∧ Honest(MˆN) ⊃ Send(MN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1)
< Receive(CN, MˆN , CˆN , msg1) < Send(CN, CˆN , MˆN , msg2))) ⊃ φDEL,CN−auth
(7)
284
Appendix G
Formal Protocol Verification
using Casper/FDR2
G.1 CRE-SK Phase.
This section presents a formal verification of the CRE-SK phase using the Casper-
/FDR2 model checker. It presents a Casper script that specifies the CRE-SK
phase and its security properties.
# Free variables
mn : MNode
cn : CNode
ha : HomeAgent
hoa, coa : IPv6Address
cookie, token, nha1 : Nonce
kmnha, khacn, kmncn : SessionKey
k : SessionKey x IPv6Address x IPv6Address x Nonce → Key
kbc1 : Key
InverseKeys = (kmnha, kmnha), (khacn, khacn), (kmncn, kmncn), (kbc1, kbc1), (k, k)
HMAC : HashFunction
#Processes
MOBILENODE(mn, cn, ha, hoa, coa, cookie, kmnha) knows HMAC
CORRESNODE(cn, khacn, kmncn, token, nha1) knows HMAC, k
HOMEAGENT(ha, cn, hoa, coa, nha1, kmnha, khacn) knows HMAC, k
# Protocol description
0. → mn : cn
1. mn → cn : cookie
2. cn → mn : cookie, token
3. mn → ha : {hoa, coa}{kmnha}
<kbc1 := k(khacn, hoa, coa, nha1)>
4. ha → mn : {hoa, coa, kbc1}{kmnha}
5. ha → cn : hoa, coa, nha1, HMAC(khacn, hoa, coa, nha1)
<kbc1 := k(khacn, hoa, coa, nha1)>
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6. cn → mn : hoa, coa, {kmncn}{kbc1}, HMAC(kbc1, hoa, coa)
7. mn → cn : hoa, coa, HMAC(kmncn, hoa, coa)
8. cn → mn : hoa, coa, HMAC(kmncn, hoa, coa)
# Specification
Agreement(mn, cn,[hoa, coa])
Agreement(ha, cn,[hoa, coa])
Secret(cn, kmncn,[mn, ha])
# Actual variables
MN, Mallory : MNode
CN : CNode
HA : HomeAgent
HoA, CoA, MalA : IPv6Address
Cookie, Token, Nha1, Nm : Nonce
Kmnha, Khacn, Kmncn, Kmala : SessionKey
Kbc1 : Key
InverseKeys = (Kmnha, Kmnha), (Khacn, Khacn), (Kmncn, Kmncn), (Kbc1, Kbc1), (Kmala, Kmala)
# Functions
symbolic k
# System
MOBILENODE(MN, CN, HA, HoA, CoA, Cookie, Kmnha)
CORRESNODE(CN, Khacn, Kmncn, Token, Nha1)
HOMEAGENT(HA, CN, HoA, CoA, Nha1, Kmnha, Khacn)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {MN, CN, HA, Mallory, HoA, CoA, MalA, Nm, Kmala}
G.2 CRE-PK Phase.
This section presents a formal verification of the CRE-PK phase using the Casper-
/FDR2 model checker. It presents a Casper script that specifies the CRE-PK
phase and its security properties.
# Free variables
mn : MNode
cn : CNode
ha : HomeAgent
hoa, coa : IPv6Address
cookie, token : Nonce
pkh : PubKey
skh : SecKey
kmnha, khacn, kmncn : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (pkh, skh), (kmnha, kmnha), (khacn, khacn), (kmncn, kmncn)
HMAC : HashFunction
# Processes
MOBILENODE(mn, cn, ha, hoa, coa, cookie, kmnha) knows HMAC
CORRESNODE(cn, token, khacn, kmncn, pkh) knows HMAC
HOMEAGENT(ha, hoa, coa, kmnha, pkh, skh) knows HMAC
# Protocol description
0. → mn : cn
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1. mn → cn : cookie
2. cn → mn : cookie, token
3. mn → ha : {hoa, coa, cn, token}{kmnha}
4. ha → cn : {hoa, coa, token}{skh}
5. cn → ha : hoa, coa, {khacn, kmncn}{pkh}
6. ha → mn : {hoa, coa, cn, kmncn}{kmnha}
7. mn → cn : hoa, coa, HMAC(kmncn, hoa, coa)
8. cn → mn : hoa, coa, HMAC(kmncn, hoa, coa)
# Specification
Agreement(mn, cn, [hoa, coa, kmncn])
Agreement(ha, cn, [hoa, coa, khacn])
Secret(ha, khacn, [cn])
Secret(mn, kmncn, [cn])
# Actual variables MN, Mallory : MNode
CN : CNode
HA : HomeAgent
HoA, CoA, MalA : IPv6Address
Cookie, Token, Nha1, Nha2, Nm : Nonce
Pkh : PubKey
Skh : SecKey
Kmnha, Khacn, Kmncn, Kmala : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Kmnha, Kmnha),(Khacn, Khacn),(Kmncn, Kmncn),(Pkh, Skh),(Kmala, Kmala)
# System
MOBILENODE(MN, CN, HA, HoA, CoA, Cookie, Kmnha)
CORRESNODE(CN, Token, Khacn, Kmncn, Pkh)
HOMEAGENT(HA, HoA, CoA, Kmnha, Pkh, Skh)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {MN, CN, HA, Mallory, HoA, CoA, MalA, Nm, Kmala}
G.3 DEL Phase.
This section presents a formal verification of the DEL phase using the Casper-
/FDR2 model checker. It presents a Casper script that specifies the DEL phase
and its security properties.
# Free variables
mn : MNode
cn : CNode
hoa, coa : IPv6Address
seq1 : SequenceNumber
kmncn : SessionKey
k : SessionKey x IPv6Address → Key
kbm : Key
InverseKeys = (kmncn, kmncn), (kbm, kbm)
HMAC : HashFunction
# Processes
MOBILENODE(mn, cn, hoa, coa, seq1, kmncn) knows HMAC, k
CORRESNODE(cn, kmncn) knows HMAC, k
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# Protocol description
0. → mn : cn
<kbm := k(kmncn, hoa) >
1. mn → cn : hoa, coa, seq1, HMAC (kmncn, hoa, coa, seq1)
<kbm := k(kmncn, hoa) >
2. cn → mn : hoa, HMAC (kmncn, hoa)
# Specification
Agreement(mn, cn, [hoa, coa, kbm])
Secret(mn, kbm, [cn])
# Actual variables
MN, Mallory : MNode
CN : CNode
HoA, CoA, MalA : IPv6Address
Seq1, Seqm : SequenceNumber
Kmncn, Kmala : SessionKey
Kbm : Key
InverseKeys = (Kmncn, Kmncn), (Kbm, Kbm), (Kmala, Kmala)
# Functions
symbolic k
# System
MOBILENODE(MN, CN, HoA, CoA, Seq1, Kmncn)
CORRESNODE(CN, Kmncn)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {MN, CN, Mallory, HoA, CoA, Seqm, MalA, Kmala}
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